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In his 1934 book After Strange Gods, T. S. Eliot declared blasphemy obsolete. There could 
be no blasphemy worth the name, he reasoned, in a world that had lost its faith in God. Yet 
recent scholarship in sociology and across the humanities has sharply questioned the once-
dominant narrative of modern secularization on which Eliot’s thesis depends. More 
importantly, the writers of Eliot’s own generation contested that thesis persistently in their 
poems and fictions. Far from obsolete, that is, blasphemy was in fact a driving force behind 
literary modernism, and not just in the figurative sense in which scholars have long described 
the period’s artistic provocations as “heretical” or “iconoclastic.” This dissertation reveals the 
extent to which blasphemy, in its full religious sense, accounts for the aesthetic and ideological 
content of works by writers such as James Joyce, Mina Loy, Langston Hughes, Richard Bruce 
Nugent, and Djuna Barnes.  
These and other writers of the period tended to view their modernist experiments as 
blasphemously godlike efforts to unite Word, Spirit, and Flesh—which helps to explain why the 
Black Mass and related sacrilegious rites carry such currency in the modernist imagination. It 
also accounts for the pervasive presence of Christ figures in these texts, usually rendered in 
highly heterodox forms: as Irish Jews, as lesbian prophets, as lynched black bodies and 
messianic “New Negroes.”Apart from their aesthetic functions, these personae suggest a 
politics of irreverence that has been largely neglected by studies of religion in modernism. 
Respecting no division of church and state, modernist writers commonly use the language and 
  
 
    
tropes of religious desecration to profane all manner of repressive dogmas—including 
prevailing secular ideologies of race, class, nation, empire, gender, and sexuality. Their 
blasphemies thus acquire special resonance in the context of broader cultural and ideological 
concerns that in recent years have enriched the scope of modernist studies. By concluding with 
a survey of postwar literary blasphemy—and with a look at blasphemy’s role in twenty-first-
century geopolitics—this study proposes still further ways in which the legacies of modernism 
continue to resonate in the present.  
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TO your blushing we shout the obscenities, we scream the blasphemies, that you, 
being weak, whisper alone in the dark. . . . 
 
THUS shall evolve the language of the Future. 
 
            —Mina Loy, “Aphorisms on Futurism” (1914) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
God exists, in language if nowhere else. “Whether or not there is a realm of the 
‘supernatural,’” Kenneth Burke reminds us, “there are words for it.”1 The Bible rather strikingly 
encourages this discursive emphasis: the Creator creates through language, then redeems that 
creation, for Christians, through language embodied. “And God said, Let there be light: and 
there was light”; “And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us” (Gen. 1:3, John 1:14). It 
is a further testament to Christianity’s special concern for the linguistic that “blasphemy against 
the Holy Ghost” stands as the one unforgivable sin—for blasphemy, too, is essentially 
rhetorical, as its suffix suggests (Matt. 12:31).2 It is the word we use to denote religious offenses 
or desecrations that are verbal in nature; we have other words (heresy, sacrilege) for other 
categories of offense. 
That is why the traditional European punishment for blasphemy was to bore through 
the offender’s tongue.3 It is also why, in the present day, blasphemy tends to arise with urgency 
as an issue of free speech: the religious believer pits the texts that he or she holds sacred against 
the “human right” of unhindered expression that others hold sacred. One sacred discourse—a 
discourse about discourse—combats another. It would be wrong to see such combat as 
exclusively rhetorical; too much blood has been spilled, through the ages and in very recent 
memory. Yet it is, at bottom, a question of words, of texts, and of the affective and political 
power that attaches to them. We find ourselves, then, at the intersection of these discourses, the 
theological and the blasphemous, and a third, literary modernism. For blasphemy is a signal 
                                                 
1  Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion, 7.  
2  Blasphemy is an inherently “verbal crime,” “a linguistic act” (Levy, Blasphemy, 10; David Lawton, Blasphemy, 17). 
Aquinas thus affirms Christianity’s privileging of discursive over other transgressions when he writes that 
“blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against God, is more grave than murder. . . . In comparison with 
blasphemy, every sin is slight” (qtd. in Levy, Blasphemy, 52).   
3  David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World, 13. 
  
2 
    
modernist discourse—indeed, it is hard to imagine modernism without it—and while hardly 
the exclusive property of modernist writers, it does acquire in their works an exceptional 
resonance and force. That blasphemy “demands fine-grained literary analysis,” as Joss Marsh 
has argued, is perhaps never so evident as in the case of modernism and its characteristic stake 
in the materiality of language.4 But as worldly blasphemies inevitably carry implications that 
exceed the linguistic, so too do the texts we shall encounter here. Among other things, this 
study attends to the close relationship in blasphemous modernism between words, the Word, 
and the flesh—a relationship that illumines the interrelations of form and content, textuality 
and the body—and to the ideological contests that blasphemers wage against each other and 
against both sacred and secular power.  
Such an undertaking demands that we pay close attention to the enduring authority of 
religious language in an epoch that has traditionally been viewed as post-religious, as though 
the ascendance of various secular realms of human experience—reason, science, art—had 
succeeded unconditionally in displacing God’s no longer requisite place in the order of things. 
The standard assumption has been, in Charles Taylor’s paraphrase, that “Modern civilization 
cannot but bring about a ‘death of God,’” and that modernism reflects that death in its literary 
texts.5 As James Joyce’s own Buck Mulligan states the case, “Jehovah, collector of prepuces, is 
no more” (U, 9.609). If we follow Burke, however, in finding the Judeo-Christian God to be an 
inherently linguistic deity, we will discover that for the works of blasphemous modernism God 
is very much alive.  
Modernist writers thus complicate the popular narrative of religion’s inexorable decline 
in the modern world. “In this process there is no stopping,” Freud wrote; “the greater the num-
                                                 
4  Marsh, Word Crimes, 12. 
5  Taylor, A Secular Age, 21.  
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ber of men to whom the treasures of knowledge become accessible, the more widespread is the 
falling-away from religious belief.”6 Freud’s striking confidence that the religious neurosis can-
not possibly survive the accumulating pressures of secularization is typical of his contempo-
raries’ prevailing assumption in these matters, even if many contemplated God’s death with far 
less satisfaction. Yet Freud’s prophecy of a wholly secular future left, ironically, no room for a 
return of the repressed. Like many other social observers, he was unable to foresee God’s 
comeback in a twenty-first century where religion remains a powerful cultural force, even, with 
some important exceptions, in the world’s most “developed,” “modernized” nations—a century 
in which perfectly sane thinkers have declared a “death of the death of God.”7  
Such reconsiderations of modernity and secularity have accompanied the humanities’ 
renewed interest in religion generally. This ongoing “religious turn” has been motivated largely 
by trends in postmodern thought that emerged in the mid-1990s, including the recognition that 
modernity itself has an obscured but deeply theological core. Michael Allen Gillespie has 
brought out with striking clarity the theological origins of modernity, in his book of that title, 
and such influential thinkers as Talal Asad, Richard Rorty, Giorgio Agamben, and Gianni 
Vattimo have drawn similar inferences about the religious core of the ostensibly secular.8 With 
as much confidence as Freud evinced in The Future of an Illusion, most are now prepared to 
affirm, with Asad, that “a straightforward narrative of progress from the religious to the secular 
is no longer acceptable”—and even to consign the very concept of secularization “to a relatively 
short and particular period of European history which still assumed (amongst other things) that 
                                                 
6  Freud, The Future of an Illusion, 49.  
7  Caputo and Vattimo, After the Death of God, 19. 
8  Rorty finds that secular positivism and religion “are products of the same urge,” while Vattimo has gone so far as 
to insist that Nietzsche and Heidegger speak “above all from within the biblical tradition,” that the hermeneutics 
associated with these philosophers represent “the development and maturation of the Christian message.” In 
retrospect, it seems inevitable that the Nietzschean critiques of positivism and Enlightenment would reopen the 
doors to the religious, but this does not seem to have been felt as inevitable by many of poststructuralism’s earlier 
practitioners or opponents. Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity; Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 157; 
Rorty and Vattimo, The Future of Religion, 46-47. 
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whatever characterized Europe’s religious life today would characterize everyone else’s 
tomorrow.”9 In short, as Callum Brown observes, secularization theory has become “a narrative 
in crisis” amid a growing consensus that modernity is not, by definition, secular—that at its root 
it may even be quite the opposite.10  
Yet literary studies have been slow to catch up with the religious turn, and studies of the 
modernists in particular continue “anachronistically to read back into them a blithely secular 
point of view.”11 Important exceptions include recent work on modernism and religion 
undertaken by Pericles Lewis and other scholars whose efforts generally accord with my own 
sense of modernism’s religious underpinnings.12 Together, such scholarship makes a 
compelling case for the fundamental importance of religious discourses to literary modernism, 
and I share a common aim with these critics in my effort to contest the conventional view of 
modernist secularity. I take, however, a via negativa, arguing that literary blasphemies of the 
period—writers’ self-conscious thematic and rhetorical deployments of religious irreverence—
are in a perverse way the surest proof of religion’s continued importance among the moderns.  
Blasphemy is double-edged, as we shall have many occasions to consider. Even as it 
profanes institutions of the sacred, in other words, it also tacitly affirms those institutions’ status 
as objects worthy of such profanation. Here my argument follows the logic, if not the diagnosis, 
                                                 
9  Asad, Formations of the Secular, 1; Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe, 1. Others have sought to complicate even 
these revisionist accounts; see, for instance, Vincent Pecora, Secularization and Cultural Criticism. 
10  Brown, The Death of Christian Britain, 30. Even Peter L. Berger, once one of the more persuasive exponents of the 
secularization thesis, has recanted (Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World, 1-18). 
11  Pericles Lewis, Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel, 7. As Tim Armstrong observes, it remains an all too 
common assumption “that spiritual values and religious belief do not find a ready place within modernist 
aesthetics” (“Loy and Cornell,” 204). More generally, a recent PMLA overview concludes that “the field of literary 
studies has not witnessed a corresponding breadth of scholarship” on religious topics (Gauri Viswanathan, 
“Secularism in the Framework of Heterodoxy,” 466). 
12  Noting the allure for many modernists of Catholicism and other forms of Christian worship, Ellis Hanson has 
suggested that the period associated with high modernism witnessed “the last great efflorescence of Christianity in 
English literature” (Decadence and Catholicism, 366). Other recent studies have argued that modernism remains 
“part of a Christian epistemology,” that God is in fact “serially resurrected” in the very textures of modernist texts 
(Gregory Erickson, The Absence of God in Modernist Literature, 8; Jennifer Hardy Williams, “Modernism’s Religious 
Other,” 69). See also Amy Hungerford’s Postmodern Belief, an important study of the religious concerns of post-1960 
American literature and literary theory.   
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of T. S. Eliot’s theorization of blasphemy in a series of lectures published in 1934 under the title 
After Strange Gods. Now best remembered for a particularly ugly sentence about “free-thinking 
Jews,” these lectures identify blasphemy as an index of religious sensibility while also claiming 
that modernity provides infertile soil for that sensibility, and hence for blasphemy of any 
genuine form, to take root (ASG, 20). The current reappraisals of modern secularism noted 
above give us ample reason to take seriously the first of these claims and to put some much-
needed critical pressure on the second. 
 
Blasphemy, Faith, and Modernity 
We can begin with Ezra Pound’s negative review of After Strange Gods, in which he 
concisely articulates the conventional modernist viewpoint on religion: “The fact is that 
‘religion’ long since resigned. Religion in the person of its greatest organized European 
institution resigned. The average man now thinks of religion either as a left-over or an 
irrelevance.”13 Pound’s remarks imply that Eliot has not sufficiently recognized this, but the 
author of After Strange Gods is if anything hyper-aware of what he perceives to be religion’s 
diminished importance—a state of affairs Eliot mourns, somewhat counter-intuitively, as “the 
obsolescence of Blasphemy” (ASG, 10). Because “no one can possibly blaspheme in any sense 
except that in which a parrot may be said to curse, unless he profoundly believes in that which 
he profanes,” for Eliot the moderns have mostly “ceased to be capable of exercising that activity 
or of recognizing it” (ASG, 55-56). As G. K. Chesterton had stated the case some years before, 
“Blasphemy depends upon belief, and is fading with it. If any one doubts this, let him sit down 
seriously and try to think blasphemous thoughts about Thor.”14 On views such as these, 
                                                 
13  Pound, “Mr. Eliot’s Mare’s Nest,” 277. 
14  Chesterton, Heretics, 20. 
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blasphemy’s extinction follows logically from God’s. So it is that any remaining trace of 
“genuine blasphemy” is for Eliot “a way of affirming belief,” “a symptom that the soul is still 
alive”—and that “first-rate blasphemy,” in particular, deserves to be treasured as “one of the 
rarest things in literature.”15  
For Eliot, blasphemy is important primarily for what it signals about the well-being of 
“therapeutic” religion, in Slavoj Žižek’s terms: a Christianity that “helps individuals to function 
better in the existing order.” For me, blasphemy’s import lies in its service to what Žižek calls a 
“critical” faith, one that “tries to assert itself as a critical agency articulating what is wrong with 
this order as such, a space for the voices of discontent.”16 My own sense of blasphemous 
modernism’s worth has less to do with what it says about the blasphemer’s own soul than with 
the critiques it enables of the institutions of power that Eliot would likely, for the most part, 
have wished to shore up. His thoughts on blasphemy are nonetheless crucial; as Raymond 
Williams once observed, “if Eliot is read with attention, he is seen to have raised questions 
which those who differ from him politically must answer, or else retire from the field.”17 Eliot is 
of course right to insist that for blasphemy to matter at all, it must be grounded in and even 
motivated by an acknowledgment of religious authority and of the affective and rhetorical force 
of spiritual feeling and traditions. He is also right to suggest that this acknowledgment not only 
can but must be accompanied by a profound skepticism and a willingness to face equally 
religion’s goods and ills, a condition he defines as “spiritual sickness”—one of three criteria for 
first-rate blaspheming, the others being “literary genius and profound faith” (ASG, 56).  
Worth recuperating among Eliot’s delineations of the first-rate is his insistence that faith 
and blasphemy cannot be sundered completely. Surely, though, we can do without his recourse 
                                                 
15  Eliot, Selected Essays, 337; ASG, 56. See also Ronald Schuchard, Eliot’s Dark Angel, 131-47. 
16  Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, 3. 
17  Williams, Culture and Society, 227. 
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to pathology; what blasphemy requires is not “spiritual sickness” but rather a commitment to 
playful and critical reworkings of orthodoxy, coupled with a reverence and respect, not for 
God, or scripture, or the church, but for religious belief itself and its enduring cultural sway. As 
Eliot said of his favorite blasphemer, Baudelaire, “His business was not to practise Christianity, 
but—what was much more important for his time—to assert its necessity.”18 Likewise, when 
Eliot judges James Joyce to be “the most ethically orthodox of the more eminent writers of my 
time,” he means not that the Irish author succeeds at achieving a fully “orthodox sensibility”—
scarcely possible by Eliot’s standards—but that his works, like Baudelaire’s, “recognize” the 
“necessity” of Christianity as the proper soil in which a philosophically and artistically 
meaningful blasphemy can take root (ASG, 41). As Georges Bataille memorably put it, 
irreverence would sink to irrelevance “if the blasphemer denied the sacred nature of the Good 
that Blasphemy was intended to despoil.”19  
One of Bataille’s own contributions to blasphemous modernism, his pornographic Story 
of the Eye (1928), is exemplary here. Having exhausted just about every secular form of 
transgression and irreverence, this novella reserves its most powerful desecrations for its final 
pages, where an orgy inside a cathedral develops into a eucharistic travesty of extreme 
proportions: its climax is marked by a Catholic priest being choked to death, in his own church, 
while enjoying and suffering a “little death” at the hands of the other celebrants. As the priest’s 
subsequently uprooted eyeball undergoes an alarming series of defilements, we may be 
tempted to ask: Is nothing sacred? But that is the wrong question altogether. What makes this 
text so troubling (and, perhaps, titillating) is its insistence that the church, and the various 
objects defiled under its roof, are sacred—and, for this reason, are worthy of the blasphemer’s 
                                                 
18  Eliot, Selected Prose, 231.  
19  Bataille, Erotism, 128. 
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“despoiling.” Like Eliot, Bataille insists that blasphemy requires not a secularist dismissal of 
religious matters but rather a recognition of the sanctity that still attaches to the institutions, 
scriptures, and sacraments of the West’s predominant religious faiths.   
As Bataille’s critical and creative practices suggest, the concept of blasphemy is ripe for 
thinking through and untangling modernism’s uses of religion and of the Bible in particular. 
Such untangling marks, moreover, a significant distinction between my own approach and 
those recent scholarly studies of modernism and religion that I noted above, since they have 
tended to focus in on authors’ transpositions of religiosity into narrative or aesthetic 
principles—so that what emerges as “sacred” in these texts (for example, Virginia Woolf’s 
“moments of being”) is generally unrecognizable as sacred in any Christian or other doctrinal 
sense. Such criticism bears the traces of an Arnoldian impulse, examining the ways literature 
creates its own versions of religion and even can become, as Arthur Symons suggested, “a kind 
of religion, with all the duties and responsibilities of the sacred ritual.” But blasphemous 
modernism is not a form of “spilt religion,” as T. E. Hulme said of Romanticism, nor is it a 
variant of “natural supernaturalism.”20 Rather than stress modernists’ sublimations and 
personalized secularizations of the religious, in other words, I attend primarily to the ways they 
assimilate scripture and exploit orthodox constructions of the sacred. To be sure, there is much 
to be said about how they transform these constructions. It is worth considering, though, how 
the resultant depictions of sacred and profane continue to function in recognizably Christian 
ways, drawing on the cultural durability of scripture and sacrament.  
                                                 
20  Symons, The Symbolist Movement in Literature, 9; Hulme, Speculations, 118; M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism.  
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Critics have long used a theological lexicon of transgression (“heresy,” “iconoclasm”) to 
explain modernism’s seemingly impious breaks with “orthodoxies” of various kinds.21 In doing 
so, these scholars have demonstrated their own assimilation of a key modernist strategy, the 
exploitative channeling of religious language and concepts for persuasive force. But they have 
done so, typically, in service to worldly notions of assault on secular authority and tradition, 
notions largely divorced from theological contexts and hence divested of religious signification. 
In claiming blasphemy as an important modernist idiom, I want to insist on the full religious 
valence of that term in order to respect modernism’s imaginative investments in, and often 
subversive reworkings of, Christian scripture and theology. The term heresy, for example, 
recognizes certain of the moderns’ idiosyncratic forays into heterodox visions of the sacred—D. 
H. Lawrence comes readily to mind—but it elides the majority’s marked investments in both 
assimilating and profaning orthodox Christian traditions.  
Additionally, recent studies of modernism and religion have concentrated on “the 
mainstream of high modernism”; Pericles Lewis even concludes that “only by sublimating 
religious experience into formal concerns have works qualified for [modernist] canonization.”22 
With the expansion of this canon to include, among others, the voices of minority modernists 
and women other than Woolf, such an assertion seems far harder to defend than it might have 
twenty years ago. Where Lewis and others (Robert Alter, Gregory Erickson, Jennifer Hardy 
Williams) tackle the old high-modernist canon (James, Conrad, Proust, Woolf, Kafka), I look 
primarily to the outliers—the Others, to borrow the title of Alfred Kreymborg’s important little 
                                                 
21  Peter Gay’s recent effort to consolidate a dizzyingly wide range of modernist art and culture under the title 
Modernism: The Lure of Heresy suggests the continued currency of such pseudo-theological narratives. For more 
substantive studies of heresy, modernity, and modernism, see Benjamin Lazier, God Interrupted, and Damon 
Franke, Modernist Heresies.  
22  Lewis, Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel, 7, 18. “Some readers,” Douglas Mao observes in a review of the 
book, “will be surprised to find Lewis making such sweeping pronouncements . . . on the basis of so restrictive a 
sample, given the radical proliferation of definitions of modernism in recent years” (Review, 1141).  
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magazine. Joyce represents an exception here, from the standpoint of the traditional canon—
but, as Enda Duffy notes, Ulysses “has always been seen in some sense as an exception among 
the masterpieces of patriarchal modernism,” staging as it does “a different kind of intervention 
within the realities of nation, race, class, even gender.”23 In Chapter One, I show how Joyce 
marshals the language of blasphemy to challenge prevailing assumptions about these matrices 
of identity—“even gender.” (And sexuality, too.) For Joyce is crucial to the story of 
blasphemous modernism, Ulysses in particular providing a template for the literary 
profanations to be found in the works of Mina Loy, Richard Bruce Nugent, Wallace Thurman, 
and Djuna Barnes—writers alternately overlooked and underappreciated for the better part of a 
century and thus far still neglected by studies of modernism and religion.  
Blasphemy and modernism do more than coexist in these writers’ fiction and poetry. 
They are in fact mutually constitutive, as can be seen perhaps most readily in texts such as Loy’s 
1914 poem “Parturition,” or Nugent’s 1926 short story “Smoke, Lilies and Jade”: two works as 
blasphemous as they are unprecedented in their formal and thematic experimentations. In such 
cases, modernism and blasphemy prove as difficult to separate as form and content. Thus do 
these authors discharge the duties of what a young James Joyce, writing in 1904, had ironically 
termed the modern artist’s “Holy Office”: the imperative to transgress orthodoxies both literary 
and theological, or, let us say, to be at once both blasphemous and modernist.  
 
The Politics of Blasphemy 
That imperative carries political as well as aesthetic implications. For blasphemy is a 
barometer and a mechanism of power, a discourse governed by the powerful but also 
occasionally usurped by the marginalized in politically significant ways. I have suggested 
                                                 
23  Duffy, The Subaltern “Ulysses,” 1. 
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already that blasphemy provides the language appropriate to what Žižek terms the critical, as 
opposed to therapeutic, role of religion—a language by means of which Christianity’s 
“subversive core” can find expression.24 Let us add that blasphemy respects no division of 
church and state; alongside its religious subversions it inevitably transgresses secular authority. 
As these modernist writers critique and reinscribe religious orthodoxy, they also expose the 
ideological complicities of ecclesiastical and more worldly institutions of power. Further, they 
evolve blasphemous ways of addressing such inevitably ideological issues as race, gender, class, 
sexuality, and religious orientation—and use blasphemy as a means to articulate novel and 
potentially liberating ways to conceive these very categories, giving voice to the subaltern, the 
unrecognized, the unnatural.   
Here we encounter one way to resolve the supposed incommensurability of a literary 
criticism that attends to such overtly political issues with a criticism that tackles the topic of 
religion—an opposition implied, for instance, by a much-remarked 2005 article in which Stanley 
Fish named religion as the topic most likely to supplant “the triumvirate of race, gender, and 
class as the center of intellectual energy.” This must have been welcome news to J. Hillis Miller, 
who had, just a few years earlier, lamented literary critics’ inattention to “the religious or 
ontological dimension of writers’ and cultures’ ideologies in favor of a more or less exclusive 
infatuation with the three mythological graces of contemporary humanistic study: Race, Class, 
and Gender.”25 One of Blasphemous Modernism’s foundational questions is: why must we choose 
between one approach and the other? Why not discuss these mythological graces, with all their 
pressing political import, in the context of the religious?  In particular, why not discuss the 
ways that often transgressive religious discourses enable confrontations with the taboos of Race, 
                                                 
24  Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, 3-4. As S. Brent Plate writes, blasphemous art and expression have historically 
functioned as “modes of resistance, whereby people with limited cultural power (especially in terms of race and 
gender) consciously enact blasphemous portrayals as a mode of subversion” (Blasphemy, 66). 
25  Fish, “One University under God?”; Miller, The Disappearance of God, ix.  
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Class, and Gender? And why not the fourth grace, Sexuality? That category, I know, would 
have spoiled Miller’s neat trinity—but sexuality is crucial to understanding spiritual ecstasy, 
and blasphemy has always offended most when it has had to do with religion’s putative 
corruption at the hands of profane Eros.   
Accordingly, the chapters that follow propose readings of blasphemy as both an artistic 
and a political mode of expression. When I speak of blasphemy’s political aims and 
consequences, however, I mean something quite different than Giorgio Agamben’s utopic 
vision of a politically liberative “profanation”—a term he defines, idiosyncratically, as an effort 
“to abolish and erase separations” between sacred and profane, “to return to common use that 
which has been removed to the sphere of the sacred.”26 I am concerned not with this idealized 
praxis of neutralizing all distinction, but rather with the subversive, blasphemous uses to which 
literary representations of the sacred and profane are put. To that end a sense of distinction 
must remain—albeit in decidedly transformed ways—so that the blasphemer can partake of the 
authority inherent in notions of the sacred, even as she upends those notions and illumines their 
repressive political uses. This is a perhaps necessary and certainly transgressive move on the 
part of modernists who need to point up, in order to critique, the functionally sacral nature of 
modernity’s new gods, and by writers—especially women writers, queer writers, and writers of 
color—who seek ways to make their voices heard.  
 
Exemplum: The Good News in Langston Hughes 
Consider Langston Hughes’s 1932 poem “Goodbye Christ.” Repudiating “Christ Jesus 
Lord God Jehovah” in favor of “A real guy named / Marx Communist Lenin Peasant Stalin 
Worker ME,” the poem aroused a storm of protest both from evangelicals, angered at its 
                                                 
26  Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation,” 87, 82. 
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blasphemy, and from American nationalists who objected to its blatantly pro-Communist 
message (CW, 228-29). (To say nothing of The Saturday Evening Post, which the poem derides, 
and which mischievously reprinted “Goodbye Christ” without permission in 1940.) Of course—
and this is the point—one cannot dissociate the poem’s religious transgressions from its political 
ones. The political cause of “godless Communism” was inseparable, in the minds of many 
detractors, from its rejection of religious faith. According to an anti-Hughes flier from the time, 
distributed by a group dedicated to the cause of “Christian Nationalism”: “‘HATE CHRIST’ Is 
the Slogan of the Communists.”27 For such readers, Hughes’s poem was both treasonous and 
blasphemous; the writer of “Goodbye Christ” knew well the potency of such an irreverent 
mixture. Or perhaps it is more correct to say that Hughes recognized that treason and 
blasphemy are at some level inextricable offenses.28 What made “Goodbye Christ” so dangerous 
was the explosive directness with which it framed its indictments of both the political and the 
religious.    
In some “Draft ideas” he jotted down in December 1964, Hughes nonetheless warns his 
fellow poets against the snares of the political: “Politics can be the graveyard of the poet. And 
only poetry can be his resurrection.” Yet later in the same draft he writes,  
Concerning politics, nothing I have said is true. A poet is a human being. Each 
human being must live within his time, with and for his people, and within the 
boundaries of his country. Therefore, how can a poet keep out of politics?   
 Hang yourself, poet, in your own words. Otherwise, you are dead.29  
 
Notable is the way that the figure of poetic “resurrection” remains even in Hughes’s volte face at 
the end of this passage, indeed becomes much more forceful. The poet must hang herself in 
                                                 
27  “A Right-Wing Anti-Hughes Flier.” 
28  As Leonard Levy writes, “the blasphemer incurs punishment because society regards his scandalous crime as a 
form of high treason against the highest powers in the universe” (Blasphemy, 3).   
29  Hughes, quoted in Rampersad, The Life of Langston Hughes, Vol. II, 385.  
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order to live, must lose her life to find it. And for Hughes, despite his initial (rhetorical) 
hesitation, that resurrection is ultimately as politically charged as it is inherently religious.  
As a poet, at any rate, Hughes’s poetic evocations of religion are invariably political, 
often in the least subtle of ways. In A New Song (1938), his radical socialism leads him to visions 
that can only be called apocalyptic, imagining “The song of the new life triumphant” emerging 
from the blood sacrifice of innocents: “the kids who die” in the struggle for economic and social 
justice (CW, 140). Like works by James Joyce and Mina Loy, A New Song depicts an oppressive 
complicity of religion and patriotism, suggestively envisioning a fascist American leader 
“Waving a flag and mouthing rot / And dropping bombs from a Christian steeple / On the 
people” (143). The poem appropriately concludes with a call to arms rendered in forcefully 
religious language: combating the ideological weight of repressive religious institutions—
memorably iconized here as bombs dropping from steeples—Hughes imagines an integrated, 
multiracial “Union” that must “shake the pillars of those temples / Wherein the false gods 
dwell / And worn-out altars stand / Too well defended” (150).30 
For Hughes, blasphemy is perhaps above all a medium in which to express outrage at 
economic inequality. In the opening stanza of his “Drama for Winter’s Night (Fifth Avenue),” a 
homeless man in search of shelter is kicked out of a rich man’s car and then is denied a place to 
sleep even on the streets; but the first institution to kick him to the curb is the church: “You 
can’t sleep here. / This is the house of God” (CW, 162). In the face of these difficulties the man 
begins “raving,” and imagines that even in the afterlife there will be no room for him—that 
                                                 
30  There is no more acid condemnation of the “Christian” West’s economic and imperialist policies than Hughes’s 
“Merry Christmas.” This 1930 poem imagines “righteous Christian England” and its “Yankee” partner-in-
righteousness sending season’s greetings to recipients around the world: to “Gandhi in his cell,” to China (“Ten-
inch [gun]shells for Christmas gifts, / And peace on earth forever”), to Africa (“Ring Hallehuiah! Praise the Lord! / 
(For murder and for rape)”), to Haiti (“We’ll rob you to the Christian hymns / Until the next Christ comes”), and to 
all the “down-and-outers” at home, with their “bread-line Santa Claus”: “While holy steel that makes us strong / 
Spits forth a mighty Yuletide song: / SHOOT Merry Christmas everywhere! / Let Merry Christmas GAS the air!” 
(CW, 199-200). 
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even God, in heaven, will tell him, “Bums can’t stay” (163). Such is heaven, Hughes implies, as 
imagined by Christians whose visions of the hereafter leave as little room for the truly destitute 
as does the church usher in the first stanza. As the white God Himself explains, speaking in the 
other Hughes poem to appear in the same issue of Workers Monthly (March 1925), “I made the 
world for the rich / And the will-be-rich / And the have-always-been-rich”; speaking to a 
“hungry child,” this God appears less a god of mercy and justice than a kind of heartless robber 
baron:“You didn’t buy any stock in my railroad. / You didn’t invest in my corporation. / 
Where are your shares in standard oil?” (163-64). Hughes thus links religious notions of divine 
Providence, whose mysteries are impenetrable, with capitalist notions of free enterprise; 
regardless what the scriptures say, God continues to be a god for the rich and the white. So, in 
another poem, he asks “the white Lord,” “What was the use of prayer.”31 As we will see further 
in Chapter Three, blasphemy is for Hughes—as for other Harlem Renaissance writers—the 
preferred idiom in which to express resistance to this white God and to the worldly injustices 
perpetuated in his name.  
 
Of Typology and Sacrilege 
In attending to the neoteric, modernist strategies that Hughes and others use to 
articulate such resistance, we shall be concerned always with what Rachel Blau DuPlessis calls 
“the intersection of two ‘news’—the rhetorical/stylistic (modernism) and the 
ideological/political (modernity).”32 The language of blasphemous modernism emerges at that 
                                                 
31  CW, 107. In his memoir The Big Sea, Hughes mocks the preference in many Christian quarters for prayer over 
praxis. Recalling a student conference he attended on race relations at Franklin and Marshall College, where he 
proposed that the attendees address that school’s “unwritten rule barring Negro students from attendance,” 
Hughes recalls the cool response he received, summed up by the white director of the conference, a YMCA leader: 
“There are some things in this world we must leave to Jesus, friends. Let us pray!” (303).    
32  DuPlessis, Genders, Races, and Religious Cultures, 26. My methodology shares much in common with DuPlessis’s 
“social philology,” “a reactivation of close reading to examine . . . the textual traces and manifestations of a variety 
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intersection, and it takes, I argue, two predominant channels of expression—channels that 
follow the two predominant forms of blasphemy as it is understood in Christian tradition. One 
of these, of course, is the act of defiling or desecrating the sacred. The other entails arrogating 
divinity to oneself—an act of willful appropriation that typically involves declaring oneself the 
fulfillment of a prophetic typology. In literature, for reasons I explain below, the former mode 
of blasphemy tends to constitute an aesthetics of sacrilege; the latter let us call transgressive 
typology, and let us appreciate that for Christians this is blasphemy’s most pertinent meaning. 
For without this form of blasphemy, the New Testament suggests, there would be no Christ and 
no religion in his name.33  
In the gospels of Matthew and Mark, the Jewish high priest Caiaphas asks Jesus directly 
“whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God.” Both Caiaphas and the gathered crowd declare 
the prisoner guilty of blasphemy when he responds, “I am: and ye shall see the Son of man 
sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.”34 Historically, Jesus’ 
promise has not yet come to pass, though believers might at least take some consolation from its 
parodic fulfillment in Joyce’s Ulysses. For at the close of that novel’s “Cyclops” episode, finding 
himself charged, like Jesus, with blasphemy, Leopold Bloom eludes his violent accuser by 
ascending to the clouds on a biblical chariot—where he sits, fittingly, at the right hand of 
                                                                                                                                                             
of ideological assumptions, subject positions, and social concepts concerning gender, race, and religious culture” 
(1). 
33
 As Alain Cabantous rightly asserts, “blasphemy founded Christianity,” since Jesus’ subversive claim to divinity “led 
him to the cross and, for Christians, to the Resurrection” (Blasphemy, 5). For an account of Jesus’ putative 
blasphemies, and of the long theological debate surrounding them, see Levy, Blasphemy, 15-30. Regardless of 
whether Jesus was really ever formally accused of blasphemy (unlikely, in Levy’s view), all four of the gospels 
insist that such a charge was made. The historical Jesus may never have been charged with blasphemy—but the 
biblical Jesus certainly was. 
34  Matt. 26:63-65; Mark 14:61-64. Another passage, from the book of John, likewise specifies that Christ’s presumed 
blasphemy lay in his alignment of himself with God: after Jesus claims his divinity outright (“I am the Son of God” 
+ “I and my Father are one”), the men and women in attendance begin to stone him—“a symbolic execution for 
blasphemy,” as Leonard Levy notes (Blasphemy, 16)—and when Jesus asks for an explanation, the people charge 
him specifically with “blasphemy . . . because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God” (10:30-36).  
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Power. Jack Power, that is: Bloom’s fellow Dubliner.35 Such playful typology is one of the most 
notable narrative components of Ulysses, which Joyce structures as much by biblical parallels as 
by the novel’s more famous Homeric correspondences. Ulysses thus exemplifies blasphemous 
modernism’s interest in transgressive typologies, the way such texts create meaning from 
unorthodox, unauthorized, and often subversive exploitations of the Bible and its tropes. 
Typology for Christians involves a hermeneutic appropriation of the Hebrew scriptures; 
more broadly, typology is a matter of linguistic appropriation and re-appropriation. It is a 
matter of colonization, even, though with the word transgressive I mean to signal a reverse 
colonization, as when a marginalized artist imaginatively stakes his or her claim to a hegemonic 
religious discourse. Observe the female Jehovahs and Christs that populate Mina Loy’s poetry; 
the black Christs and other biblical figures strewn throughout African American modernism; 
and Djuna Barnes’s sly parody, in Nightwood (1936), of the Virgin Birth: an irreverent rewriting 
that typifies blasphemous modernism’s approach to scriptural typology. In this novel, the 
character Robin Vote produces a son for her husband, Felix Volkbein, who holds decidedly 
messianic expectations for his new heir—at one point defining him as “the central point toward 
which life and death are spinning” (N, 117). (The son’s name, Guido, derives from the Latin 
Vito, or “life.”) Felix, though, seems to have little to do with conceiving him, and Robin herself 
disavows any penetration by man, as Nightwood hints that Guido may be the product of a 
modern-day miraculous conception. Not for nothing will he later fondle the Virgin that hangs 
from his neck and call it “mother” (162).  
With the stoic faith of Christ’s mother obeying the Annunciation, “Robin prepared 
herself for her child with her only power: a stubborn cataleptic calm, conceiving herself 
pregnant before she was” (45). The conspicuous pun on conceiving here suggests a willed auto-
                                                 
35  Declan Kiberd notes the “right hand of Power” connection in “Ulysses” and Us, 303.  
  
18 
    
reproduction on Robin’s part, again in echo of the Blessed Virgin—albeit without the influence 
of the Spirit. When her labor pains arrive, the nativity she has fostered with “monstrous” 
prayers and inspired with “the memoirs of the Marquis de Sade” soon becomes a travesty of the 
biblical precedent: “Amid loud and frantic cries of affirmation and despair, . . . cursing like a 
sailor, she rose up on her elbow in her bloody gown, looking about her in the bed as if she had 
lost something. ‘Oh, for Christ’s sake, for Christ’s sake!’ she kept crying like a child who had 
walked into the commencement of a horror” (47-48). Like the birth scene in Loy’s “Parturition,” 
whose speaker hears “the gurgling of a crucified wild beast” as her child emerges from her 
womb, Guido’s virgin birth travesties the birth that truly was “for Christ’s sake” (Lost, 5). Robin 
has given life, not to the Christ-child, but to what she can only interpret as “a horror”—and not 
long afterward she threatens, having defiled his Nativity, to effect little Guido’s premature 
Crucifixion, “holding the child high in the air as if she were about to dash it down” (48).36  
If this example from Nightwood suggests the allure for modernist writers of transgressive 
typologies, it also exemplifies the other mode of blasphemy, distinct but related: the rhetorical 
desecration of the sacred. Modernist strategies of this kind aspire, often, to the condition of 
actual physical or embodied profanation—in accordance with what I call an “aesthetics of 
sacrilege,” whose ideal, it seems, would be somehow to literalize or reify the conventional 
Christian figuration of blasphemies as words that “injure and rend the body of Christ.”37 Here 
some brief definitions are in order. While for most practical purposes the terms “blasphemy” 
and “sacrilege” are interchangeable, there is nonetheless a semantic distinction that proves 
fruitful for theorizing literary irreverence. Both blasphemy and sacrilege are profanatory, which 
                                                 
36  It must be said that Guido, “born to holy decay,” largely disappoints his father’s messianic expectations (N, 107). 
Despite his interest in the Church, “in all probability the child would never be ‘chosen’”—and Felix’s strange 
heretical letters to the Pope seem unlikely to help matters (108-09). Yet this child of blasphemy, if no messiah, has 
emerged holy. “Guido’s shadow is God’s,” O’Connor explains, as if to confirm the logic that compels Guido to 
maternalize the Virgin that hangs from his neck (120, 162). 
37  David Lawton, Blasphemy, 10. 
  
19 
    
is to say that both are offenses against the sacred. What distinguishes them is that blasphemy, as 
I began by saying, is textual—a matter of rhetoric, form, and expression—while sacrilege 
denotes physical desecration. If the realm of the former is discourse or text, the realm of the 
latter is physicality, embodiment. Blasphemy thus lends itself as the more obvious term for 
religious irreverence that exists in or as literature, but literary profaners are rarely content with 
this distinction: their provocations inevitably test the boundaries between sacrilege and 
blasphemy, referent and sign, content and form, body and text. Literature’s most memorable 
profanations, after all, are those that forcefully usher forth the profane and profaning body 
within a context of the sacred, pressing blasphemy’s essential discursiveness as near as possible 
to the immanent materiality of sacrilege.   
For a modernist paradigm of this operation, recall Faulkner’s Reverend Hightower in 
Light in August, “up there in the pulpit with his hands flying around him and the dogma he was 
supposed to preach all full of galloping cavalry and defeat and glory just as when he tried to tell 
them on the street about the galloping horses, it in turn would get all mixed up with absolution 
and choirs of martial seraphim.”38 Such rhetorical mixing-up of profane and sacred is the stuff 
of blasphemy. But it is Hightower’s unique talent for evoking these profane bodies and ghosts, 
for rendering them virtually present in the house of God—to conjure, incarnate, resurrect 
them—that invites a slightly more dangerous suspicion in the minds of his parishioners, namely 
“that what he preached in God’s own house on God’s own day verged on actual sacrilege” (63; 
emphasis added). This actual sacrilege, of which Hightower’s oratory seems ever on the brink, 
is the unachievable but nonetheless persistent goal of the blasphemous writer.  
Like Hightower’s sermons, the corporeal excesses of blasphemous modernism seem 
often to exceed the “merely” textual—often, as it happens, by asserting the sexual. Mina Loy, 
                                                 
38  Faulkner, Light in August, 62-63. 
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for instance, puts the highly sexualized speaker of Songs to Joannes through her own Passion and 
Crucifixion as the poem itself begins to come apart at the seams, undergoing its own textual 
immolation; structurally and formally, this and other of Loy’s poems mirror the somatic 
textuality of Joyce’s self-described “epic of the human body,” Ulysses.39 In both Loy and Joyce, 
body and text  conflate (Molly Bloom’s “soliloquy” is only the best-known example), and with 
them sacrilege and blasphemy—making these authors’ works the touchstones or ur-texts of 
modernism’s sacrilegious aesthetics. But the vision they share also has special resonance for 
such writers as Wallace Thurman and Bruce Nugent, whose fictions bring the body very much 
to the fore—notably in their contributions to the little magazine Fire!!—and to writers like 
Djuna Barnes, whose fiction so often entwines the thematics of religion and of erotic 
embodiment. 
While the pages that follow generally emphasize a complementary relation in modernist 
texts between the typological and the sacrilegious, Chapter Three locates an aesthetic tension 
between these blasphemous strategies—one that illuminates the competing politics and poetics 
of the Harlem Renaissance. In that chapter we shall consider, first, the large-scale exercise in 
imaginative modernist typology that is Alain Locke’s New Negro anthology (1925). If white 
Americans had, historically, had their own political aims in presenting (often highly selective 
versions of) Christianity and its Bible to African Americans, The New Negro aims to reverse this 
paradigm. By presenting their Bible, the voices of the renaissance—as presented, organized, and 
edited by Locke—stake a new claim to control of a privileged discourse. The New Negro thus 
arrogates to itself the kind of sacred authority reserved, ordinarily, for divine revelation. From 
the vantage of Harlem’s “promised land,” and in the wake of a decades-long exodus of black 
Americans from the rural South to the urban North, The New Negro moves decisively away from 
                                                 
39  Quoted in Frank Budgen, James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses, 21. 
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the Hebraic homology traditionally limned between African America and the Old Testament’s 
“chosen people.” Instead it invokes an updated messianic presence: no longer a Mosaic 
liberator, but a black Christ who will redeem an as-yet artistically and politically undeveloped 
black culture. The New Negro’s rhetoric and poetics thus announce a realignment of traditional 
African American typology from Old Testament to New, forsaking the topos of exodus for that 
of redemption. It is against The New Negro’s typological project that Harlem’s younger writers, 
the self-styled “Niggeratti”—including Hughes, Thurman, Nugent, and Zora Neale Hurston—
aim their own sacrilegious aesthetics.  
This dialectic can be read profitably as one of those politically inflected, blasphemous 
contests that are “staged, often ritually, for control of a shared discourse.”40 In this case the 
contest is staged as a kind of “signifyin(g),” in Henry Louis Gates’s formulation: an irreverent 
dialogue with, troping on, and transformation of The New Negro’s own blasphemous strategies. 
These contexts also represent one form the divisions take between factions of the New Negro 
movement—with Du Bois and Locke at one extreme, and with writers such as Thurman and 
Nugent at the other—over competing valorizations of the “classical” and the “decadent,” that 
is, of the discreetly and the openly homoerotic. And it is fitting that society’s “inverts”—those 
who are thought to invert the natural characteristics of their sex—should turn to blasphemy as a 
way to turn inside-out society’s ideas of what is natural or acceptable, given that blasphemy so 
often operates according to “painfully literal inversion[s]” of the sacred.41 Inversions of holy 
writ and sacred rite accordingly characterize the homoerotic content of such underexplored 
Harlem-Renaissance texts as Nugent’s “Bible stories” and his novel Gentleman Jigger—as well as 
Barnes’s Nightwood, which sounds tirelessly the motif of inversion, and which ends with a 
                                                 
40  David Lawton, Blasphemy, 4. 
41  Ibid., 31.  
  
22 
    
sacrilegious ritual that replaces God with dog. For Barnes, as I demonstrate in Chapter Four, 
these profanely theological modes of inversion become a way to unsettle and critique the then-
standard notion of homosexuality as congenital inversion: a concept promulgated most widely 
by sexologists such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis.  
 Ellis, incidentally, subscribed as confidently as anyone to the death-of-God thesis, 
writing in 1897 that since “the problem of religion has practically been settled,” “the question of 
sex . . . stands before the coming generations as the chief problem for solution.”42 It is important 
to note that writers such as Joyce, Loy, Nugent, and Barnes keep both of these “problems” open, 
the former just as much as the latter. Their works acknowledge the aesthetic and political 
powers of the religious structures they profane, in order more meaningfully to assimilate and 
exploit them. The very profanability of the church implies its abiding sanctity; the seemingly 
total irreverence of a novel like Ulysses or Nightwood is in fact circumscribed by this tacit 
concession of Christianity’s power and symbolic necessity. Modernist blasphemies derive their 
force in large part from this necessity and from the transgressive possibilities its limitations 
make possible—reminding us that to blaspheme an institution without respect for its authority, 
its sanctity, would be not to blaspheme at all. In this and other ways, the modernists I discuss 
belie Eliot’s declaration that blasphemy had become obsolete in a faithless century. Their poems 
and fictions insist that both religion and its artistic subversions continue to matter, that by 
drawing fully on religion’s cultural authority blasphemy can achieve real literary and political 
significance. The pages that follow explore the various but always radical ends to which these 
writers put this shared understanding.  
 
                                                 
42  Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. 1, vi. 
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Chapter One 
 
BLASPHEMY AS “SACRELIGION”:  
A JOYCEAN PRIMER 
 
 
Dear Pappie, 
  
. . . I have not seen the sun for four months. Nevertheless I 
believe it exists for it is in the Bible, a book which like Ulysses, no 
good Catholic should read. . . .  
       Jim1 
 
 
Shortly after the publication of Ulysses, James Joyce sat for an interview with a young 
journalist named Djuna Barnes. Her friend Mina Loy accompanied them, sketching a portrait of 
the artist in profile that would appear alongside Barnes’s account in Vanity Fair’s March issue. 
The Joyce we encounter in that article seems the very model of the messianic artist, with 
perhaps just a touch of the demonic; as he joins Barnes and Loy at a popular Parisian watering 
hole, he seems to emanate directly from a church across the way:   
Sitting in the café of the Deux Magots, that faces the little church of St. Germain 
des Près, I saw approaching, out of the fog and damp, a tall man. . . .  At the 
moment of seeing him, a remark made to me by a mystic flashed through my 
mind[:] “A man who has been more crucified on his sensibilities than any writer 
of our age,” and I said to myself—“this is a strange way to recognize a man I 
never laid my eyes on.”2      
 
Strange, indeed, to recognize a man in this way—though not, in Joyce’s case, atypical. “Christ 
capitalized,” Loy describes him in a poem she will publish the following year; “God of Paris,” 
she calls him elsewhere.3 So, for this meeting, Joyce slips readily into the role assigned him: that 
                                                 
1  Quoted in JJ, 540-41. .  
2  Barnes, “James Joyce: A Portrait,” 65. Conversation that afternoon appears to have turned often enough to 
Christianity and to “the instinctive genius of the church”—Barnes notes that Joyce “is never without” his “book of 
saints”—and on the whole it is difficult to resist seeing this occasion as a meeting of like minds on the topic of 
religion (104). Despite the disparities, of course: Joyce was an avowedly atheistic but God-haunted Catholic 
apostate, Loy a heterodox Christian Scientist raised by a Jewish father and repressive Protestant mother, Barnes 
irreligious though attracted to the aesthetics and rituals of both Catholicism and Protestantism. 
3  Lost, 89; BM, 311. 
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of the messianic exponent, and sacrificial lamb, of the modernist experiment. And Barnes and 
Loy slip into theirs: journalist and illustrator, yes, but also acolytes, disciples.  
The arrangement is suggestive. Joyce’s work had a major impact on both of these 
writers, and his influence—“unsurpassed,” in Barnes’s case, “by any other literary forebear”—
had much to do with his characteristically blasphemous breed of modernism (D, 103). In his 
1904 poem “The Holy Office,” Joyce had portrayed the truly modern artist as, in part, a 
spokesperson for the sacredly profane; his highest calling would be to articulate the obscene 
and unorthodox, to put into words “Those things for which Grandmother Church / Left me 
severely in the lurch.”4 This rhetoric of religious transgression foretells the substance of Joyce’s 
novels, in which he not only features blasphemy prominently as both discourse and theme—as 
a matter, that is, of both form and content—but also uses blasphemous discourses and thematics 
to construct his most trenchant satires of subjects both sacred and secular: faith and patriotism, 
sectarianism and nationalism, Pope and King, Church and Empire, spirituality and sexuality.  
“The Holy Office” likewise articulates another of Joyce’s novelistic projects, that of using 
the language of blasphemy to elevate the lowly, to bring to the fore those taboo subjects that 
had traditionally been passed over in silence by literature as well as by Grandmother Church. 
Joyce does so, significantly, across a series of profanely theologized bodies, including  those of 
both Mr. and Mrs. Bloom in Ulysses, of Shem the Penman in Finnegans Wake, and even, at times, 
of the text itself. For the printed word in Joyce’s novels itself emerges as a kind of Host, in a 
process that deserves closer scrutiny for its blasphemous implications. (So too does the 
character of Malachi Mulligan, Ulysses’ resident profaner, and a character with whom we shall 
here deal in some uncustomary ways—his value to the novel looking rather different when we 
view his blasphemies as authorized rather than as evidence of some unregenerate malignity.) In 
                                                 
4  Joyce, “The Holy Office,” 658.  
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short, Joyce’s fictions demonstrate three central theses of Blasphemous Modernism: first, that for 
modernist writers blasphemy is as much a political weapon as a formal or stylistic device; 
second, that this discourse is always rooted in and expressed through figurations of the often 
emphatically sexualized body; and third, that this discourse relies upon and exploits an 
essential ambivalence, equal parts affirmative and profanatory, in its relation to the religious 
structures under its critique.  
Joyce himself gives us a useful shorthand term when in Finnegans Wake he speaks of 
“sacreligion”: a word that indexes the ambivalent, symbiotic relation between transgression and 
the sacred, as well as blasphemy’s aesthetic aspirations to the sacrilegious—to the realm, that is, 
of material, embodied profanation (FW, 365.3). Joyce’s oeuvre thus affords us a primer of the 
varieties of critical blasphemy we shall encounter in subsequent chapters, from the irreverent 
deconstructions of gender and sexuality we find in Loy and Barnes to the artistic rebellion 
undertaken by a coterie of young Harlem artists—Langston Hughes, Wallace Thurman, Richard 
Bruce Nugent—whose insistently iconoclastic works often telegraph their debt to the Joycean 
precedent.5 (The group’s short-lived periodical, Fire!!, was to the New Negro Renaissance what 
Joyce’s “Holy Office” had been to the Irish Literary Revival.) Joyce will serve in these pages, as 
he did for each of the writers just mentioned, as a paradigmatic figure. By his lights we may see 
most clearly and comprehensively how blasphemous modernism works, and to what ends. 
 
                                                 
5  Ulysses’ influence on at least Thurman and Nugent is attested by references to that novel in these authors’ own 
works —on one hand as literary influence and precedent, and on the other hand as a material artifact, an important 
form of cultural capital. In Nugent’s 1930s-era roman à clef Gentleman Jigger, “Joyce’s forbidden novel, Ulysses,” is 
left conspicuously open in an apartment at “Niggeratti Manor” in order to set the scene properly for an exhibition 
of their own avant-garde art. Having proven as censorable by the law as it was redeemable “on artistic grounds,” 
this forbidden novel provided an apt precedent and icon for the Niggeratti’s own aspirations both to artistic merit 
and to shocking the bourgeois (GJ, 127, 34). As for Thurman, the central characters of his 1932 novel Infants of the 
Spring are “incontinently rhapsodic” over Dubliners and A Portrait of the Artist. Thurman’s reference to Ulysses as “a 
swamp out of which stray orchids grew” is more equivocal, but given the explicitly Decadent aspirations of the 
Niggeratti, much remarked both here and in Gentleman Jigger, those stray orchids alone would seem to be worth 
the price of the swamp (IS, 35-36). 
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How Blasphemy Works 
One of the perennial debates in Joyce studies concerns the question whether Joyce is best 
understood as a Catholic or atheistic writer.6 What should be obvious to Joyce’s readers, 
though, is that as an author he is neither of these—and is, at the same time, both. Drawing as 
they do so ubiquitously on biblical and ecclesiastical tradition and tropes, his fictions can hardly 
be called secular in any common sense of that term; even the “profanity of Joyce’s art,” as 
Eugene Goodheart rightly observes, derives its significance in large part from his “curiously 
unresolved struggle with his Catholic heritage.”7 Yet if Joyce’s works are essentially 
“sacramental,” as Richard Ellmann and others have maintained, we must also recognize the 
extent to which these sacraments are inherently ironic, revisionist, and very often profanatory 
(JJ, 550). Roy Gottfried hits on something essential about Joyce’s relationship to religion when 
he casts the author not as disbeliever or unbeliever, but as a creative, I would add blasphemous, 
misbeliever—a species Gottfried defines as “one who engages the issues and tenets, the figures 
and forms of dogma, from a distance. . . . Misbelief shares with belief the same terms, the same 
facts of history, the same forms of worship, but wants to handle them differently, wrongly, of 
course, by slightly misapplying or misdirecting them.”8 Joyce’s mind, like that of Stephen 
Dedalus, was “supersaturated” with the Catholic faith—but also like Stephen’s it functioned as 
a profane “cloister” in which “limp priestly vestments” were made “to sway and caper in a 
sabbath of misrule” (PA, 192).  
In other words, as a writer Joyce is neither religious nor irreligious but “sacreligious.” 
And to borrow another Joyce-term, one might say that the mode of expression proper to 
                                                 
6  The latter position tends to be pressed with more vehemence than the former, having been taken up most recently 
in a book-length study by Geert Lernout. Like that of William Empson before him, Lernout’s polemic is guided by 
a supposedly urgent need to defend Joyce against the legions of readers who might otherwise think him a pious 
Catholic. Lernout, Help My Unbelief; Empson, Using Biography, 214-16. 
7  Goodheart, The Failure of Criticism, 158-59.  
8  Gottfried, Joyce’s Misbelief, 4.  
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blasphemous literature is that of the “jocoserious,” a blend of comic and earnest, of reverent and 
profane (U, 17.369). Mina Loy’s own evocation of avant-garde artists as “sacerdotal clowns” 
distills the jocoserious portrait of the blasphemous modernist (Lost, 77): is there a fitter two-
word description of the author of Ulysses’ catechistic “Ithaca” episode, wherein sacerdotal Joyce 
asks a long series of priestly questions and clown Joyce answers in typically playful, irreverent 
fashion? In reading Ulysses we must contend with its hieratic jester, the invisible fingernail-
paring God looming disembodied above and beyond his creation, as well as the impish trickster 
who descends into that creation, cracking little inside jokes about himself and the book he has 
made. “O Jamesy let me up out of this,” calls Molly Bloom from her bed—her “monthlies” have 
just come on—and Jamesy the Father obliges (18.1128-29). 
Let us turn, then, to a decidedly jocoserious moment in Ulysses that is also—no 
coincidence, in my view—the novel’s most affecting. I refer to the finale of “Cyclops,” where a 
set-upon Leopold Bloom, normally so reserved, bravely defends himself and his “race” against 
the anti-Semitic vitriol of the Citizen and his fellow drinkers in Barney Kiernan’s pub. Bloom 
even risks what seems the gravest of crimes in such a setting—the display of a sentimentality 
not wrapped in nationalist nostalgia, even if it is, to some ears, rather feebly expressed: “But it’s 
no use. . . . Force, hatred, history, all that. That’s not life for men and women, insult and hatred. 
And everybody knows that it’s the very opposite of that that is really life. . . . Love, says Bloom. 
I mean the opposite of hatred” (12.1481-85). Bloom seems, if only for an instant, to live up to 
what the Citizen glibly calls him, “A new apostle to the gentiles,” heroic proponent of 
“Universal love”—a more Christ-like figure, surely, than many of the nominal Christians who 
surround him (12.1489). 
One’s admiration for Bloom continues to increase as he flees his persecutor, successfully 
eluding fisticuffs and biscuit-tin while managing a final appeal to reason and sympathy: 
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“Mendelssohn was a jew and Karl Marx and Mercadante and Spinoza. And the Saviour was a 
jew and his father was a jew. Your God. . . . Christ was a jew like me” (12.1804-09). This outburst 
leads to the heroic-comic climax of the episode—Bloom’s Ascension—in which Joyce tellingly 
and typically resorts to the resonant literary resources of the biblical:  
When, lo, there came about them all a great brightness and they beheld Him in 
the chariot wherein He stood ascend to heaven. And they beheld Him in the 
chariot, clothed upon in the glory of the brightness, having raiment as of the sun, 
fair as the moon and terrible that for awe they durst not look upon Him. And 
there came a voice out of heaven, calling: Elijah! Elijah! And He answered with a 
main cry: Abba! Adonai! And they beheld Him even Him, ben Bloom Elijah, amid 
clouds of angels ascend to the glory of the brightness at an angle of fortyfive 
degrees over Donohoe’s in Little Green street like a shot off a shovel. (12.1915-18) 
 
Like a shot off a shovel. Such are the ways of the mock-epic, of course a constant quantity in this 
novel: magnification, diminution; inflation, deflation. Bloom can hardly be allowed to ascend to 
heaven in the raiment of Elijah and Christ without having the wind taken out of his sails. So in 
“Circe” the new Bloomusalem will be described as “a colossal edifice,” complete with crystal 
roof and forty thousand rooms, that has been “built in the shape of a huge pork kidney” (15.48-
49). Yet here in “Cyclops” the deflation is, thankfully, too little too late, not nearly enough to 
balance or mitigate Bloom’s triumphal opposition to ignorance and intolerance. In any case, the 
passage gains its pathos as well as its humor from the biblical precedent, which manages in this 
instance to be both apt and ridiculous.  
Joyce has used the trappings of Catholicism to similarly ridiculous effect some pages 
earlier. When Bloom steps temporarily away from Kiernan’s pub, the Citizen reflects aloud that 
“Saint Patrick would want to land again at Ballykinlar and convert us . . . after allowing things 
like that to contaminate our shores”; the conciliatory Martin Cunningham attempts to cool this 
heated rhetoric, saying, “Well . . . God bless all here is my prayer”; and “Joe” responds, with the 
kind of mindless certitude so prevalent in this episode, “I’m sure He will” (12.1671-75). There 
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follows a two-page Joycean divagation that elaborately sends up the very notion that Kiernan’s 
pub would ever find itself blessed by the Catholic God in whom these men profess their faith—
the upshot of the joke being that the pub “is to be consecrated as the long-awaited permanent 
cathedral in Dublin.”9 While these men spend the episode turning Bloom into a joke, the 
episode itself ensures that the joke is in fact on them.  
Yet while the Citizen and his ilk take the brunt of Joyce’s satire in this chapter, the 
author reserves room also for some gentle satire of both Bloom and the Bible. If Bloom’s paean 
to universal love moves us, after all, it does so in spite of its lame expression, and our exultation 
at his escape from a flying biscuit-tin is accompanied by a smile at the mental image of Bloom at 
full gallop, when much fun has already been made of his awkward gait in “Aeolus” (7.440-51). 
Similarly, Bloom’s chapter-ending Ascension channels the style and affect of biblical precedent 
while also depicting the mundane mechanics of such an ascent as akin to a load thrown from a 
shovel. Bloom and Elijah, Bloom and Christ; fiction and religion, narrative and scripture: all are 
the objects here, and very often throughout the novel, of an ironic ambivalence, of an effect very 
like William Empson’s concept of “double irony.”10 The pairs balance one another in ironic 
suspension, recipients equally of Joyce’s satirical jibes and of his ethical generosity. So when 
Joyce does present his more solemn critiques of, say, the Catholic Church, those critiques 
demand our attention all the more for taking root amidst this framework. Catholicism must 
occasionally bear the brunt of Joyce’s satire but never of his intellectual condescension.  
To deal with the labyrinthine tangles of irony in a text like Ulysses we need to set a 
conception of the jocoserious alongside that of the mock-epic, especially in these moments of 
reverent yet playfully irreverent borrowings from the religious and the scriptural—moments as 
                                                 
9  Gifford, “Ulysses” Annotated, 377. 
10  See Empson’s essay on Tom Jones in Using Biography, 131-57.  
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numerous, surely, as the novel’s Homeric and other literary borrowings. Such blasphemy 
stands in complex relation to the discourse from which it borrows. It indulges in the affective 
potential of Christianity’s sacred figures even as it lampoons those conceptions—just as the 
mock-heroic both relies upon and lampoons the generic trappings of the heroic. At the same 
time it uses those figures as barometers by which the author alternately elevates and diminishes 
his characters. Bloom as Elijah or Christ engages our reverence and pitches Joyce’s prose to a 
register it would not otherwise enjoy. The complementary depictions of Bloom as “really” a 
mortal Dublin ad canvasser intervene to balance and offset the sacralizing effect, highlighting a 
comic incongruity. And the moment of Bloom’s greatest glory, his ascension to the heavens, is 
likewise the moment Joyce pulls out his shovel, burying and resurrecting Bloom in a single 
move.  
Such ironic doubleness finds its corollary in an ambivalence at the heart of blasphemy 
itself. For Joyce’s achievement lies partly in a talent for exploiting blasphemy’s double-edged 
significance: on one hand the term denotes all “impious irreverence” and encompasses any 
“profane speaking of God or sacred things,” but at its most extreme, and most relevant, it 
denotes the outrageous avowal of self-deification—the crime for which Christ was crucified, 
according to the New Testament.11 Significantly, blasphemy is also Bloom’s crime in “Cyclops,” 
at least as the Citizen interprets it: “I’ll brain that bloody jewman for using the holy name. By 
Jesus, I’ll crucify him so I will” (12.1811-12).12 Blasphemy’s ambivalence is clearly at play here: 
Bloom blasphemes by virtue of what the Citizen perceives as his insolent transgression of the 
Third Commandment (“using the holy name” in vain, in his quite reasonable assertion that 
                                                 
11  Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “blasphemy,” 1a.   
12  Evidently the Citizen has been less offended by blasphemies indulged in by the pub’s other patrons: “Good 
Christ!,” “Who said Christ was good?,” “He’s a bloody ruffian,” and so on (U, 12.383-92).  
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“Christ was a jew”) as well as by his subsequent assumption of the messianic role—which the 
Citizen unwittingly enables by assuming the role of crucifier (12.1808). 
Mina Loy’s 1923 poem “Joyce’s Ulysses” captures the novel’s ambivalent relation to 
religion, characterizing Ulysses as “The word made flesh / and feeding upon itself / with 
erudite fangs” (Lost, 89). Here Loy aptly praises the nimble ironic modes with which Joyce 
succeeds in having his religion and eating it too. Insofar as Joyce emulates God as both Father 
and Son, and insofar as his literary creation is insistently eroticized and embodied, that creation 
is a “Word made flesh.” At the same time, in its irreverent satire and blasphemous 
appropriations of God and scripture, Joyce’s novel “feeds upon” the Word made flesh; such a 
cannibalistic enterprise is in fact not far removed from Joyce’s own avowed understanding of 
his book’s relationship to literary tradition, an understanding he built explicitly upon the 
cannibalistic implications of the Eucharist. “His mind longed,” Richard Ellmann tells us, “to 
adore and to desecrate,” and Joyce’s literary dealings with Christianity often evince both urges 
simultaneously (JJ, 48). Such cannibalism lends itself to an apparent rhetorical contradiction: 
Joyce’s blasphemous satires of Christianity and its God would seem to vitiate the effect of 
incorporating sacred biblical elements into his art, the first move demeaning the Christian 
mythos and thus diminishing the significance of the second. In Joyce, however, the two moves 
reinforce one another. His jocoserious prose tacitly reinforces Christianity’s privileged status as 
an object of veneration and, thus, of profanation, even as he blasphemes that religion in his by-
turn playful and solemn manner, whether rendering Bloom’s ascension at the end of “Cyclops” 
or taking swipes at the Church’s grip on Ireland. 
But I should instead say Catholicism’s privileged status as an object of veneration, a 
distinction that reminds us of the principle underlying Joyce’s outright dismissals of 
Protestantism—for example as expressed by Stephen in the Portrait, when he refuses to trade a 
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“logical and coherent” absurdity, Catholicism, for its “illogical and incoherent” counterpart 
(244). In other words, an absurd religion may nonetheless be respected and even venerated for 
its internal coherence, and there is evidence enough of Joyce’s profound respect for Catholicism 
during the many long years after he formally abnegated it—not least in the narrative logics of 
his own texts.13 Consider that “Circe,” Ulysses’ most memorably blasphemous and eyebrow-
raising excursion into the profane, ends with a pious vision that draws its pathos from Christian 
typography of redemption and of the sacrificial lamb. In the final lines, Bloom’s lost Rudy is 
resurrected before Bloom’s “wonderstruck” eyes for a heartbreaking instant, “a white lambkin” 
showing from his pocket to suggest that for all this episode’s traffic among imagery of the 
damned, “Circe” remains, in the final instance, invested in a promise of redemption—a promise 
that finds its iconization in a spectral image of the sacrificial lamb and ever-innocent son 
reunited with the father (15.4962-67).14  
Robert Alter holds that Ulysses de-sacralizes the Bible by absorbing it “into a modern 
textual promiscuity” in which “canon decline[s] into claptrap,” but this accounts for at most one 
half of the equation.15 Just as Joyce’s mock-heroic transformation of Leopold Bloom into 
Odysseus (and Abraham, and Moses, and Elijah, and Christ) can serve, often simultaneously, 
both to mock and to exalt his protagonist, so too does Ulysses extol and elevate—not merely 
mock and subvert—the Bible, a text that plays at least as important a role in the novel as does 
Hamlet or the Odyssey. He has a lot of fun at the Church’s expense in Ulysses and his other 
                                                 
13  For Joyce, God never became a fully settled issue; traces of the Catholic faith lingered (to use a Stephen-word) 
ineluctably. The fact that he never fully dispensed with the religion of his youth is evidenced by his reluctance, 
unlike many of his contemporaries, to entertain seriously any faith besides Catholicism; by his continued 
attendance at Church services, if ostensibly for aesthetic purposes; by his lifelong investment, to the betterment of 
his art, in theological rhetoric and logic and in the narrative resources of the Bible; and by his deadly fear of 
thunder and lightning as manifestations of God’s wrath. “‘Why are you so afraid of thunder?’ asked [Arthur] 
Power, ‘your children don’t mind it.’ ‘Ah, said Joyce contemptuously, they have no religion’” (JJ, 514). In “Oxen of 
the Sun,” thunder is God’s riposte to Stephen’s drunken blasphemies, his “hellprate and paganry” (14.408-11).  
14  By Joyce’s account, the birth of his own son Giorgio was sufficient to move him to a wholly un-ironic recitation of 
the baptismal creed (The Workshop of Daedalus, 99).  
15  Alter, Canon and Creativity, 156.  
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works, but it is serious fun, and at its most significant moments his blasphemous play rests 
upon a tacit contract with the God he has disavowed: for His parodic and satiric assimilations 
into Joyce’s prose, God is rewarded with yet another monument to His, and His church’s, 
cultural relevance. Joyce siphons Christianity’s abiding authority into his religious 
appropriations, so that, for example, Bloom’s ascension over Donohoe’s in Little Green Street 
can be one of the novel’s most affecting and comically absurd moments at the same time. Each 
of the novel’s potential trivializations or travesties of religion is accompanied by an implicit and 
counterbalancing reinforcement of its status as worthy of Joyce’s attention. For this reason, if for 
no other, it is also worthy of ours.  
 
Battleships, Bibles, and Bishops: Blaspheming Empire 
When the Citizen of “Cyclops” threatens to “brain that bloody jewman” with a biscuit-
tin, he does so ostensibly because Bloom has blasphemed “the holy name” (U, 12.1811)—but 
this is just the stated component of the Citizen’s more general animosity toward a man 
conceived as religiously, racially, sexually, and nationally alien. Here Joyce demonstrates an 
alignment, in the minds of Dublin’s citizenry, between two classes of “criminal”: blasphemers 
and outsiders. Bloom’s preceding diatribe in the episode has affected the Citizen and others as 
blasphemous in the strictly religious sense that is our primary concern here, but also in several 
secular senses—a state of affairs that mirrors Joyce’s use of specifically religious irreverence to 
construct his many ideological critiques of secular power. We have taken note of Joyce’s artistic 
achievement at the end of “Cyclops,” his complexly ironic and seriocomic uses of scriptural 
precedent, and of what this indicates about blasphemy’s double nature as profanatory and 
affirmative. But this scene also figures centrally in Ulysses’ larger polemical project of using 
blasphemy formally and thematically to combat the intolerances of both British imperial and 
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Irish nationalist ideologies, as well as those that issue from Ireland’s other colonizer, in Joyce’s 
view: the Roman Catholic Church. Joyce uses the language and raw materials of Catholicism in 
the same irreverent fashion in which he uses the English language and the English literary 
tradition, turning the rhetorical weaponry of church and empire against them. Finnegans Wake’s 
Shem the Penman functions as an allegorical figure for Joyce in this regard, directing his 
“blasphematory spits” at these twin colonialisms as he denounces the crimes committed by the 
Church and by his own rival, Shaun, the British-like imperialist (183.24). “[A]lways 
blaspheming,” Shem wields the “lifewand,” as a priest might wield his mysterious powers of 
consecration—to lift it is to make “the dumb speak”—while the imperial Shaun “points the 
deathbone and the quick are still” (177.23, 195.5, 193.29). Like his creator, Shem deals equally 
with Ireland’s “conqueror” and its “gay betrayer” (U, 1.405). 
An earlier instance of blasphemy’s positioning between religion and politics comes in 
the Portrait’s celebrated Christmas dinner scene, which highlights a contest between politically 
inflected discourses of sacred and profane. In that scene, Simon Dedalus and his friend Mr. 
Casey object to what they perceive as a profanatory treatment of their idol, Charles Stewart 
Parnell. They object, in other words, to the rhetorical and other forms of desecration that Parnell 
has endured from the very people he was trying to lead and to save. For her part, Stephen’s 
aunt Dante rejects Parnell as himself a profaner; as a pious woman, she follows the dictates of 
the Church, which denounced Parnell as “a public sinner,” thus “no longer worthy to lead” (32). 
The rift caused by the Church’s position in this matter has forced Irish Catholics to realign their 
own allegiances, to decide which authority they hold more sacred than the other: that of the 
Church, or that of the thwarted Parnell.  
We are concerned here primarily with blasphemy in its full theological sense, rather 
than a diluted secularization of the term—but when discussing Joyce in the contexts of Irish 
  
35 
    
colonialism and nationalism, it is important to recognize the extent to which Joyce puts both 
discourses into dialogue: blasphemy as such, in one corner, and “blasphemies” against 
prevailing political orthodoxies in the other. One is struck in the Christmas dinner scene, for 
example, by the way political irreverence becomes inevitably implicated in the language of 
religious transgression. As the family argument escalates around the dinner table, Mr. Casey is 
moved to declare, “No God for Ireland! . . . Away with God!” (39). Dante’s response is swift and 
unequivocal: “Blasphemer! Devil!” (39). As always with the politics of blasphemy, opposing 
factions battle over control of blasphemy itself as a discourse—over who will wield it, and who 
will assert the authority to accuse the other of it. In a rather ingenious move, Simon even 
charges the Bible with using “bad language,” implying that scripture itself is blasphemous (32). 
Dante’s reaction is to lament that Stephen will never be able to forget “the language he heard 
against God and religion and priests in his own home,” and insofar as Stephen is an 
autobiographical character, her prediction proves true (33). For Joyce not only remembered 
these blasphemies well enough to enshrine them in literature; he also never forgot the mutual 
implications of blasphemy as both a religious and a political phenomenon, an expressive vehicle 
for polemics of church as well as of state.  
Joyce’s critiques of both empire and nationalism build on profane rewritings of biblical 
typologies, including Ireland’s deep-rooted cultural identification with the Bible’s “chosen 
people,” the Israelites.16 (We shall see in Chapter Three that a strikingly similar Hebraic context 
informs the strategies of many Harlem Renaissance writers.) This is one of the foremost contexts 
determining Joyce’s decision to set an Irish Jew at the center of Ulysses; the Celtic-Israelite 
                                                 
16  As Neil Davison writes, “Joyce’s theory about an Irish-Jewish similarity,” dramatized at length in Ulysses, “drew 
on nationalistic rhetoric he had encountered in childhood. Utilizing Irish histories that claimed an Hebraic ancestry 
for the Milesian Celts, Parnell-as-Moses images influenced Joyce’s earliest political awareness” (James Joyce, 7). Not 
incidentally, Joyce also casts Shem the Penman—and, implicitly, himself—in the role of set-upon Jew, or “yude” 
(FW, 171.1). See Marin Linett, “The Jew’s Text: ‘Shem the Penman’ and ‘Shaun the Post.’” 
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identification also emerges in many other ways throughout the novel.17 The Ithaca episode’s 
catechistical respondent cites, among other “points of contact” between Jews and the Irish, 
“their dispersal, persecution, survival and revival,” and “the restoration in Chanah David of 
Zion and the possibility of Irish political autonomy or devolution” (17.745-60). In “Circe,” in his 
role as messiah and civic reformer, Bloom warmly embraces John Howard Parnell and praises 
“green Erin, the promised land of our common ancestors” (15.1517-18). “Well, they’re still 
waiting for their redeemer,” observes Martin Cunningham in “Cyclops”; “For that matter so are 
we” (12.1644-45). Small surprise that the rhetorical highlight of the obsessively oratorical Aeolus 
episode should arrive when Professor MacHugh recites, from memory, a speech of John F. 
Taylor’s which hinges on a figurative identification of the Irish with the Israelites and of Egypt 
with England—or that Joyce should have deemed this recitation the only portion of Ulysses that 
could be lifted from its context and recorded, for all posterity, by the author (7.828-79).18 
Joyce puts this cultural identification, in part, to the uses that Professor MacHugh does, 
as a way of deriding British imperialism and of articulating colonial dissent. But Joyce is keener 
than MacHugh to turn the logic of the Hebraic homology back against many Irish citizens’ own 
misguided perceptions of cultural otherness. As Andrew Gibson demonstrates in his book 
Joyce’s Revenge, the rhetoric of Irish nationalism turned decisively against the figure of the Jew 
as the twentieth century approached, essentially repudiating the Jewish identification on which 
it had earlier drawn: “as Jews enter Ireland in greater numbers,” Gibson writes, “the Irish-
Jewish identification traditional within the culture breaks down. Griffith, Moran, and others 
                                                 
17  Stephen invokes it in the context of a celebrated Fenian leader (“They have forgotten Kevin Egan, not he them. 
Remembering thee, O Sion”) and riffs again on this theme in “Oxen of the Sun”: “Return, return, Clan Milly: forget 
me not, O Milesian” (U, 3.263-64, 14.371-72). Elsewhere Stephen makes the Hebraic identification at a more 
personal level; recalling the Jewish merchants he observed during his sojourn in Paris, he perceives a cultural 
imposition similar to that of the British over the Irish. If his own “soul frets in the shadow of [the English] 
language,” Jews too must make their way using the languages and customs of alien cultures: “Not theirs: these 
clothes, this speech, these gestures” (PA, 189; U, 2.367). 
18  For more on this audio recording, see Adrian Curtin, “Hearing Joyce Speak.” 
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begin to identify the arriving Jews with invaders and thus with the colonizer.”19 This, of course, 
is exactly what Joyce depicts the Citizen doing in “Cyclops,” indiscriminately casting Jews and 
the British as alien invaders—to the extent, even, of comparing Bloom to Cromwell and to other 
English “canters,” the homophonic suggestion of “cantor” further insinuating the logical 
conflation of Jewish and imperialist (12.1506). The Jewish Irish Bloom, a doubled figure of 
colonization and homelessness, is Joyce’s answer to the Citizen’s warped identification of Jew 
and imperialist, and Bloom explicitly endorses the cultural homology that he himself embodies; 
in “Ithaca,” he imagines a “multiple, ethnically irreducible consummation” of the two 
“Zionisms,” chanting the Zionist anthem for Stephen’s delectation (17.761-64).   
Meanwhile, Ulysses casts the British Empire as relying upon a different form of biblical 
rewriting. According to the Cyclops episode’s parody of the Apostles’ Creed, Britain believes in 
“rod, the scourger” instead of God the Father, creator not of heaven and earth but of “hell upon 
earth” (12.1354). In place of Jesus Christ the Son of God, the colonizer believes “in Jacky Tar, the 
son of a gun,” born not of a Virgin and the Holy Ghost but of the Navy and of “unholy boast” 
(12.1355). This creed comically conflates religion and patriotism in much the same way that the 
Citizen himself does, in all seriousness, by collapsing religious zeal and Irish nationalism into 
one dubious sentiment: “The blessing of God and Mary and Patrick on you” (12.1504). What is 
left out of such a blessing is the Christian sentiment Bloom endorses, that of love, “the opposite 
of hatred” (12.1485). To the Citizen, love is a farce, and he thus characterizes Bloom as complicit 
with all those British “canters” who preach love and peace as a way to excuse the very injustices 
they perpetrate (12.1506-09). Here we may well pause to marvel at the Citizen’s unconscious 
self-criticism. For he uses the language of religious and nationalist piety to promote his own 
intolerant and violent rhetoric, much as the British excuse their “battleships” with reference to 
                                                 
19  Gibson, Joyce’s Revenge, 50.  
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their “bibles,” placing less faith in Christ’s teachings than in the so-called British Beatitudes: 
“Beer, beef, business, bibles, bulldogs, battleships, buggery and bishops” (14.1459-60).      
If Joyce here mocks empire by putting ludicrously blasphemous words into its mouth, 
elsewhere he more subtly satirizes the empire’s own often overblown rhetoric; Victoria is 
facetiously celebrated, at one point, as “defender of the faith, Empress of India, even she, who 
bore rule, a victress over many peoples, the wellbeloved, for they knew and loved her from the 
rising of the sun to the going down thereof, the pale, the dark, the ruddy and the ethiop” 
(12.296-99). Joyce habitually uses blasphemy in the service of such critiques, as when he has 
Britain’s monarch step onto the stage of “Circe”:   
EDWARD THE SEVENTH  
 
(levitates over heaps of slain, in the garb and with the halo of Joking Jesus, a white jujube 
in his phosphorescent face)  
 
My methods are new and are causing surprise. 
To make the blind see I throw dust in their eyes. (15.4475-79) 
Edward VII appears here in the Joking Jesus role prepared by Malachi Mulligan’s ballad in the 
novel’s first episode, making a mockery of Britain’s religious as well as its political sovereignty, 
its straight-faced but absurd bearing of the white man’s burden. In a travesty of Christ’s 
ascension, Edward levitates, but he does so over “heaps of slain,” at once a specific reference to 
the Boer Wars and a more general denunciation of colonialist violence. The king’s jujube, 
sucked white, metaphorizes the empire’s bloodletting and the cultural “whitening” of its 
subjects. The lines he speaks adopt the rhyme scheme and meter of Mulligan’s ballad, but they 
constitute a less playful, more acid indictment of the empire’s Orwellian rhetoric: as war makes 
peace, so blinding and misdirection bring sight. These examples of British dissimulation, of self-
serving rhetoric promulgated in the interest of suppression and of ideological consolidation, 
likewise borrow Christianity’s language of paradox—“For whosoever will save his life shall lose 
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it”; “So the last shall be first, and the first last”—as both the Joking-Jesus trappings and the logic 
of Mulligan’s ballad imply.20 (Stephen Dedalus offers a more comical reflection on Christian 
paradox in Ulysses: “He Who Himself begot middler the Holy Ghost and Himself sent Himself, 
Agenbuyer, between Himself and others,” and now “sitteth on the right hand of His Own Self 
but shall come in the latter day to doom the quick and dead when all the quick shall be dead 
already” [9.493-99].) 
Following “Circe”’s blasphemous portrayal of the sovereign as a jujube-sucking, 
imperially murderous “joking Jesus,” another transgressively typological figure takes the stage: 
the Irish “Croppy Boy,” subject of Ben Dollard’s ballad performance in the Sirens episode 
(15.4475-77). The Croppy Boy returns here to figure once more as both an Irish Christ figure and 
a personification of colonial, anti-Catholic persecution. In the ballad version Joyce incorporated 
in “Sirens,” the Croppy Boy falls victim to a betrayal both colonialist and religious: he enters a 
Catholic church and makes his confession to “a vested Priest in a lonely chair,” only to discover 
that this “priest” is really a British soldier in disguise.21 The Croppy Boy is then arrested and led 
away to be hanged, a Christlike fate whose typological overtones are emphasized in macabre 
fashion. In one of the darker instances of Joycean humor, the crucified here suffers a 
spontaneous erection and emission, and three women “rush forward with their handkerchiefs” 
to clean up the Croppy Boy’s semen—a morbid version of the three Marys who attend the 
Crucifixion in John’s gospel (15.4548-52; John 19:25). Ulysses’ far more central Christ figure, of 
course, is the man who in “Sirens” sits in an adjoining room at the Ormond Hotel bar, sipping 
cider and listening to the Croppy Boy’s sad tale as sung by Ben Dollard. Like the ballad’s hero, 
Leopold Bloom must suffer in “Circe” a variety of bodily humiliations. Unlike the Croppy Boy, 
                                                 
20  Luke 9:24; Matt. 20:16. Cleanth Brooks makes this point about Christianity and the language of paradox in The Well 
Wrought Urn, 17-18.   
21  Carroll Malone, “The Croppy Boy,” 156-57.  
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though, Bloom’s own Christ-identifications exceed the normal bounds of typology, approaching 
something like a literary re-Incarnation—at least given the logic of Joyce’s fictional universe, 
which is, among other things, an irreverent exercise in transubstantiation.  
 
“For This is My Body” 
There are novelists for whom fiction is only secondarily an evocation of imagined 
worlds—for whom novels, first and last, are variable arrangements of words on pages. Hugh 
Kenner called such writers “stoic comedians,” less storytellers than word-arrangers, and he 
placed James Joyce squarely among them: “He could not, we know, improvise a tale by the 
fireside, not to save his life; but he is enough the master of Gutenberg technology to fabricate 
the traces of a tale out of printed signs.” While there is much truth in this, it is nonetheless also 
true that Joyce viewed his artist’s vocation in more rarefied, sacerdotal terms than those of a 
tech-savvy Gutenbergian. The title of his verse manifesto “The Holy Office” was only partly 
ironic; Joyce’s preoccupation with words found expression not in the words themselves but in 
the production of words made flesh, and he explicitly conceived of his texts as 
transubstantiated bodies. “Don’t you think,” he would ask, “there is a certain resemblance 
between the mystery of the Mass and what I am trying to do?”22  
This comparison ultimately became for Joyce less a matter of mere resemblance than of a 
strikingly literalized identification of literary production with the mystery of the Eucharist.23 
The logic of the Mass encourages such literalism, it being heretical to conceive of the  
Communion as only figurative, and Joyce’s mind never ceased to obey the coldly Jesuitical logic 
in which it was steeped. Thus did he announce at his fiftieth birthday party, presented with a 
                                                 
22  Kenner, Flaubert, Joyce, and Beckett, xviii; Joyce, qtd. in Stanislaus Joyce, My Brother’s Keeper, 103-04. 
23  Frederick Lang has developed an elaborate schema of correspondences between the events of Ulysses and of the 
Catholic Mass in “Ulysses” and the Irish God. For more on Joyce’s creative uses of the Mass, see Dennis M. 
Shanahan, “The Eucharistic Aesthetics of the Passion,” and Frances L. Restuccia, “Transubstantiating Ulysses.” 
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cake decorated as a copy of Ulysses, “Accipite et manducate ex hoc omnes: Hoc est enim corpus 
meum” (“Take and eat you all of this, for this is my body”).24 Part and parcel of Ulysses’ 
blasphemous aesthetic is the eucharistic textuality that constitutes it, and Joyce happily takes up 
the roles of Creator, martyr, and priest in offering that book for our reverent consumption. As 
William Franke rightly observes, “the core of the Bible as it is refracted in Joyce consists in the 
eucharistic celebration of the death of Christ, his offer of his flesh as nourishment for all.”25 The 
ceremony of the Eucharist is in fact the predominant blasphemous figure in Ulysses, a novel that 
begins with a mock-Communion, climaxes with an elaborate Black Mass, and ends with the 
eucharistic embodiment of Molly Bloom. If Ulysses and Finnegans Wake are any indication, in 
other words, Joyce did not outgrow the eucharistic trope of the artist the way he outgrew other 
aesthetic notions of his own and Stephen’s youth.  
Joyce’s characterization of Stephen in A Portrait of the Artist lays bare the theological 
impetus of his art in a way that reflects the impetus of Joyce’s own.26 However, as suggested by 
Joyce’s subtly mocking attitude in the Portrait and more obviously critical depiction in Ulysses, 
Stephen never does fulfill the function of such a “priest of eternal imagination”—in large part, it 
seems, because of his constitutional repulsion from “the daily bread of experience” and, even 
more, from the “radiant body” of mortal flesh (PA, 218, 221).  Joyce’s Portrait famously casts 
religious apostasy as the prerequisite for authentic art, but this is merely an early stage in 
                                                 
24  Quoted in Eugene Jolas, “My Friend James Joyce,” 8. F. Scott Fitzgerald memorialized a similar dinner party of a 
few years earlier with a drawing, the “Festival of St. James,” that bears a cartoonish resemblance to Leonardo’s Last 
Supper. The sketch outfits Joyce with a halo, as befits his hypostatic role, and depicts Fitzgerald himself at Joyce’s 
side, on bended knee, in the attitude of a pious disciple (Fitzgerald, “Festival”).   
25  Franke, “Joyce and the Bible,” 642. 
26  Consider the composition of Stephen’s villanelle in that novel. After dreaming of “the ecstasy of seraphic life,” 
Stephen awakens to the task of transubstantiating Word into word, and word into flesh: “O! In the virgin womb of 
the imagination the word was made flesh. Gabriel the seraph had come to the virgin’s chamber” (PA, 217). (As he 
proceeds to indite his “eucharistic hymn,” he imagines “incense ascending from the altar of the world” [218]. 
Stephen is also fond, like Joyce, of equating his authorial persona with God the Father. In Ulysses’ Proteus episode, 
too, having jotted down some verses about a pale vampire, Stephen remarks, “Et vidit Deus. Et erant valde bona” 
(“And God saw. And they were good”); later, just before launching into his Parable of the Plums, he thinks, “Let 
there be life,” again equating his literary production with the Father’s creation (3.439-40, 7.930). 
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Joyce’s evolving blasphemous project. Stephen Dedalus lacks the sensual awareness, the respect 
for the body, that Leopold Bloom and Ulysses both celebrate and manifest. Ulysses contends 
implicitly that transcendent art need not transcend the body, that furthermore the novel form 
can be used to express the one by means of the other. Thus it is Bloom’s body, not Stephen’s, 
that enjoys the eucharistic pride of place in Ulysses. It is Bloom who says, while envisioning an 
imminent bath and the quasi-Elevation of his floating penis, “This is my body”: Jesus’ words at 
the Last Supper, as he offers his flesh to the consumption of the faithful, much as Joyce offers 
Bloom’s in Ulysses (5.566; Luke 22:19). Not incidentally, Bloom’s bathing scene—an 
overdetermined religious image combining Eucharist, baptism, and an evocation of Bloom as an 
ironic Jewish patriarch, the “limp father of thousands”—is also completely incommensurable 
with everything we know about the hydrophobic Stephen, who last bathed in October 1903 
(17.237-39). Bloom’s body will be made to bear much of the novel’s religious and typological 
freight; Stephen’s cannot.  
The elevation of Bloom over Stephen in Ulysses, like the Elevation of Bloom’s organ in 
the bath, is a core component of Joyce’s implicit commentary on the nature of Christ. For in 
conceiving of one’s art as a Word made flesh, the blasphemous modernist must privilege the 
fleshly part of that equation as a weapon against the centuries of ecclesiastical identification of 
flesh with sin. Mina Loy, for one, undertakes this cause with a vengeance; Joyce too, in Ulysses 
and Finnegans Wake, rejects the kind of dualism that characterizes Stephen’s thinking and which 
makes possible such rigid oppositions as flesh and spirit, sin and grace. Richard Ellmann writes 
that Joyce’s writing was a means of “purification,” “a continual rebaptism of the mind,” yet the 
“baptismal” waters of something like “Penelope” or Finnegans Wake insist on impurity, or rather 
on the illusoriness and undesirability of purity (JJ, 110). If purification is what Joyce is after, it is 
an ironic cleansing by means of impure mixtures and bodily fluids—a Joycean project on 
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display from the punning title of his first published book, Chamber Music. (“Chamber music,” 
thinks Bloom. “Could make a kind of pun on that. It is a kind of music I often thought when 
she. Acoustics that is. Tinkling” [11.979-81].) As for Ulysses, the “mixedup things” Molly cites 
Bloom as knowing so well, and the “mixed middlings” that other Dubliners accuse Bloom of 
embodying, suitably reflect the mixed-up stylistic and thematic predilections of the novel 
(18.179-80, 12.1658-59). As John Paul Riquelme observes, Ulysses’ “styles resist being understood 
as unmixed or unadulterated language,” yielding “no coherent basis for accepting aesthetic, 
cultural, political, or racial purity as attractive or possible. Even Molly’s ‘Yes’ is mixed.”27 
Nowhere is this preference for the mixed, the impure, and the hybrid more pronounced 
than in Ulysses’ treatments of the sacred and the profane, as emblematized by such unexpected 
interpolations as “Christicle” and “Christass” (14.1579, 15.4141) and by such lewd parodies as 
this, in “Oxen of the Sun”: “O lust our refuge and our strength. . . . Of John Thomas her spouse. 
. . . Through yerd our lord, Amen” (14.1520-27; “John Thomas” and “yerd” are slang for penis.) 
Such is the nature of Joyce’s art, the profane always dogging the sacred and vice versa—so that 
when Stephen’s soul is made to cry “Heavenly God!” in the Portrait, it does so “in an outburst of 
profane joy” (171). So it is that in “The Holy Office” Joyce proclaims his ironically Christlike 
mission as that of redeeming his literary elders and contemporaries from their own soulless and 
fleshless art, and by revealing in his own the full body and soul of human experience, word and 
Word, Eros and agape, flesh and spirit:     
Thus I relieve their timid arses, 
Perform my office of Katharsis. 
My scarlet leaves them white as wool: 
Through me they purge a bellyful.28  
                                                 
27  Riquelme, “‘Preparatory to Anything Else,’” 11.  
28  Joyce, “The Holy Office,” 658. 
  
44 
    
Joyce’s “scarlet” writing here conflates Joyce/Christ’s redeeming blood with a naked textuality 
of the flesh. Such are the terms of his (un)holy office, his calling as randy Redeemer and cloacal 
Christ.  
 
  Buck and Other Body-Texts 
In the world of Ulysses this office, the blasphemer’s burden, is shouldered most 
conscientiously by Malachi “Buck” Mulligan—a consideration which requires that we 
reappraise this character and his value to the novel. Ulysses after all opens by invoking, not the 
Muse—as would seem to be dictated by the novel’s Homeric trappings—but rather a 
transgendered Christ, “the genuine christine” (1.21). That it does so in the voice of Buck 
Mulligan, as he intones the opening phrase of the old Latin Mass, says something about the 
novel’s imaginative investments and also about the character who does the invoking. Rather 
than the author beseeching the Muse’s inspiration, we have a character, the bawdy Buck, 
conjuring a female Redeemer in his trademark mock-solemn fashion. We begin, that is, with the 
“prelate” Mulligan and his series of blasphemous invocations, and we are unable as yet to 
determine whether the author endorses or disdains the irreverence of their utterance (1.32). 
Certainly the adult Joyce, “notable for his avoidance of blasphemy and foul language,”  had as 
little appreciation for such casual irreverence as does the Stephen Dedalus of Ulysses, who now 
ascends “displeased and sleepy” to the foot, not of God’s altar (“Introibo ad altare Dei”), but of 
Mulligan himself (1.13, .5).29 Stephen “looked coldly at the shaking gurgling face that blessed 
him” (1.14-15), but does Joyce look on so coldly? Are we to interpret Mulligan as the “usurper” 
that Stephen and, later, Bloom perceive him to be, or might Joyce have a more significant role 
for him to play?  
                                                 
29  Roy Gottfried, Joyce’s Misbelief, 8. 
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Mulligan has often been taken for a malignant character, either a villain within the 
novel’s scheme of values or, at best, the cautionary foil and bad influence for a troubled 
Stephen. It has been easy enough to write this character off, in the words of that other Bloom 
(Harold), as “The obscene Buck Mulligan, Joyce’s black beast.”30 When we reflect, however, that 
Ulysses is structured by the very ceremony over which Mulligan presides in the opening scene, 
we are impelled to other reflections, including the recognition that Mulligan is the resident 
blasphemer of a richly blasphemous text. It may be, in other words, that Joyce endorses 
Mulligan’s playful recycling of Christianity and Scripture—this, after all, is what Ulysses itself 
does with them—over Stephen’s morose denial.  
Stephen identifies Mulligan as belonging to “the brood of mockers,” associating him 
with such Catholic heresiarchs as Photius, Arius, and Sabellius (1.657). But his casting of 
Mulligan in this fashion suggests that Stephen has emphasized what is at most the lesser 
portion of his friend’s irreverent character: the heretical, that is, instead of the blasphemous. 
Mulligan, a mocker indeed, has far less in common with such infamous Catholic heretics than 
he does with those serial blasphemers of the nineteenth century, such as George William Foote, 
whose crimes included publishing ribald cartoon depictions of the Bible’s more comical 
moments—for instance, God’s posterior as revealed to Moses.31 It is much easier to imagine 
Mulligan joining in such jocularly blasphemous company than it is to imagine him holding 
forth on heretical doctrine along with a Photius or an Arius. It is likewise hard to imagine an 
earnest heretic performing the many “rather blasphemous” functions, as Haines understates the 
case, that Mulligan performs in this episode and throughout the novel—from the Communion-
style breakfast he dispenses to the gathered trinity of Martello Tower inhabitants (“Patris et Filii 
                                                 
30  Bloom, Introduction, 5. 
31  Founder of The Freethinker and printer of many such irreverent cartoons and commentaries, Foote was sentenced to 
a year’s imprisonment, which he documents in the 1886 work Prisoner for Blasphemy.  On Foote’s career as a 
blasphemer, see Leonard Levy’s Blasphemy, 479-94, and Joss Marsh’s Word Crimes, 127-214.    
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et Spiritus Sancti”) to the perpetual recitations of his “Ballad of Joking Jesus” (1.605, .351, .584-
599). Mulligan is particularly fond of travestying scripture—Matthew 26:75 and Proverbs 19:17 
are favorites—and the Stations of the Cross (1.527, .727; 1.510, 15.4170). His pet name for 
Stephen, “dogsbody,” is, as Robert Bell notes, “a characteristically blasphemous inversion.”32 
And later we will find him “praying,” with “pious eyes upturned,” “Blessed Margaret Mary 
Anycock!” (9.645-46). 
In sum, Mulligan’s jokes and jibes yield scant evidence of heterodox belief. What they 
instead evince is a blasphemous willingness to toy with Catholic Christianity on its most 
orthodox terms. There is much, of course, that the Stephen of 1904 has yet to learn in order to 
grow into something more like the adult Joyce, and his misidentification of Mulligan as 
heretic—despite Stephen’s formidable theological prowess—signals, perhaps, one of his more 
urgent deficits of understanding, taking its place alongside his naivety with regard to the 
opposite sex and his lack of a proper appreciation for the body. Stephen, as we know him in 
Ulysses, could never have written Ulysses, a fact in part attested by his failure to understand the 
nature of blasphemy as such or to appreciate the virtues of blasphemous play. His relationship 
to blasphemy may indeed have been one of the more significant reasons that Joyce felt, after the 
Portrait, that Stephen had “a shape that can’t be changed,” and so could not be cast as Ulysses’ 
central figure.33 That central figure ended up being Bloom, but perhaps Joyce also had in mind a 
more central and valorized role than is generally recognized for the character of Mulligan. 
Robert Bell’s work on Ulysses is a useful precedent here. Since “Malachi” is Hebrew for 
messenger, Bell wonders, might we rightly see him as Joyce’s messenger? Mulligan does seem 
                                                 
32  Bell, Jocoserious Joyce, 36. 
33  Quoted in Frank Budgen, James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses, 105.   
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preternaturally gifted with authorial insight.34 I would add that Malachi in the Old Testament 
prophesies the return of Elijah or, according to Christian typology, the coming of Christ: not an 
insignificant precedent, given that Joyce casts Bloom as a quasi-Christ and has him ascend in 
Elijah’s chariot at the end of “Cyclops” (Elijah 4:5).  
Stephen thinks, as Buck enters the library, “Hast thou found me, O mine enemy?”: the 
question Ahab asks Elijah at 1 Kings 21:20 (9.483). Mulligan here is figured not only as the 
prophet of Elijah’s return but as Elijah himself, an identification normally reserved for Bloom. 
More broadly, the notion that Mulligan is in some sense the novel’s “messenger” is attested by 
the way his own particular blasphemous and literary performances mirror those of Ulysses 
itself. “The Lord has spoken to Malachi,” he announces in the Scylla chapter as he begins to 
write his play “Everyman His Own Wife”—thus not only echoing his Old-Testament namesake 
but also invoking God instead of the Muse for literary creation, much as Ulysses itself has done 
in its first lines (9.1056). Appropriately, when the divinely inspired Mulligan later reads the play 
aloud, he does so from “his tablet,” as though like Bloom and Moses he bears “in his arms the 
tables of the law, graven in the language of the outlaw” (9.1170, 7.868-69). Buck’s is indeed the 
language of the outlaw, of the blasphemer, and his sacred tablets appropriately yield “a 
national immorality in three orgasms”: an extended riff on masturbation (9.1174). But 
Mulligan’s blasphemies most significantly mirror those of Ulysses itself in the novel’s very first 
scene. As he transubstantiates his shaving lather into “the genuine christine”—whose 
corporeality he emphasizes by remarking her “white corpuscles” and “blood and ouns”—he is 
performing in microcosm the service Ulysses performs as a whole, making of words and of the 
                                                 
34  Bell points to Mulligan’s seemingly “supernatural insight” in the Scylla-and-Charybdis episode, “as though he 
were endowed with some divine or authorial knowledge”—or as though “Buck has discussed the novel’s schema 
with Joyce” (Jocoserious Joyce, 16). 
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Word a text that is also determinedly a body, and a body that will finally overwhelm the novel 
in its final episode, as distinctions between flesh and text recede almost entirely (1.21-32).  
We must at any rate ask whether Ulysses, Joyce’s self-described “epic of the human 
body,” does not privilege this bawdy Buck over the body-phobic Stephen.35 Jonathan Greenberg 
has observed that Mulligan habitually “reverses the process of transubstantiation, reducing 
spirit to body,” and he is right to identify Mulligan as the locus of Ulysses’ satirical energies; I 
take issue only with the word “reducing.”36 For Joyce’s novel raises the body. Here the “Spirit,” 
in the words of Mina Loy’s Ulysses poem, is ever “impaled upon” the Flesh, subordinated to its 
sanctity (Lost, 88). Mulligan thus finds himself, with Mr. and Mrs. Bloom, on the winning side of 
Ulysses’ valorizations of the body, while Stephen seems if anything to have devolved in this 
regard from where we left him in the Portrait. Cranly was well within his rights when, in that 
novel, he contested Stephen’s claim to “freedom” from the Church: “But you are not free 
enough yet to commit a sacrilege” (246). Ulysses is the inscription and embodiment of that 
sacrilegious temerity for which the young Stephen is not yet prepared. Unlike Stephen, Ulysses 
is less interested in the spirit as such than in the spirit made flesh, in the figures of Leopold and 
Molly Bloom and in the textures of the novel itself. 
The first acquaintance Bloom meets in his day’s travels greets him appropriately: 
“How’s the body?” (5.86). For Bloom is body, a body with much more definite desires than 
Stephen’s has.37 Watching an attractive woman in silk stockings, Bloom thinks, “Esprit de corps,” 
                                                 
35  Quoted in Frank Budgen, James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses, 21. In the Linati schema, Joyce notes that Stephen 
“non soffre ancora il corpo” (“does not yet bear a body”) (Richard Ellmann, Ulysses on the Liffey, 189). In contrast, 
we meet Buck immediately as a “plump” and highly visible body, covered only by an “ungirdled” dressing gown 
tossed about by the mild morning air. The narrator lingers over Mulligan’s corporeal details in a way it never does 
for Stephen: we see Buck’s “light untonsured hair, grained and hued like pale oak,” his “even white teeth 
glistening here and there with gold points,” his “plump shadowed face and sullen oval jowl”; we watch him shave, 
and soon we will see him swim, without so much as an untied gown to cover him (1.15-32).  
36  Greenberg, Modernism, Satire, and the Novel, 34. 
37 From the first sentence of “Calypso,” Joyce underscores the corporeal chasm separating Stephen and Leopold. The 
author refrained, in his schemata, from indicating a symbolic organ for Stephen’s star-turn in “Proteus”; here we 
  
49 
    
a pun suggesting that where Stephen accepts a dualism of flesh and spirit, Bloom is ready 
always to celebrate the spirit of the flesh (4.135). Even when Joyce makes us privy to Bloom’s 
privy at the close of “Calypso,” it is as though we are attending a sacred rite; “Ithaca” 
remembers the occasion as a “holy of holies” (17.2045). Bloom’s holy orifice falls well within the 
purview of Joyce’s holy office, his maculate defecation reminding us that Ulysses’ characteristic 
blasphemies come always in and through and of the human body. Which is why, as Robert Bell 
argues, the novel “absorbs” Mulligan’s mocking, playful, and—I would add—blasphemous 
spirit, his scatological irreverence and sacrilegious aesthetic.38 It is also why Mulligan leaves us 
halfway through the book, his services no longer necessary.  
No longer necessary, that is, because another blasphemous presence steps in to take his 
place, most notably in the Nausicaa, Circe, and Penelope chapters: the Joycean Arranger. 
Postulated by David Hayman and promptly adapted by Joyce critics everywhere, “the 
Arranger” is a name for that playful presence in Ulysses—“something between a persona and a 
function, somewhere between the narrator and the implied author”—that is responsible for 
such prose effects as the newspaper headlines in “Aeolus,” the sudden interpolation of iambic 
pentameter in “Scylla and Charybdis” (with its terminating “Woa!”), and for all those textual 
pyrotechnics—which become increasingly pronounced as Ulysses progresses—that can be 
neither attributed to nor allied with any known narrator or character. Another way to 
understand this arranging presence is to think of it, in Richard Pearce’s words, as a “body-text,” 
a subversive voice generated not from a narrator or character but “from the physical text itself, 
                                                                                                                                                             
meet a man who relishes organs of all sorts, and this is the first thing Joyce tells us about him. A little later we find 
him contemplating his wife’s “ample bed-warmed flesh” with similar relish (4.238-39). As a poet, at any rate, 
Bloom is far too “kinetic” to satisfy the terms of Stephen’s Thomist aesthetic theory (17.410), and Molly confirms 
her husband’s inordinate knowledge of “the body and the inside,” the sort of knowledge Joyce elsewhere satirizes 
Dubliners as lacking utterly—most pathetically in Stephen Hero’s mother’s attempt to describe “that hole we all 
have . . . here” (U, 18.180; Stephen Hero, 163; ellipsis in original). 
38  Bell, Jocoserious Joyce, 21. 
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the printed page.” It is a voice of rebellion: “Countering the authorial voice is the voice of the 
body-text, functioning like voice in speech as it modifies, contradicts, or adds meaning that goes 
beyond the meaning of the words. . . . The voice of the body-text makes itself felt rather than 
heard by intruding the materiality, or physicality, of the print.”39  
Pearce’s concept reflects an understanding of the text itself as a body that moves 
independently of the novel’s semantic significations. Worth emphasizing for our purposes, 
moreover, is that it is specifically a blasphemous voice and a blasphemous body. Its affinity for 
an aesthetics of sacrilege is inherent in its own somato-textual form, a form that finds its perfect 
expression in the novel’s final chapter. Its corporeality, finally, is wholly appropriate given that 
this is the blasphemous voice that picks up where Buck leaves off, asserting its presence more 
and more as Mulligan’s presence recedes farther and farther from view. Ulysses’ fifteenth 
episode, the first following Mulligan’s final departure from the novel (even when he appears in 
“Circe” it will be in metamorphosed form as Father Malachi O’Flynn), is thus likewise the 
blasphemous Arranger’s time to shine. It is this presence, not Mulligan or any other character, 
that will replace Christ’s face with that of “Sweny, the druggist” in a parodic invocation of the 
end of Flaubert’s The Temptation of St. Anthony, and who will give us  “Shitbroleeth” in place of 
the “Shibboleth” of Judges 12:6 (15.340, .770). It is also this presence that will instigate the 
phantasmagoric effects of Ulysses’ most bizarre and most blasphemous chapter.  
 
  At Circe’s Altar 
Commentators have tended to share Richard Ellmann’s interpretation of the Blooms’ 
coupling and of their sharing of the seedcake on Howth Hill—that Edenic ur-moment so 
                                                 
39  Hayman, “Ulysses”: The Mechanics of Meaning, 122; Pearce, The Politics of Narration, 50, 60. For more on Joyce’s 
somatic textuality, see Laura Doyle, “Races and Chains”; Katherine Mullin, “Joyce’s Bodies”; and Derek Attridge, 
Peculiar Language, 168-70. 
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centrally important to Ulysses’ emotional content—as essentially “a eucharistic occasion” (JJ, 
379). In which case, it is remarkable that this scene is attended by a third party, a goat: 
emblematic, in Christian symbolism, of lust and sin and the Devil, the beast to be damned when 
the sheep are saved. This is the symbolism at work in Stephen’s strange vision in A Portrait of 
filthy, concupiscent goat-men, figures for his own lust and guilt (137-38). Yet here at the 
moment of Poldy and Molly’s first communion we find a goat “walking surefooted, dropping 
currants” (8.911-12). The obviously positive content of the scene perhaps implies a revaluation 
of the goat figure and thus of sexuality, of lust and that which issues from it. Yet this goat’s 
presence inevitably also lends something of a satanic element to the eucharistic, paradisal 
tableau—subtly presaging the Black-Mass antics of “Circe,” whose riotous pages culminate the 
Howth Hill scene’s interrelated themes of Communion, sexuality, and the demonic.40  
One finds in “Circe” a microcosm of Ulysses’ profanely eucharistic structure. The Mass 
here begins with Private Compton’s announcing the entrance to Bella Cohen’s brothel of “the 
parson,” our own Stephen Dedalus, who duly begins to chant the “introit” as Mulligan did at 
the novel’s opening (15.74). He then starts in on the Vidi aquam, blasphemously metaphorizing a 
prostitute’s open arms as the healing, purifying waters of the faith (15.77-84). (His companion 
Lynch likewise chants from the Mass as he embraces one of the prostitutes on a couch 
[15.3640].) The episode’s Benediction comes later, presided over, as in “Nausicaa,” by Canon 
O’Hanlon. Communion itself will be celebrated in sacrilegious form at the height of “Circe”; led 
by a funhouse version of Malachi Mulligan, this Black Mass mirrors the whole chapter’s 
placement and function in Ulysses as both narrative climax and metanarrative distortion.  
                                                 
40  In an abandoned note for A Portrait of the Artist, Joyce writes that Stephen wanted to believe that his friend 
Doherty’s (i.e., Gogarty’s, or Mulligan’s) “coarseness of speech was not a blasphemy of the spirit but a coward’s 
mask, but in the end the troop of swinish images broke down his reserve and went trampling through his memory, 
followed by his laughter . . .” (The Workshop of Daedalus, 107). If this unused note recalls the herd of swine into 
which Jesus cast unclean spirits (Mark 5:8-13), it also suggests a symbolic association between Circe and blasphemy 
that Joyce magnifies and explodes in Ulysses’ fifteenth episode.      
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Informing Stephen’s blasphemous, mock-pastorly discourse throughout this episode are 
his memories of certain “heaven and hell show[s]” witnessed in Paris, with their pornographic 
depictions of debauched nuns, angels, and “holy apostles big damn ruffians” (15.3889-902). The 
more salient precedent for Stephen’s reductive blaspheming in “Circe,” however, is his very 
own usurper; Mulligan is the obvious model for Stephen as the latter vacillates between 
perversions of the liturgy and “Pornosophical philotheology,” playing mischievously on the 
exalted “horns” of Psalms 75:10 and earning the proprietress’s censure for such willful 
irreverence: “None of that here. Come to the wrong shop” (15.109, 3864-71).41 Stephen thus 
continues to pattern his blasphemies after Mulligan’s as he did in the previous episode, drink 
having given him the requisite courage: “Greater love than this, he said, no man hath that a 
man lay down his wife for his friend. Go thou and do likewise. Thus, or words to that effect, 
saith Zarathustra, sometime regius professor of French letters . . .” (14.360-63). This is pure 
Mulligan—the biblical parody (John 15:13), the Zarathustra, the French letters (condoms)—and 
it is he who presides, in the guise of Father Malachi O’Flynn, over the tumultuously sacrilegious 
climax of “Circe” and of Ulysses as a whole.  
Joyce here portrays a Black Mass of earth-sized proportions, attended by iconic imagery 
of the Crucifixion, Last Judgment, and Resurrection of the dead:  
Brimstone fires spring up. . . . Pandemonium. . . . The midnight sun is darkened. 
The earth trembles. The dead of Dublin from Prospect and Mount Jerome in 
white sheepskin overcoats and black goatfell cloaks arise and appear to many. A 
chasm opens with a noiseless yawn. . . . On an eminence, the centre of the earth, 
rises the fieldaltar of Saint Barbara.42 Black candles rise from its gospel and 
                                                 
41  When we recall Stephen’s earlier definition of God as a “shout in the street,” we can see that when Stephen says, in 
“Circe,” “Damn that fellow’s noise in the street,” he is blaspheming in the strictest sense according to the Law as 
given in the Hebrew Bible, which requires that the offender has both invoked God’s name in vain and insulted or 
defiled Him, as in “Damn God”—which is essentially what Stephen says here (U, 2.386, 15.2119-20). Compare 
15.3998: “Hark! Our friend noise in the street.” 
42  St. Barbara, as Don Gifford notes, is “the only female saint to bear the attribute of the sacramental cup and wafer”; 
it is also notable, given Joyce’s fear of lightning and his association of it with God, that St. Barbara’s “intercession 
was invoked as protection against lightning, explosives, and fire” (“Ulysses” Annotated, 527).  
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epistle horns.  . . . On the altarstone Mrs Mina Purefoy, goddess of unreason, lies, 
naked, fettered, a chalice resting on her swollen belly. Father Malachi O’Flynn in 
a lace petticoat and reversed chasuble, his two left feet back to the front, 
celebrates camp mass. (15.4661-95)           
 
This is traditional Black Mass staging, with the naked woman’s body taking the place of altar, 
but the rite is here elevated to biblical heights; “Ithaca” will call this episode “Armageddon” 
(17.2056). Similarly, the principle of irreverent inversion is taken to dramatic lengths: Father 
O’Flynn stands on backward feet and wears a reversed chasuble, while his attendant, the 
Reverend Mr. Haines Love, wears his head and collar backward. Soon the Voice of All the 
Damned—of those Dubliners who have emerged from their graves wearing “black goatfell” 
instead of “sheepskin overcoats”—responds to the ceremony with a reversal of Revelation 19:6: 
“Htengier Tnetopinmo Dog Drol eht rof, Aiulella!” (15.4707-08).     
The placement of the chalice on the woman’s belly compels us to read Mulligan’s 
“omphalos”—both as creative concept and as nickname for the tower from which he operates, 
and indeed as the resonant center of his body, so often exposed to view—as emblematic of his 
blasphemous and sacrilegious characterizations in the novel. Over the course of Ulysses, the 
omphalos has accrued meanings both reproductive and biblical, meanings which undergo a 
diabolic transvaluation in this Black Mass: Mulligan has proposed to establish on Lambay 
Island “a national fertilising farm to be named Omphalos,” where he will graciously facilitate 
“the fecundation of any female”; for his part Stephen has imagined the human omphalos as an 
umbilical telephone capable of dialing all the way back to Adam and Eve in “Edenville” (14.684-
87, 3.38-40).Now, although Mulligan has morphed into Father O’Flynn, he essentially repeats 
his priestly duties from atop “the omphalos” of Martello Tower on Ulysses’ opening page (1.544). 
Here, however, his Introit takes on a more explicitly devilish character (“Introibo ad altare 
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diaboli”), and in place of his shaving bowl and cream he draws from a chalice a “blooddripping 
host,” declaring “Corpus meum” (15.4699-703).  
This Mass inverts and distorts the already-mock Communion that opened the novel, 
while also lampooning and, in a reverse, blasphemous fashion, celebrating Ulysses’ eucharistic 
structure and thematics. At this instant, and to a subtler extent throughout the episode, Joyce’s 
arranging body-text performs an auto-sacrilegious critique. Given Joyce’s own conception of 
Ulysses as a eucharistic novel, in other words, this scene represents an extraordinary moment of 
reflexive profanation. It is as if, at the climax of a Mass, the presiding priest were diabolically to 
begin a blasphemous inversion of the ceremony. “Circe” thus has the effect, not only of 
simultaneously profaning and tacitly reinforcing the traditions of the Church (as any blasphemy 
worth the name must do), but also of profaning and reinforcing Joyce’s own eucharistic project, 
satirizing it while also throwing that project into relief. By profaning his own text, as it were, 
Joyce announces Ulysses as worthy of the act, thus affirming the sanctity of his art by 
incorporating its own blasphemous inversion and would-be negation.  
During this High Black Mass, Father O’Flynn’s attendant praises “the devil which hath 
made glad my young days,” echoing Stephen’s earlier praise of the prostitute Georgina 
Johnson, “ad deam qui laetificat iuventutum meam”: “the goddess who has gladdened the days of 
my youth” (15.4701, .122-23). Recalling Mulligan’s invocation of a “genuine christine,” Stephen 
effectively has a woman take God’s place in the language of the Mass. And although at the 
height of “Circe” God’s altar will be replaced by Mina Purefoy, it is this other exchange, that of 
God’s body for that of a woman, that more centrally dominates the novel from first page to last.  
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  Ecce Molly 
I have argued for Mina Loy’s affinity with Joyce in integrating religion, body, and text—
what she commemorates as “The Spirit . . . impaled upon the phallus”—and we shall see in 
Chapter Two that Loy’s poetry performs a similar integration while repudiating the implicitly 
phallocratic subtext, disentangling Spirit from phallus (Lost, 88). Yet Joyce himself knows a 
thing or two about unmanning the Spirit, and he does so in much the same ways Loy does, 
namely through radically blasphemous depictions of female embodiment. Loy habitually uses 
figurations and depictions of female embodiment to evoke women’s subjectivity, in diametric 
opposition to masculinist strategies of stressing that embodiment to objectify women. A similar 
process occurs in Ulysses’ Penelope episode, where the female body emerges, in a way Loy 
would surely appreciate, as an inherently sexual, life-sustaining, and polyamorous body. More, 
it emerges as the telos of Ulysses’ transubstantiative project. The result is a blasphemous 
transgendering of Christian ritual, one of the more significant ways “Penelope” rejects “the 
fallaciously inferred debility of the female” (17.2215-16). It is not only that Joyce creates, in 
Ulysses, a eucharistic, incarnational text in which words, the Word, and the flesh all meet. It is 
that where they meet, ultimately, is in the discursive body and embodied discourse of a woman, 
a body and words that effectively displace the male body and masculinist Word of Catholic 
ritual and dogma.  
Buck Mulligan’s initial substitution of christine for Christ has prefigured the final 
ascension of this body and voice. As Molly’s soliloquy makes emphatically clear, the end of 
Joyce’s eucharistic project is not the body of Christ but of a genuine Christine, whose 
incarnation finally arrives in the flesh and word of Marion Bloom.43 “[A]nd he came out,” says 
                                                 
43 Whether Joyce intended “christine” or “Christine” is a matter of debate. The word went un-capitalized in the Little 
Review (Joyce, “Ulysses: Episode 1,” 3) but was capitalized in Ulysses’ first and subsequent editions, including the 
1961 Random House edition. Hans Walter Gabler’s edition of the novel is the first to de-capitalize it, based upon 
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Molly of her pedantic husband, “with some jawbreakers about the incarnation he never can 
explain a thing simply the way a body can understand” (18.566-67). Bloom’s jawbreakers in 
“Calypso” had nothing to do with the Incarnation, of course—unless we interpret that event as 
a Christian theological version of divine “metempsychosis”—but in this final episode, by 
confusing her husband’s words, Molly unwittingly gets at the heart of Ulysses’ scriptural 
typology, which is indeed metempsychotic but is also something more. Bloom may have been 
Odysseus in a past literary life, that is, but insofar as he is this novel’s Christ he is more than a 
reincarnation; he is a re-Incarnation. As though the voice and body of a man is ultimately 
insufficient, however—even so “womanly” a man as Leopold Bloom—Joyce reserves for 
Ulysses’ final chapter its irreverently eucharistic culmination and the quintessential incarnation 
of the novel’s core values. For here sacred and worldly converge, word and flesh conflate, and 
they do so not, as in the gospels, in the teachings and sacrificial body of a divine man, but in the 
voice and body of a woman.  
“Penelope” is a text, above all, of desire: of desires fulfilled and frustrated, of desires for 
the future and desires for the here-and-now. Same-sex desire, too, and self-love. “[W]hat else 
were we given all those desires for Id like to know,” Molly wonders (18.1397-98). These desires 
occasionally take on religious trappings, as when she recalls the frisson of her petticoat 
“slip[ping] down” during the Elevation at Mass—with the suggestion that she was stimulated 
by the elevated body of Christ—and when she imagines a dalliance with a man of the cloth: “Id 
like to be embraced by one in his vestments and the smell of incense off him like the pope” 
(18.862, 118-20). Elsewhere, however, she raises vaguely feminist objections to the Church’s 
“senseless” teachings: “that old Bishop that spoke off the altar his long preach about womans 
                                                                                                                                                             
what appears to be a lower-case c in Joyce’s manuscript—but it deserves mention that the errata-hunting Joyce 
took no issue with its capitalization in the published novel.   
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higher functions about girls now riding the bicycle and wearing peak caps and the new woman 
bloomers God send him sense and me more money” (18.837-40). Her irreverence also takes 
more secular but inevitably related forms. She does not hesitate, for instance, to claim her 
superiority over men, or to reflect on the unfairness of patriarchy: “man man tyrant as ever. . . . 
and they always want to see a stain on the bed to know youre a virgin for them all thats 
troubling them theyre such fools. . . . itd be much better for the world to be governed by the 
women in it . . . I knew more about men and life when I was 15 than theyll all know at 50” 
(18.1245-46, .1125-27, .1435-36, .886-87). Nor does she remain silent on her indignation at having 
to exchange her professional life for the traditional division of labor (“I could have been a prima 
donna only I married him,” 18. 896). Nor, for that matter, is she willing to abide by such 
traditional norms for much longer: “were to be always chained up theyre not going to be 
chaining me up no damn fear once I start I tell you” (18.1390-92).   
In spite of Molly’s irreverence, however—or, perhaps, because of it—her bed is a sacred 
place, to be approached “reverently, the bed of conception and of birth, of consummation of 
marriage and of breach of marriage, of sleep and of death” (17.2119-21). Moreover, this sacred 
place is cast in the lineaments of Christian mystery, the blood and water Molly releases into her 
chamber pot recalling the blood and water that pour forth from Christ’s wound on the cross. As 
flesh and word, as all-body and logorrhea, as an embodiment of sexuality and of textuality, 
Molly incarnates Ulysses’ “sacreligious” gospel.44 “Penelope” replaces the body and theology of 
Christ with a female body and a female voice—and given Joyce’s evolving but consistently 
eucharistic conceptions of art and literature, from A Portrait to Finnegans Wake, such substitution 
is far from negligible.  
                                                 
44  Citing a well-known letter from Joyce to Frank Budgen, Jane Goldman writes that the Penelope episode finds Joyce 
“blasphemously inscribing the Christian gesture of the sign of the cross” onto Molly’s body (Modernism, 1910-1945, 
201). (Joyce had described Molly’s “four cardinal points” to his friend as comprising her “breasts, arse, womb and 
cunt” [Selected Letters, 285].)     
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Among other things, then, a consideration of Ulysses’ blasphemous modernism 
necessarily complicates critical views of “Penelope” as an instance of blatant misogyny or, at 
best, of a male author’s perversely androcentric projection. As Bonnie Kime Scott has observed, 
this episode occasions “greater critical anxiety than all the rest” of Joyce’s fictions.45 That 
statement was published in 1984, and the critical anxieties have only continued to accrete. My 
own opinion in the matter chimes, more or less, with Vicki Mahaffey’s recuperative viewpoint:   
Which is the more misogynist stance, the one that celebrates the full experience 
of female flesh, or the one that censors even the mention of intimate articles of 
female clothing? . . . And when Molly starts to speak, the reader learns that she is 
far more than the “2 lumps of lard” to which she fears Bloom has reduced her 
(18.1404). . . . Unlike so many women who think of themselves even in the third 
person, she speaks for herself: powerfully, lyrically, sometimes crudely, and 
without inhibition. 
 
Mahaffey reminds us of Joyce’s uniqueness among prevailing novelistic standards of the time 
while also rightly extolling Molly Bloom’s continued relevance for feminist study. In addition, 
as Laura Doyle argues, with “Penelope” Joyce gives voice not only to a woman but to a 
decidedly “other” woman—for Molly is “polyracial” as well as “‘impure’ . . . both sexually and 
racially. Yet Joyce gives this other woman a voice. In fact he gives her the last word.”46 The last 
Word, I would add, at least in this novel. For in the beginning was the Word, in this case a 
blasphemously feminized Word—“the genuine christine”—that at last has found its genuine 
Incarnation in a body and voice that are equal parts sacrilegious and sacred. Within the context 
of Ulysses, Molly Bloom represents the full flowering of that seedling whom Buck Mulligan 
invoked from atop Martello Tower—a flower that blooms and unfurls still further as it 
metamorphoses into Anna Livia Plurabelle, “haloed be her eve, her singtime sung, her rill be 
run, unhemmed as it is uneven!” (FW, 104.2-3).  
                                                 
45  Scott, Joyce and Feminism, 157. For more on the fraught questions of Joyce, feminism, and “Penelope,” see especially 
Richard Pearce, ed., Molly Blooms; Henke and Unkeless, eds., Women in Joyce; Wawrzycka and Corcoran, eds., 
Gender in Joyce; and Christine Van Boheemen, “Molly’s Heavenly Body,” 268.      
46  Mahaffey, “Ulysses and the End of Gender,” 165; Doyle, “Races and Chains,” 182.   
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Blasphemy, “Nature,” and Difference 
Anna Livia is of course “the Mosthighest” of Finnegans Wake, a novel that also makes 
room at the inn for highly profane versions of the male eucharistic body, notably Humphrey 
Chimpden Earwicker and Shem the Penman (104.4).47 Together with the Blooms, these 
insistently sexualized and scatologized Hosts embody wholly unorthodox and even, by the 
standards of their time and place, unnatural ways of thinking and desiring. Molly, for one, 
shares the general opinion that there is something unnatural about her husband. He would 
“kiss anything unnatural,” she supposes; “he wanted to milk me into the tea well hes beyond 
everything. . . . I suppose there isnt in all creation another man with the habits he has . . . but of 
course hes not natural like the rest of the world” (18.1402-03, .267-78, .1197-98). Joyce himself, 
who after all shared many of Bloom’s predilections, would surely appreciate our questioning 
Molly’s conception here of what is “natural.” In fact, it is one of Ulysses’ great successes to put 
pressure on ideological assumptions about what is natural and what is not—assumptions that 
dictate one’s criteria for what constitutes a man, or a woman, or a Jew or a Christian, an alien or 
kin, sacred or profane. Combining sacramental Communion with the heterodox, profane 
communions these bodies alternately imagine and enact, Joyce’s “sacreligious” art in fact drives 
at the very heart of conventional assumptions about the natural and unnatural, exposing and 
dismantling the normative ideologies of gender and sexuality. 
Joyce’s novels are replete with emphatic disavowals of the heteronormative. One aspect 
of such disavowal is their toleration and even celebration of aberrant sexualities, of the range of 
sexual experience that falls outside “complete carnal intercourse, with ejaculation of semen 
                                                 
47  HCE’s initials invoke the liturgical Hoc corpus est; the celebrants at his wake even “partake of his very body, as of a 
eucharist” (William York Tindall, A Reader’s Guide, 6; Campbell and Robinson, A Skeleton Key, 5). 
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within the natural female organ” (U, 17.2278-79.)48 We are not encouraged, for example, to judge 
Bloom negatively for what appears to be the habitually un-reproductive nature of his 
intercourse with Molly (18.76, 18.1538). We are in fact encouraged to feel, as Bloom does, “with 
wonder women’s woe”; to sympathize with the plight of women, such as Mina Purefoy, who 
are made to endure with painful regularity the burdens of reproduction (14.119). Ulysses even 
makes a strong case for both the reasonableness and the pleasures (see “Nausicaa”) of non-
reproductive sexuality. (Derek Attridge puts it mildly when he observes that Blazes Boylan’s 
“punctual phallic insemination of Molly’s body is less valorized by the novel than Leopold’s 
disseminative play on its surfaces.”49) Joyce in fact makes same-sex desire a pointed dimension 
of such central characters as Stephen Dedalus, Leopold and Marion Bloom, and Finnegans 
Wake’s HCE, “that homogenius man” of “the old Middlesex party” (34.14, 523.27-28). Following 
Joseph Valente, then, I strongly question the critical tendency “to assume that contemporary 
sexual schemes and taxonomies, and the homophobic energies they galvanized, constitute a 
decisive structural impetus of [Ulysses], rather than, as with virtually every other ethico-political 
attitude that Joyce entertained, a focus of literary interrogation, negotiation, and 
reformulation.”50  
Among Ulysses’ “queerities” are the homoerotic undertones at work in Stephen and 
Mulligan’s relationship, not least in their mutual appreciations of Whitman and Wilde, and of 
                                                 
48  Emphasis added. Of course, Joyce’s adoption of prophylaxis as “sin” in “Oxen of the Sun,” along with that 
episode’s elaborate development of the gestation-birth metaphor for literary production, might be seen as a 
denigration of non-reproductive intercourse—but it seems more or less obvious that Joyce is as little invested in the 
form his “sin” takes for this episode as Homer was invested in the sanctity of Apollo’s cattle. As is often the case 
with Ulysses’ Homeric parallels, the choice seems equal parts playful, arbitrary, and contingent—not a statement 
of absolute values. As Richard Brown observes, there is plenty of evidence not to read the Oxen episode’s 
ostensible thematic and moral economy (where contraception and non-reproductive sex are taken as “crimes”) as 
authorized: “On the contrary, Joyce’s purpose seems to be to give us a strong taste of militantly and rather 
oppressively ‘reproductive’ doctrines and show characters like Bloom and Mina Purefoy on the receiving end of 
such views” (James Joyce and Sexuality, 78).  
49  Attridge, Joyce Effects, 115. 
50  Valente, “Ulysses and Queer Theory,” 92.  
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Shakespeare’s own “Love that dare not speak its name”—intertexts foregrounded from the 
opening chapter (14.528, 9.659). Stephen likewise recalls his unspeakable “love” for his 
quondam companion, Cranly (3.451). Molly Bloom, for her part, is no stranger to Sapphic 
sexuality; her husband recognizes the erotic nature of her relations with Josie Powell, and Molly 
herself testifies to such erotic encounters and fantasies (13.814; 18.641-73, .1146-47). Then, of 
course, there is Poldy himself, full name Leopold Paula Bloom (17.1855). “One of those mixed 
middlings,” Bloom exhibits many conventionally feminine characteristics.51 Indeed, perceptions 
about his masculinity and sexuality alienate him from other Dubliners in the same way that his 
“race” and perceived religious identification do. “Queer kind of chap,” this Bloom, “so foreign 
from the others” (15.3231, 13.1210); “a perverted jew,” “Greeker than the Greeks,” “too beastly 
awfully weird for words” (12.1635, 9.614-15, 15.832-33). His doctors in the Circe chapter confirm 
him to be “bisexually abnormal,” “a finished example of the new womanly man” (15.1775-99). 
(The more disinterested narrator of “Ithaca” confirms Bloom has a “firm full masculine 
feminine passive active hand” [17.289-90].) That Bloom functions in Ulysses as simultaneously 
hero and “new womanly man” implicitly devalues masculinity and also parodies conventional 
ideologies of race, gender, and sexuality. Through this womanly Jewish hero, Joyce makes an 
appeal for the virtues of the sexually ambiguous as well as of the Jewish people, who are said, 
by the likes of Otto Weininger, to unite traits of the feminine and the masculine in a racialized 
androgyny. 
Moreover, Bloom’s heroization has everything to do, as we have seen, with Ulysses’ 
transgressive typologies—with Bloom’s ironic yet forceful (and occasionally literal) elevations 
                                                 
51  For one thing, he seems to suffer from monthly menstruation (U, 12.1658-59, 13.824, 15.210). For another, he sits to 
pee (“really it’s better the position”), a habit Molly confirms in “Penelope” (15.3019-20, 18.1197). When they met, 
Molly thinks, Bloom was a bit “too beautiful for a man”—but “that was why I liked him because I saw he 
understood or felt what a woman is” (18.210, .1578-79). As Maud Ellmann writes, “Bloom can only write his name 
in womantalk, the language of flowers”; he “supplants the phallus with the omphalos” (“To Sing or to Sign,” 67). 
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as framed in the discourses of Jewish and Christian scriptures. In keeping with Ulysses’ 
inveterate polysemy, he is also a multiply typological figure, variously evoking Abraham, 
Moses, Isaac, Elijah, Christ, and Wandering Jew. It is, however, the Christ association that 
stands out as the most significant and developed of these, and it is here that Joyce most 
powerfully stakes a claim for the virtues of the non-normative.52 Like Jesus, moreover—the 
“most female of men,” in Luce Irigaray’s formulation—Bloom is a womanly man, eschewer of 
violence, denouncer of hatred, Jewish-born: “Ex quibus . . . Christus or Bloom his name is” 
(“From that race [i.e., the Israelites] is Christ, or Bloom his name is”).53 Bloom is an alternately 
ironic and earnest messiah of goodwill, of peace, of love (“the opposite of hatred”), and, at 
bottom, of difference—racial, sexual, religious, and otherwise. Like Jesus, he is “a man 
misunderstood,” as readily “made a scapegoat of” in Catholic Dublin as Christ was in Roman 
Judaea (15.775-76). And his “blasphemy”—a crime of which he is explicitly accused in both 
“Cyclops” and “Circe”—lies in his difference: in his presumed status, that is, as eccentrically 
“mixed middlings,” and as racially and religiously Other.  
Proponent of universal love and equality for all, herald of a new day and a New 
Bloomusalem, Bloom is a Jesus for the twentieth century. “I resent violence and intolerance in 
any shape or form,” he proclaims. “It’s a patent absurdity on the face of it to hate people 
because they live round the corner and speak another vernacular, in the next house so to speak” 
(16.1099-1103). Here is a messiah for the womanly men and the manly women, for the Jews and 
for the Gentiles, for the adulterers and the cuckolds. He literally offers the other cheek at one 
                                                 
52  “Christ was a jew like me,” Bloom announces, arriving at only the tip of an iceberg of affinities (U, 12.1808-09). 
Stephen perceives Bloom’s “concealed identit[y]” to be the “traditional figure of hypostasis,” while Mulligan 
recognizes the Christ in Bloom by the latter’s “pale Galilean eyes” (17.782-83, 9.615). Bloom identifies explicitly 
with Christ by way of a painting in “Lotus Eaters”; in “Cyclops,” he delivers a paraphrastic Sermon on the Mount; 
his enigmatic “I AM A” in the Nausicaa episode suggests “I am Alpha,” as in Alpha and Omega; and he is 
accompanied throughout Ulysses by a Christic iconography of fish and panther (5.289-99, 12.1237-38, 13.1258-64). 
For more on Ulysses’ Christ-typologies, see Stephen Sicari, Joyce’s Modernist Allegory, 165-92. 
53  Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 199; U, 16.1091-93. Cf. Romans 9:5.     
  
63 
    
point (15.1109), bringing out, in a fictional version of turn-of-the-century Dublin, the core 
Christian message of tolerance—without adhering, it must be added, to the bloody economics 
of martyrdom and salvation, being “reluctant to shed human blood even when the ends 
justified the means” (17.293-94).54 In “Circe” Bloom becomes apotheosized as a Christlike 
Messiah named “Emmanuel,” working miracles and inaugurating “year 1 of the Paradisiacal 
Era” (15.1841-69, .1632). Asked what sort of Messiah he is, he answers, “(darkly) You have said 
it,” in echo of Jesus’ response to Pilate (15.1834; Luke 23:3). His genealogy likewise parodies 
Christ’s in the opening verses of Matthew, and the writing on the wall—“Bloom is a cod”—
continues the identification of Bloom with the fish symbolism that attends Christ (15.1854-71). 
So it is that “[w]omen press forward to touch the hem of Bloom’s robe” (15.1585; cf. Matt. 9:20-
22). Of course, Bloom is also denounced in “Circe” as a “false Messiah,” indeed an Antichrist, 
but these things go with the territory (15.1907). For his pretensions to both civic and spiritual 
sovereignty, Dublin’s citizens act out the biblical punishment for blasphemy, hurling “soft 
pantomime stones” at him (15.1902). In doing so they mime, more specifically, the stoning of 
Christ in the gospels by those who charge him with “blasphemy . . . because that thou, being a 
man, makest thyself God” (John 10:30-36).55   
 Again Joyce depicts an equation in Dubliners’ minds of blasphemy and otherness, as 
well as of blasphemy and sexuality. Among the reasons for Bloom’s punishments at the hands 
of his fellow citizens in “Circe,” after all, is his insistence on the suitability of erotic embodiment 
as a component of the sacred: “If there were only ethereal where would you all be, postulants 
                                                 
54  When a printed advertisement reminds him that “All are washed in the blood of the lamb,” Bloom correctly 
identifies with his typological forerunner but then rejects the violent implications, signaled by a chain of 
associations that includes martyrdom and war: encountering the first four letters of the phrase “blood of the lamb,” 
he thinks, “Bloo …. Me? No” (U, 8.8-12). 
55  But also like Jesus, after his figurative “crucifixion” at the hands of the people, he is resurrected. Wearing “a 
seamless garment marked I.H.S.” (a traditional cryptogram for Christ), Bloom “stands upright amid phoenix 
flames,” saying, “Weep not for me, O daughters of Erin” (U, 15.1935-36; cf. John 19:23, Luke 23:28). Said daughters 
respond with their Litany of Bloom (15.1941-49).  
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and novices?” (15.3449-50). When a nun proceeds to attack his “loins” for the apparently 
profanatory implications of his question (“Sacrilege! To attempt my virtue! . . . Sully my 
innocence! You are not fit to touch the garment of a pure woman”), a “large moist stain appears 
on her robe,” and Bloom goads her on suggestively: “What do you lack with your barbed wire? 
Crucifix not thick enough?” (15.3449-65). This last and highly irreverent gibe plainly implies 
masturbation on the nun’s part while also intimating that to be the bride of Christ is not nearly 
enough, that the bridegroom is not “thick enough” to satisfy. Underlying this prurient 
insinuation of Christ as insufficient phallus, moreover, is Bloom’s more general critique of the 
notion that the “ethereal” can ever suffice, on its own, to account for the sacred dimension of 
human experience. Indeed, throughout “Circe” Joyce summons blasphemy and sacrilege as 
formal equivalents to the episode’s outrageous and equally subversive evocations of gender and 
sexuality. (One wonders what contemporary readers must have made of Bella/Bello, the 
brothel’s sex-shifting madam, plunging an arm “elbowdeep in Bloom’s vulva” [15.3089].)  
It is typical of Ulysses’ sacrilegious aesthetics, and of its use of blasphemy to critique 
insular, repressive ideological assumptions, that the Circe episode uses a mock-eucharistic 
frame—beginning and ending with iterations of a Black Mass—to contain, at its center, a 
whirligig of gender reversals, sudden erotic metamorphoses, fetishism, masochism, sadism, 
coprophilia, same-sexuality, exhibitionism, voyeurism, cross-dressing, adultery, fisting, bigamy, 
buggery, onanism, and “a form of clandestine marriage with at least one woman in the shadow 
of the Black church” (15.3028-29). More especially, Joyce suggestively aligns the episode’s 
thoroughgoing inversions and perversions of sacred ritual with sexual “inversion” and other 
ostensible perversions of normative sexuality—a strategy Djuna Barnes will also take up. 
“Circe” thus highlights a congruity between religious law and the effectively sacral character of 
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modern sexual norms, the transgression of which, for the Catholic Dublin of 1904, might well be 
seen as a doubly sacrilegious trespass both of Catholic orthodoxy and of nature.  
Vladimir Nabokov, in his justly celebrated lectures on Ulysses, nonetheless seems to 
have missed this critique of nature, of assumptions about the natural and unnatural, and the 
way Joyce expresses that critique in the person of Leopold Bloom. In Nabokov’s judgment, 
Bloom is, “if not on the verge of insanity, at least a good clinical example of extreme sexual 
preoccupation and perversity,” indulging as he does “in acts and dreams that are definitely 
subnormal in the zoological, evolutionary sense.”56 This otherwise keen reader of Ulysses 
stopped short of questioning those norms that the novel begs us to reevaluate, along with the 
ideological assumptions that create them; it would appear that he took at face value Molly’s 
sense of Bloom as “not natural like the rest of the world” (18.1197-98). To be sure, Bloom’s tastes 
tend toward the masochistic, voyeuristic, and “cloacal,” and we do have evidence aplenty of 
potentially compromising behaviors. He carries on love affairs by post; masturbates in public; 
inspects a statue for evidence of an anus; facilitates, passively, his wife’s tryst with Blazes 
Boylan; toys with the possibility of pimping Molly to Stephen Dedalus; keeps pornographic 
pictures in his desk (including one depicting a nun and a priest in flagrante); fetishizes, like his 
creator, women’s underwear and excrement; and, in his last act as hero of Ulysses, kisses his 
wife triumphantly on the “plump mellow yellow smellow melons of her rump,” as well as “in 
their mellow yellow furrow, with obscure prolonged provocative melonsmellonous osculation” 
(17.2241-43). Nabokov regarded all such “very special pathological stuff” as “artificial and 
unnecessary,” dismissing it as evidence of Joyce’s “special preoccupation” and thus eliding the 
very possibility of a rational motivation behind Bloom’s ostensible pathology (287).  
                                                 
56  Nabokov, Lectures on Literature, 287; emphasis added.  
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In fact, such motivation is much in evidence throughout the novel. When Ulysses goes to 
the lengths it does in depicting Bloom’s supposed subnormality, it effectively leaves us, as 
literature tends to, with an altered understanding of the assumptions that corral our thinking 
and our living. One of the jobs of “Circe” in particular is, by means of its abstracted and 
exaggerated relation to the novel that contains it, to extend Ulysses’ critiques of normativity 
beyond all “normal” bounds, and for that matter to push its critique of the natural beyond the 
narrative constraints of naturalism. Further, the episode’s predominant equation of these 
hyperbolic displays of sexual inversion and perversion with blasphemous language and 
sacrilegious imagery implies an equation of Church orthodoxy on matters of the flesh with 
secular ideologies of sexual normalcy—and thus proposes blasphemy and the sexually non-
normative as allied strategies of resistance.  
Ulysses on the whole resists and unsettles “natural” categories, not least by featuring a 
protagonist whose very identity is, by the usual measures, extraordinarily indeterminate. Bloom 
is as liminal a character in his religious identifications as in his sexual ones: a Jew who isn’t 
Jewish, who has moreover been baptized as both a Protestant and a Catholic but appears to 
know as much about Christian ritual and traditions as he does about Judaism. Which may be 
the reason he can detect elements of the gospels that elude the understanding of more 
confirmed believers; among the myriad “mixedup things” Bloom knows, according to Molly, is 
that Jesus was “the first socialist”—a recognition of Jesus’ political radicality that Bloom 
presumably shares with at most a small minority of his Irish compatriots (18.178). Ulysses mocks 
those compatriots, especially the Irish nationalists among them, right alongside their imperial 
subjugators—and alongside the Roman Catholic Church in whom most of those nationalists 
profess their faith. Joyce finds no shortage of irony in that allegiance, since he views the Church 
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as itself a colonialist presence in Dublin. Britain, as Stephen remarks in Ulysses, is but one of 
Ireland’s “two masters” (1.638).  
 
Ricorso 
As self-appointed scourge of those masters, Joyce embodied his opposition most 
extravagantly in the character of Shem the Penman, the cloacal transubstantiator of Finnegans 
Wake. Shem serves, moreover, not only as a figure for Joyce’s blasphemies against church and 
state, but also as the apogee of Joyce’s “sacreligious” aesthetics, the final and most extreme 
embodiment of his profanely transubstantiative art. Shem is the inheritor of the “I AM” of 
Yahweh, of Christ and of Bloom; thus his declaration, in the beginning, is “mishe mishe,” or “I 
am I am” (3.9).57 Equal parts God of the Creation and punning Christ,58 “scourging / incontrite 
usurers of destiny” (as Mina Loy’s Joyce does), Shem is also the graven image of Joyce as 
noisome, filthy apostate, “always blaspheming” and spewing “blasphematory spits”(Lost, 89; 
FW, 177.23, 183.24).  
The source of those “spits,” insofar as we conceive them to be the illicit, sacred-profane 
texts Shem writes, is the ink he makes of his own excrement. In a passage rendered in Latin, the 
language of the Church, Joyce describes the process by which Shem converts his excrement into 
“indelible ink,” singing a psalm all the while (185.14-26). (The Latin, Joyce writes, is for the 
kindly protection of the Protestant, Latin-less reader, who may thus continue to “behold the 
brand of scarlet on the brow of her of Babylon and feel not the pink one in his own damned 
cheek” [185.11-13].) From this excremental ink, Shem proceeds to write “over every square inch 
                                                 
57  Joyce explained in a letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, “Mishe = I am (Irish) i.e. Christian” (Selected Letters, 315).  
58  One of Joyce’s apologias for the Wake was that the “Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was built on a pun. It 
ought to be good enough for me” (JJ, 546). (The pun in question concerns the identification of the Aramaic and 
Greek words for “Peter” and “Rock,” which allows Jesus to be interpreted as founding his church upon his disciple 
Peter [Matt. 16:18].)              
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of the only foolscap available, his own body,” and what he produces, evidently, is Finnegans 
Wake: “till by its corrosive sublimation one continuous present tense integument slowly 
unfolded all marryvoising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history” (185.35-186.2). Like “Jesus 
Mundane,” the worldly Christ who narrates the first chapter of Djuna Barnes’s Ryder (1928), 
Shem presents an image of Creation as coterminous with bodily evacuation—in Barnes’s words 
“the loosening and the tightening that was among the bowels of Him who gave [humankind] 
birth and who gave them death in the selfsame dream. For thou knowest nothing of the mighty 
rains of Heaven that come down of Him and that return to Him.”59 With Shem, Joyce makes 
plain the Wake’s eucharistic impetus in a way that partakes of, indeed revels in, the basest 
ingredients of material existence. Even as he works the wonders of his Creative art, he does so 
with “crap in his hand” while “[doing] a piss” (185.17-23).  
 Shem the “national apostate” is introduced as “sacer,” both sacred and accursed, one of 
those “blasphorus blesphorous” types invoked on the previous page (171.33, 167.13). His very 
existence is equivocal. A figure of the kinds of blasphemous doublings Joyce evokes elsewhere, 
he instantiates a profane ambiguity quite distinct from the singular authority of his rival, Shaun, 
whose “unchanging Word is sacred” (167.28). Shaun’s discourse is official, legal, licit. Shem’s is 
that of the subversive blasphemer, the illicit counterdiscourse that is both truer and 
unacceptable: sacer rather than sacred, and fluid rather than “unchanging.” In the Penman we 
witness both the degradation and culmination of Joyce’s urge to mingle and conflate word and 
flesh. Shem also reminds us of the extent to which Joyce’s evocations of sacred and profane are 
ever a two-way street; the author and his texts remain, like Shem, “of twosome twiminds 
                                                 
59  R, 4. Later in Ryder, Barnes offers yet another dung-centric portraiture of Creation: “In the beginning was the 
jungle, and there you had turds of some account, beasts paying back the earth in coin new minted” (115). The 
metaphor of that last clause speaks aptly to the currency of bodily excretions in Barnes’s work, as well as their 
insistent entangling with religious economies.  
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forenenst” God and the Church, both for and against, affirmative and critical, equally indebted 
and disputative beyond all measure (188.14-15).  
Gian Balsamo rightly finds that Shem is “the flesh-made-word that makes the Word 
perennially carnal,” that he “has incarnated himself into the stercoraceous and desecrated 
species of Scripture.”60 I question, however, Balsamo’s conclusion that Shem’s is “a most secular 
liturgy enacting the end of Christian eschatology and the affirmation of base, scatological, 
perennial human reproduction” (116). For “secular” is the one thing this homo “sacer” is not, 
and Joyce’s affirmation of the base and human here need not imply a denial or rejection of the 
eschatological, transubstantiative, and otherwise scriptural investments of this section or of the 
Wake as a whole. What Joyce has done is to put the scatology in eschatology, not to announce 
the end of eschatology or the death of God or any such thing. Finnegans Wake’s indebtedness to 
Church and Bible is extensive, from its Mamalujo chorus (i.e., Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) 
to the Old-Testament narratives of Creation, of Paradise and Fall, of Cain and Abel, of Jacob and 
Esau. The text begins where the Bible does, with “Eve and Adam,” and its first four paragraphs 
mimic the first four verses of Genesis (3.1).61 The author of Finnegans Wake is still believer 
enough in the Christian theological implications of Original Sin and Redemption, of Fall and 
Resurrection, to make them the lynchpins of a book that endeavors to encompass all history and 
human experience: “Phall if you but will, rise you must” (4.15-16). Joyce interweaves these 
theological themes and structuring principles with those of other religious traditions, and with 
the philosophical bases of Vico, Bruno, and the rest—but none of these intertexts compares to 
                                                 
60  Balsamo, Joyce’s Messianism, 119, 115. 
61  See Campbell and Robinson, A Skeleton Key, 23. There is also, as Richard Brown remarks, “the passage in Book III 
Chapter 4 where Earwicker and spouse are graphically depicted in four successive copulatory positions, 
blasphemously analogous to the four-fold narrative of the gospel writers of the New Testament” (James Joyce and 
Sexuality, 68). 
  
70 
    
the centrality of the Bible and of Catholic theology to this last of Joyce’s novels, no less than in A 
Portrait and Ulysses.62   
With the advent of Shem, in any case, Joyce’s textual selves have progressed from 
Stephen’s morose ethereality to Bloom’s sacred worldliness, and now to this final figure of the 
subaltern, the exiled, the subversive. Shem combines word and flesh at once more literally and 
more fantastically than any of Joyce’s other experiments in transubstantiation. He is also Joyce’s 
final figuration of Creator and messiah, yet it is hard to imagine a more degraded messiah than 
this; his depiction resonates little with the grand and gilded monuments of the Church, but one 
might well perceive echoes of the beaten, violated, and execrated body of Christ. Shem’s body 
marks the terminus of Joyce’s jocoserious yoking of contraries—of sacred and profane, 
affirmative and desecratory, solemn and comic, pious and “blasphematory.” Even as he 
embodies Catholic tropes, he blasphemes the Church for its historical persecutions and, 
specifically, for what it did to Parnell: “Saint Ignaceous Poisonivy, of the Fickle Crowd (hopon 
the sexth day of Hogsober, killim our king, layum low!)” (186.13-14).     
This indictment of the Church for “killim our king” brings us full circle—as the Wake 
must ever do—back to that Christmas dinner in the first chapter of A Portrait of the Artist, when 
Stephen’s father denounces the Church for having defiled his “dead king” and even accuses 
holy writ itself of blasphemy for lending sanction to the Church’s acts:   
     —Woe be to the man by whom the scandal cometh! said Mrs Riordan. . . . That is 
the language of the Holy Ghost.  
      —And very bad language if you ask me, said Mr Dedalus coolly. (32) 
 
It is worth recalling that this pivotal passage, this primal scene of dueling blasphemies that 
plays out before young Stephen’s “terrorstricken face,” is initiated by its own “blasphematory 
                                                 
62  For a brief but brilliant exegesis of Joyce’s uses of Christianity in this “extraordinarily blasphemous” novel, see 
William Franke, “Joyce and the Bible” (645). See also Beryl Schlossman, Joyce’s Catholic Comedy of Language, 69-180; 
Robert Boyle, James Joyce’s Pauline Vision; and Gian Balsamo, Scriptural Poetics in Joyce’s “Finnegans Wake.”  
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spits,” a pair of them (39). First, Mrs. Riordan informs the men that she “will defend my church 
when it is insulted and spit on by renegade catholics” (34). Mr. Casey responds by affirming his 
own Catholicism, then relates the tale of a prior spit: the gob of tobacco juice he projected into 
the face of a Parnell-denouncing woman in the street for using, Casey says, the sort of language 
that he refuses to “sully this Christmas board . . . by repeating” (36).  
His spit has been “blasphematory” in part because its provocation was a woman’s “bad 
language,” her profanation of Casey’s sacred, fallen hero—but also because, in the eyes of 
Stephen’s pious aunt, Casey himself must be held to account for assaulting a woman who was 
only espousing her Church’s unequivocal position in the matter. From the perspective of the 
devout Catholic, only one word applies to a man who would do such a thing, and Mrs. Riordan 
screams it at Casey now: “Blasphemer!” (39). To be spat upon by a blasphemer is to be defiled 
in a uniquely verbal and physical way, and Mrs. Riordan here imagines both Casey’s victim and 
her own Church as having been so desecrated (“spit on by renegade catholics”). Mr. Casey’s 
spittle, like Shem’s, is a material substance that blurs the bounds between verbal blasphemy and 
physical sacrilege—so it is fitting that Joyce, whose texts so often blur this distinction in 
analogous ways, should find room in his first novel and his last for both the material and the 
discursive implications of such irreverent discharge.  
The sources of that discharge, the mouth and its tongue, constitute the thresholds 
dividing and uniting body and discourse. They are the mortal nexus of Word and flesh—and in 
that sense can even be seen as analogues to the body of Christ. The space that Joyce devotes to 
them in contexts of the sacred and the profaned underscores both the discursive and the 
corporeal nature of blasphemy, its essence as text or utterance as well as its tendency always 
toward the emphatic embodiment of sacrilege. We have not seen the last of such blasphemous 
tongues; later we will deal with Djuna Barnes, whose 1928 work Ladies Almanack concludes with 
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a highly eroticized evocation of the Pentecost and its “tongues like as of fire” (Acts 2:3)—and 
whose novel Nightwood (1936) likewise concludes with an image of the tongue as “a stiff 
curving terror” at the center of another profanely sacramental rite (N, 170). We shall encounter 
still more burning tongues in the sermonic foreword to Wallace Thurman’s short-lived little 
magazine Fire!! (1926), which evokes the transgressive literary and artistic efforts of the 
“Niggeratti” as “poking livid tongues between stone apertures and burning wooden opposition 
with a cackling chuckle of contempt” (F, 1). And before that we will consider the “two-edged 
tongue” that protrudes from the mouth of an imagined female Redeemer—a tongue of 
righteously blasphemous retribution, imagined by a poet, Mina Loy, who throughout her career 
was fascinated by “trickle[s] of saliva” and “the tattle of tongueplay.”63 Such imagery in fact 
suffuses Loy’s poetry and prose. Like the rest of these writers, Loy speaks in tongues, which is 
to say that she borrows the miraculous tongues of holy writ—the rhetorical instruments of 
scripture, liturgy, and theology—and puts them to her own, highly profanatory uses. More 
specifically, she conscripts those tongues into the service of her irreverent feminism and equally 
idiosyncratic faith, a pair of heterodoxies that find their expression in Loy’s often startlingly 
blasphemous poetry—to which subject we now turn.  
   
               
                                                 
63  Mina Loy Papers, box 6, folder 159; Lost, 53; Last, 89. 
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Chapter Two 
     
BLASPHEMY AS LOGOPOEIA:  
MINA LOY’S PROFANE COMMUNIONS  
 
 
“Mina Loy,” wrote Gertrude Stein in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, “has always 
been able to understand.”1 Thus did she reward, in a work not otherwise notable for its 
kindnesses, the futurismo alumna and dada fellow-traveler who in the Transatlantic Review had 
compared Stein’s prose favorably with that of Ecclesiastes and Job.2 Indeed, Loy’s early 
appreciation of Stein and other avant-garde writers, along with her prescient championing of 
the “insufficiently heeded” Joseph Cornell, betrays an uncommon perspicacity (Last, 300). And 
so, too, does Loy’s fascinating 1923 poem “Joyce’s Ulysses”—for instead of trotting out the more 
conventional approvals of Ulysses’ Homeric parallels, or its use of monologue intérieur, this 
perceptive poem instead highlights the novel’s scriptural and theological character, its 
blasphemous investments in “the Spirit and the Flesh” (Lost, 88). Joyce himself appears here as 
“Christ capitalized,” evidently more Christ-like than Christ himself; it is his mission, as Loy 
depicts it, to drive the insipid arbiters of cultural opinion (“incontrite usurers of destiny”) from 
the “temples” of art, just as Jesus drove the money changers from the temple (89). If he is Son, 
though, he is also father, not only Christ capitalized but also a creative deity forging “the voice 
and offal / of the image of God”—of his own image, that is—from within his “Empyrean 
emporium” (88, 90).  
This is likewise Loy’s vision of the appropriately modern artist, a vision she conveys 
always in words and images borrowed from Genesis—notably in such works as “‘The Starry 
Sky’ of Wyndham Lewis,” “Brancusi’s Golden Bird,” “The Pamperers,” and the concluding 
                                                 
1  Stein, The Autobiography, 132.   
2  Last, 289, 296. This assessment of Stein’s work, published in two parts in 1929, remains useful even today—as much 
for its sensuous close readings of Stein’s texts as for its assertion that their meaning is often to be found precisely in 
their polysemous elusion of fixed meaning.  
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section of her long poem Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose (Last, 172-75). Her 1922 poem “Apology of 
Genius” also belongs to this camp; brimming with biblical language (“flesh,” “soul,” “spirit,” 
and, least subtly, “the passion of Man”), “Apology” renders the artist in language that echoes 
not only Genesis but also Stephen Dedalus’s avowed intention to “forge   . . . the uncreated 
conscience of [his] race” (PA, 276): 
In the raw caverns of the Increate  
we forge the dusk of Chaos  
to that imperious jewellery of the Universe  
        —the Beautiful— (Lost, 77-78)   
 
Loy thus aligns religion and art, God and artist in a way that reflects her own exultation in the 
writing process. “I am the book,” she wrote to Carl Van Vechten of her finished Songs to Joannes 
(1917), echoing the Whitman of Song of Myself and also, like Whitman, claiming a godlike 
equation of her Word and flesh. “I have,” she continued, “that esoteric sensation of creating!” 
(Lost, 188). Lest we doubt the theological character of such creation, in her prose works Loy 
assigns the label “esoteric” to the kinds of religion she values over “exoteric,” mainstream 
varieties.3 It is also worth recalling that creation is foremost a theistic term; as Raymond 
Williams notes, the term as used by Romantic artists and writers was “at first thought 
blasphemous.” (Coleridge’s definition of the creative imagination as replicating “the eternal act 
of creation in the infinite I AM” certainly strives for blasphemous effect.4) Like Joyce, Loy 
retains and wonderfully exploits the blasphemy inherent in artistic creation as it strives to rival 
that of God Himself, Who, in Genesis 1:2, surveys an earth “without form” and sets about the 
modern artist’s task of bringing form to the formless, of molding “the dusk of Chaos” from “the 
                                                 
3   In what is at first glance a paradoxical formulation, for Loy the esoteric is the version of faith that is “available to 
man.” What makes it esoteric is that so few people ever learn to access it, largely because so many religious 
institutions are hell-bent on obscuring its ready availability. “Religion is a lost word,” Loy  writes, “having come to 
mean millions of rows of pews. . . . There are two religions—the esoteric and the exoteric, the exoteric is the row of 
pews. The esoteric is the power of God, available to man” (“HRE,” unpaginated). Maeera Shreiber discusses this 
aspect of Loy’s “History of Religion and Eros” but unfortunately reverses Loy’s terms (“Divine Women,” 469). 
4  Williams, The Politics of Modernism, 52; Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 304.  
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raw caverns of the Increate” into art. In so doing the artist repeats Eve’s transgressive gesture, 
yielding to the original temptation to “be as gods” (Gen. 3:5).  
That temptation, for Loy, was in evidence as early as the four “Love Songs” that graced 
the first issue of Alfred Kreymborg’s Others magazine (July 1915)—the publication that sealed 
her reputation as a provocative poet and quintessential “New Woman.” As Kreymborg later 
recalled, Loy’s verses “horrified our gentry and drove our critics into furious despair.”5 This 
response was prompted by the poet’s novel technique as well as her irreverent subject matter—
by Loy’s modernism, that is to say, as well as her blasphemies. “We might have coupled,” she 
wrote,  
In the bed-ridden monopoly of a moment  
Or broken flesh with one another  
At the profane communion table  
Where wine is spilled on promiscuous lips  
 
We might have given birth to a butterfly  
With the daily-news  
Printed in blood on its wings6  
 
These lines offer a transgressive enactment of Holy Communion that takes itself as earnestly as 
its orthodox counterpart. The participants break flesh, not bread or wafer, and the wine they 
spill on each other’s lips literally becomes, through this un-immaculate copulation, the blood on 
their progeny’s wings. (Or “might have” become, had Loy’s speaker had her way.) If, as Julia 
Kristeva argues, the Eucharist functions as the catharsis for a Christian fantasy that combines “a 
lust for swallowing up the other” with a “fear of impure nourishment . . . revealed as deathly 
drive to devour the other,” then the literalization of such devouring at Loy’s profane 
communion table embraces the divine impurity of such lust and mutual “nourishment,” 
exposing the Communion’s eroto-cannibalistic implications. As often in her poetry, Loy here 
                                                 
5  Kreymborg, Our Singing Strength, 488. 
6  Loy, “Love Songs,” 7. These lines also became the third section of Songs to Joannes (Lost, 54).   
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unites sexuality and sacrament in profane communion. In the words of Maeera Shreiber and 
Keith Tuma, Loy’s is a “pugnacious poetics of the body crossed by eroticism, spirituality, and 
irony all at once”: a richly blasphemous mixture.7  
All of Loy’s major poetic achievements, in fact—Songs to Joannes (1917), Lunar Baedeker 
(1923), and Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose (1923-25)—are characterized by blasphemous 
invocations of scripture and sacrament. Lunar Baedeker stresses these dynamics from the start, 
commencing with the image of a “silver Lucifer” who beckons the reader to partake of 
forbidden fruit (“cocaine in cornucopia”) and forbidden bodies (“adolescent thighs”), to sate 
those sinful cravings whose indulgence must ultimately “lead / to mercurial doomsdays” (Lost, 
81). Lucifer, the archetypal blasphemer, thus introduces a thematic of irreverence that will wend 
its way through Loy’s one fully realized book of verse, and indeed through the rest of her 
poetry and prose. Yet while critics unfailingly remark the blasphemous quality of Loy’s early 
work, few have considered its range of aesthetic and polemical implications. By bringing 
together Loy’s poetic evocations of religion, sexuality, and transgression with her musings in 
unpublished manuscripts and in such rarely discussed works as her “History of Religion and 
Eros,” the pages that follow seek to elucidate Loy’s blasphemous poetics: her rewriting of 
religion and theology as a means to critique and re-imagine the gendered hierarchies of both 
church and state, orthodoxy and patriarchy.  
That poetics takes root in a discourse of the body. She may have praised Gertrude Stein 
for giving us “the Word, in and for itself,” but the Word, in and of itself, is not what Loy is after 
(Last, 298). Loy is infinitely more interested in a Word made flesh, as suggested by her own 
heterodox, erotic Christianity; employing a spiritual lexicon pitched somewhere between those 
of Whitman’s Song of Myself and Cixous’s “Laugh of the Medusa,” she insists on a fleshly 
                                                 
7  Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 118; Shreiber and Tuma, eds., Mina Loy: Woman and Poet, 12. 
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approach to the religious. It is such an intertwining of the sexual and the sacramental that Loy 
celebrates in her poem on Ulysses, affirming her compatibility with Joyce on the score of their 
mutual commitment to what Maeera Shreiber calls “a generalized effort to repair the rupture 
between body and text.”8 Loy addresses this affinity in describing Joyce’s religious thematics as 
inseparable from his attention to the erotic body: in Ulysses, she proclaims, “The Spirit / is 
impaled upon the phallus” (Lost, 88). Yet for all her affinities with Joyce, in much of her poetry 
Loy sets herself the task of disengaging Spirit from Phallus, of liberating her erotic theo-
corporeality from the phallocratic subtext that dogs the major ecclesiastical institutions of her 
day and ours. 
Loy does so most memorably in her literary reinscriptions of Logos, the divine creative 
principle that resides, she wrote, at the heart of “Modern art”: “And there is no renaissance 
without breath— / The breathing upon of the logos” (SE, 262). It was Ezra Pound who coined 
the term logopoeia to account for the cerebral poetics of Loy and Marianne Moore—“poetry 
which is akin to nothing but language . . . a dance of the intelligence among words and ideas”—
and discussions of logopoeia with regard to Loy have been de rigueur ever since.9 The term 
derives from the twin meanings of logos as “word” and “reason,” and seems not to account at all 
for the bodily concerns and textures of Loy’s poetry—which so often reveals, in Peter Nicholls’s 
words, “the ‘logos’ of ‘logopoeia’ to be embedded in the very body it was supposed [by Pound] 
to rise above.”10 I propose nonetheless a revival of the concept in newly capitalized form: a 
Logopoeia that accounts for the theological aspect of Logos, its biblical sense as the word of the 
Father made incarnate in the Son. Loy’s poetry, however, typically replaces these male 
embodiments of Logos with the female body. Logopoeia becomes, in her hands, a nakedly 
                                                 
8  Shreiber, “‘Love is a Lyric,” 147-48. 
9  Pound, Selected Prose, 242. 
10  Nicholls, “‘Arid Clarity,’” 64. 
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theological version of the écriture féminine that other feminist admirers of Joyce would theorize 
over half a century later. In poems such as “Parturition” (1914) and Songs to Joannes, she 
refigures Father and Son as a pro-creative Mother and a crucified female Christ; she completes 
this Trinity in an apocalyptic prose work, untitled and unpublished, that imagines an avenging 
goddess who mischievously manifests both the Holy Spirit and the Second Coming. Tracing the 
cosmic and often deific dimensions of a New Womanhood, Loy upends both sacred and secular 
dogmas of gender and sexuality in works that continue to resonate with the blasphemer’s full 
subversive force. Before turning to her literary profanations, however, it behooves us to 
consider the heterodoxies that motivate them, rooted as they are in an idiosyncratic version of 
Christian Science—one whose doctrine holds that religion, like life itself, “is generally reducible 
to sex” (Lost, 189).     
 
In Praise of Xes 
 In The Gender of Modernism, Bonnie Kime Scott cites Loy as one of several modernist 
women writers who “write the erotics of the female body,” and various critics before and since 
have linked this observation to the performative erotics and corporeality of the texts 
themselves.11 If men have traditionally objectified the female body, for Loy that body instead 
becomes a counterintuitive means of subjectification, while the male body becomes objectified 
and debased. In the first three lines of Songs to Joannes, for example—where phallic pigs’ snouts 
sow “wild oats     in mucous membrane”—Loy nakedly de-sacralizes what Peter Brooks has 
called the “mysterium tremendum,” patriarchy’s “most sacred object,” the penis.12 Loy’s 
unflinching attention to the erotic body, male as well as female, coincides with her rewritings of 
                                                 
11  Scott, The Gender of Modernism, 13. 
12  Lost, 53; Brooks, Body Work, 279. “To display the penis,” Brooks writes, “is to turn subject into object”; “in a culture 
where patriarchy is the basis of knowledge and power, and the gaze is phallic, [the penis] must be veiled” (279). 
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scripture and sacrament to condemn such varieties of sexual repression as proceed from both 
religious dogma and secular ideology. In the autobiographical long poem Anglo-Mongrels and 
the Rose, for example, she appropriates Christ’s “they know not what they do” to describe the 
lackluster consummation of her parents’ passion (Luke 23:34). Loy here re-contextualizes the 
phrase, shifting our attention from Jesus to Eros, while simultaneously implying that the 
ecclesiastical institutions erected in the former’s name are responsible for an ideological 
stymieing of the latter: 
        they pursued their conjugal 
dilemmas         as is usual  
with people 
who know         not what they do 
but know         that what they do 
-    -    is not illegal (Last, 127)13 
 
“To know,” in both the usual and the biblical sense, is for Loy no idle pun. The use of blank 
space in this stanza points up the dual meaning: the lovers “know,” which is to say that they 
have sex, but it is equally clear that they “know not”—and such ignorance, for Loy, constitutes a 
transgression of the truly sacred. No real knowledge of Eros or of self is forthcoming in this 
spiritually and erotically bankrupt union of the travestied flesh. Indeed, the legality of the act—
surely something of a surprise for the participants, given the lifelong inculcation of negative 
associations with sex—appears to be its sole virtue.   
Loy’s repressive upbringing at the hands of these parents taught her to equate 
conventional Christianity with the stifling of women’s intelligence and the prohibition of self-
expression, an equation that would later inform her blasphemous critiques of religion as well as 
the development of her own adult faith. The “gentle Jesus” of the New Testament, whom Loy 
                                                 
13  I cite page numbers for this long poem as it appears in Last. Throughout, however, my quotations follow the more 
expressive typography of Anglo-Mongrels’ original piecemeal publication in two issues of the Little Review (1923-24) 
and in Robert McAlmon’s Contact Collection of Contemporary Writers (1925).   
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encountered as a child during Bible study with a sympathetic maid, became a weapon in the 
hands of a mother who “inflict[ed] / Him upon her / as a spiritual bludgeon” (Last, 148, 167). 
The household regime forbade any display of creativity or self-knowledge, and any combining 
of the two was cause for especial parental indignation. A passage from Goy Israels vividly 
recounts her mother’s reaction to the young Mina’s writing a poem about a gnat’s “marriage” to 
a daisy:  
a pretty thing I declare for a child of your age to write about a wedding; 
positively immoral! But far be it from you to get down on your knees to God for 
Him to make you a better girl Oh dear me no We can do very well without God 
or our Mother too for the matter of that. . . .  Where on earth’s your modesty? 
You certainly never got such ideas from me. Nice girls never think about 
weddings until after they’re married.14   
 
That Loy’s mature poetic blasphemies insist so adamantly on liberative inscriptions of what, in 
her mother’s faith, were “the vaguely disgusting / inquietudes of the flesh” attests to her 
rejection of this repressive Christian past—but not, importantly, to a rejection of Christianity per 
se (Last, 168). As Keith Tuma has argued, Anglo-Mongrels manifests Loy’s “struggle to articulate 
a Christianity opposed to her mother’s evangelical Christianity.”15 Loy’s adult commitment to 
her own selective version of Christian Science, from 1909 to the end of her life, makes clear her 
continued investment in a comparatively egalitarian and liberated alternative to the religion 
that Loy’s mother had wielded like a club; Christian Science’s “feminized ‘Father-Mother-
God,’” as Richard Cook notes, attracted adherents who felt “alienated from patriarchal images 
of Deity,” and in Carolyn Burke’s words struck Loy as “the one spiritual practice that promised 
to bridge the gaps between mind and body.”16 It was only “through the indefatigable helping 
                                                 
14  Loy, Goy Israels, 49-50. 
15  Tuma, “Mina Loy’s ‘Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose,’” 183.  
16  Cook, “The ‘Infinitarian,’” 458; BM, 131. For more on Loy and Christian Science, see Tim Armstrong, “Loy and 
Cornell.” 
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hand of C. S.,” Loy later wrote, that she had managed to elude her upbringing’s “logical 
dénouement of lunacy” (BM, 375).  
As her “History of Religion and Eros” and other writings demonstrate, the figure of 
Christ is very much at the center of Loy’s faith—the fully fleshed, erotic, “gentle Jesus” that 
most dogmas paper over. This embodied Christ is the poetic Word made flesh, a Jesus on whose 
cross are nailed a “poet’s feet . . . neat- / ly crossed / in anguish” (Last, 169). Contrasted with 
the religious instruction of Loy’s youth and its emphasis on a coercive Old-Testament God of 
“butcherly chastisement,” Christ stands among the butchered, not the butchers, and his 
message, too, is the refreshing one of “Fear / not” (Last, 169). Indeed, for Loy, the most 
pertinent aspect of Christ’s gospel was an invitation to pleasure: “Put in the simplest words, the 
divine mission of Jesus was to invite us to a party.”17 He embodies, as orthodox representations 
of him do not, Eros itself. He is the fleshly tie that binds “Religion and Eros” in Loy’s 
formulations, because “[t]he Flesh,” in the case of both the religious and the erotic, is the 
“instrument” of the body’s access to the divine (SE, 250). This is not T. S. Eliot’s Christianity, nor 
the Catholic Church’s; it is a Christianity that brooks no distinction between Agape and Eros, 
seeing them as inseparable manifestations of that love which, the scriptures tell us, God is—and 
that love which God is not, in such versions of Christianity on which Loy was raised (1 John 
4:8). For Loy, desire is a key component of “esoteric” (good) religion, whereas the “exoteric” 
shuns it. Humankind’s “quarrel with ‘Desire’ coincides with the incipience of Exoteric 
Religion,” a religion of the letter, which kills; only the fully erotic, “esoteric” Spirit gives life (SE, 
247). 
                                                 
17  “HRE,” unpaginated. Two folders’ worth of manuscripts, notes, and a twenty-page typescript are filed under this 
title in the Mina Loy Papers at the Yale Collection of American Literature (box 6, folders 158-59). The typescript has 
very recently been published in SE. Where possible, I cite this published essay as it appears in SE; the still 
unpublished materials I cite as “HRE.” 
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What mainline churches and their adherents need, Loy insists, is “a Christianly 
clarification,” and sacralization, of sexuality: “In an ideal Society . . . ‘Sex’ would be consecrated 
by the church” (“HRE”; SE 372). This church would do well, she writes, to heed Freud’s 
teaching that “Religion and Sex are interchangeable” (SE, 226). It is not too much to say that 
whenever she uses the one term she implies the other, and that this knowledge is one of the 
keys to understanding her written works from early to late. Accordingly, sexual intercourse 
often emerges in her poetry as a truly religious experience, as when she echoes Adam’s “flesh of 
my flesh” to describe the delights of Eros: “Flesh from flesh / Draws the inseparable delight / 
Kissing at gasps    to catch it” (Gen. 2:23; Lost, 57). Or when she evokes two lovers communing 
at an altar, breaking flesh and spilling both wine and blood in a tableau that suggests a 
sacrilegious version of transubstantiation. For God is made present, those lines suggest, not in 
the distribution of wine and wafer, but in the commingling flesh and fluids of wholly human 
bodies (Lost, 54). Elsewhere Loy expresses her belief that in the sexual merging of bodies, 
human beings can become electric, sublime, apotheosized. Love, she affirms, “is not of the body 
/ love is of bodies,” bodies moving “in musical rhythm / with the cosmic duet” (Last, 233)—a 
duet in which the singular body melts away to a more meaningfully embodied, religious 
merging.  
Sex for Loy represents a holy merging of intellects, souls, and bodies. If this triadic 
erotico-mystical conflation calls to mind the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Loy has drawn 
that conclusion already, in Songs to Joannes, where in the coming-together of two bodies (“or 
three,” she suggests), human beings “shall become god” (Lost, 58). In this scheme of values, one 
contributes the singular body to the superior union of two (or three) bodies. Having thus 
“broken flesh with one another / At the profane communion table,” those bodies, along with 
their associated intellects and souls, are then subsumed into the one godhood just as Father, 
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Son, and Spirit become one in Catholic orthodoxy (Lost, 54). Notably, Loy’s lines—“Where two 
or three are welded together / They shall become god”—recall Christ’s “where two or three are 
gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them” (Matt. 18:20). Again Loy seeks 
to one-up the biblical source. Her lovers join together, not with God, but as God. And in her 
1917 poem “Human Cylinders,” Loy depicts coitus again as a “communion” in “Concordance 
of respiration” (Lost, 40). Her final polysyllable here only half-conceals an etymological play on 
the Latin for “breath,” spiritus; concordance of breath is also concordance of Spirit. Indeed, 
toward the end of “Human Cylinders” Loy pointedly describes sexual coupling as “Receiving 
the holy-ghost” (Lost, 41).  
No profane communion, this. Or, more precisely: it is sacred, by Loy’s standards, to 
much the same extent that it is profane by orthodox standards. Sex here becomes a divine 
merging that Loy charges Christian dogma itself with defiling in its “war against the flesh”—a 
war whose logic is one of “dissubstantiation,” a term she introduces in the final section of 
Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose (SE, 248; Last, 173). With reference to con- and transubstantiation, 
Rachel Blau DuPlessis reasonably glosses this term as indexing the Jewish refusal to believe in 
the divine embodiment of Jesus.18 Context, however, indicates that this is not the meaning Loy 
attaches to the word. True, dissubstantiation as DuPlessis understands it would make a fit 
“problem” for Loy’s “Theological tinkers / and serious thinkers” to tackle (Last, 173). But 
dissubstantiation as Loy presents it is a far more basic and even universal theological problem, 
that of religion’s accounting for and dealing with the desires of the flesh—religions’ seeming 
compulsion to dissubstantiate our fleshly substance. The preceding stanza addresses the 
purported 
 
                                                 
18  DuPlessis, Genders, Races, and Religious Cultures, 163.  
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        incompatibility  
with his dignity  
of exposing man  
to the contemplation  
of the insignia  
of his origin  
and continuity (172) 
 
—that is, the contemplation of the vulva, presumably during or preparatory to a sexual 
encounter. The stanzas that succeed the word “dissubstantiation” continue in this vein, 
documenting the uses of asceticism and theological prestidigitation for eliding the question of 
desire: one can sleep on beds of nails in order to “forget it,” or leave it to the “Spiritual drapers 
/ Popes and fakirs and shakers” to shroud the question in “oblivion / and let it / appear / to 
disappear” (173). Certainly what is at issue in these stanzas has little to do with the Jewish 
rejection of Christ’s embodiment, and much to do with Loy’s typical interest in “Eros-Bliss” and 
its deformations by religious dogma (SE, 249).   
Following these and other stanzas that address religion’s suppressions of erotic desire, 
Loy observes that, nonetheless, “absurd / as it may seem / the ‘unprintable word’ / is 
impossible to erase from a vocabulary” (Last, 173). DuPlessis’s interpretation leads her to read 
this reference to “the ‘unprintable word’” as an allusion to God, or “G-d.”19 Again plausible, 
were it not for the context established by the immediately preceding stanzas; the unprintable 
word here is doubtless “sex,” or as Loy often renders it, “Sex.” Or, as she writes it at least once 
in her manuscripts for “History of Religion and Eros,” deploying the strategy of inversion so 
central to blasphemous expression: “Xes.”  
Xes, as if in acknowledgment of the word’s powerful unprintability. As if, conversely 
and at the same time, the word has, like “God,” become so diffuse and vacuous by overuse that 
it requires a Steinian recasting, a typographic rearrangement that will temporarily obscure and 
                                                 
19  Ibid. 
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then revivify the word’s meaning.20 There is “sex,” a term that in legal, literary, scientific, and 
popular discourses “is used in reference to nothing at all”; but then there is Eros, or Xes, the 
divine pulse, humankind’s most direct means of access to the sacred (“HRE”). It is also Molly 
Bloom’s famous affirmation, but with the Y replaced by an X: the chromosome common to both 
sexes. Xes is Loy’s trigrammaton. Pronounce the word, taking some liberties, and you wind up 
with something like excess, a happy signifier of Loy’s seemingly excessive treatments of the 
subject in her poetry—but in truth Xes is as unsayable as it is unprintable, as ineffable a signpost 
as the unspeakable YHWH. Which is to say that Xes is Loy’s G-d, and what matters more than 
my quibbling with DuPlessis’s speculation is that, when reading Mina Loy, the distinction 
between Sex and God does not matter much. It is one of her achievements, in fact, to use the 
language of poetry to evoke religious and sexual ecstasies as both wholly compatible and 
compatibly holy. When she portrays, for instance, a nun’s flesh as a “virgin apple to angels’ 
offering,” she sings the praises of a fleshly mysticism and an ethereal eroticism, at once a 
knowing innocence and an innocent lust, the sort of union Loy addresses in a brazen assertion 
of her own guiltless erotic knowledge: “There are already / So many ignorances / I am not 
guilty of” (Lost, 260, 26).  
 
Blasphemy and “Social Consciousness” 
To read such poetic moments in light of Loy’s “History of Religion and Eros” is to 
recognize aspects of her better-known works that have been overlooked—for example, just how 
essentially religious is her declamation in the “Feminist Manifesto” that “there is nothing 
impure in sex” (Lost, 156). Such a statement is not, as it might seem, a secular flouting of 
                                                 
20  “[I]nversion,” Loy writes in her essay on Stein, is one of the ways the latter achieves “her unsheathing of the 
fundamental” (Last, 289). 
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religious values. It is instead sanctioned, for Loy, precisely by the Creator who made sex the 
basis of human life and propagation. Christianity, she writes, should “never have snubbed the 
Creator with derogation of ‘the Flesh’—for also our desire, not of our own contriving, is from 
the Creator broadcast to us. . . . He would have no more imposed chastity on the common man 
than would Bach have forbidden him to play the concertina” (SE, 248). Indeed, sexuality is not 
only sanctioned by the Creator but is also closely related to Loy’s ideas of artistic creativity, as 
suggested by the reference to Bach. Once the artist has “at last tuned in on / THE 
CREATIONAL OVERTURE,” she writes, she will have full access to “the source of presensate 
ecstasy whereof, to earth life, Eros alone brings some intimation” (SE, 243). Over and against 
this erotic cosmogony, Loy writes that sex, in the church’s hands, has become merely “a debris 
of sadism” (251). “Morality” has served organized religion as a “pretense” for cruelty, just as 
“the scapegoat personification of Satan” has changed “all God’s beneficiencies to man”—fleshly 
pleasures included—“to menaces” (250-51). 
In turn, what would strike most believers as the Church’s “beneficiencies” can appear 
rather as menaces in Loy’s poetry. Her early poem “The Prototype” (1914), for example, 
employs such a subjective inversion in its dramatic engagement with doctrinal Christianity’s 
denials of the flesh. The poem describes two babies seen in the Duomo on midnight at 
Christmas Eve. The first, made of “cold wax,” is “quite perfect, of that perfection / which 
means immunity from / the inconsistencies of Life” (Lost, 221). It is intended as a doll-like icon 
of the infant Christ, but according to this poem’s logic it really iconizes a religiosity separated 
from life’s vicissitudes, a product of a Church that divorces the sphere of the sacred from such 
ostensibly impure, imperfect human phenomena as fleshly desires. “Worship him,” a voice tells 
us in the poem’s third stanza—Loy is facetiously channeling what she takes to be an unspoken 
underpinning of Catholic dogma—“for his infinitesimal / mouth has no expansiveness for a 
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puck- / ering to the heart-saving wail of the / new-born Hungry One” (221). The phrase “no 
expansiveness,” coming from so expansive a poet, who writes as expansively as Loy does about 
the cosmically elastic contours of the self (“the smallest person, potentially, is as great as the 
Universe”), signals Loy’s reservations about this cold wax Christ-child, who goes un-capitalized 
in contrast to the living, flesh-and-blood Hungry One at stanza’s end (149). Likewise, the 
syllable “puck,” emphasized by an eye-catching caesura (“puck- / ering”), recalls the Puckish 
pleasures of the flesh that orthodoxy and its wax icons deny.  
But it is not only the flesh’s pleasures that this wax Christ denies. There is also the highly 
visible and diseased flesh of the other baby Loy sees in the Duomo,  
                                       a horrible little 
baby—made of half warm flesh; 
flesh that is covered with sores—carried 
by a half-broken mother. 
 
And I who am called heretic, 
and the only follower in Christ’s foot-steps 
among this crowd adoring a wax doll 
—for I alone am worshipping the poor 
sore baby—the child of sex igno- 
rance and poverty. (221) 
 
“Igno-” conjures ignoble and ignominious, while also directing one’s attention to the ambiguity of 
these final lines. Are there implied commas between the last four words (sex, ignorance, and 
poverty), or is the child a product of “sex ignorance,” that is, of a Church-promulgated 
ignorance of reproductive realities? In which case this sick baby, needless to have been born, 
serves as emblem of the maternal martyrdom that for Loy makes all mothers Madonnas, all 
deserving of canonization, even if their own conceptions have been less Immaculate than 
“Felicitous”—or infelicitous, as the case may be:   
Madonnas are everlastingly mothers in ecstacy.  
Their alcove arms 
retire the Felicity of their conception  
  
88 
    
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Omitted omen of Calvary! 
Uncarved Crucifixion!  (Lost, 115) 
These last two lines go further in suggesting not only that mortal mothers are Madonnas, but 
also that Mary’s own suffering consists, in large part, in her having to birth humanity’s 
sacrificial victim at the behest of God the Father—one of many biblical endorsements of 
women’s capitulation to male authority, and a kind of martyrdom whose analogue is 
undergone by all mothers who submit to the often thankless, and often religiously enforced, 
maternal task.21  
Eyeing the “half-broken mother” and her diseased child, Loy’s speaker in “The 
Prototype” proceeds to pray to “humanity’s social consciousness” that it might “do for that 
mother & that child in the light, what / the priests have tried to do in the dark”—that is, to aid 
them by seeing them, by recognizing and facing their worldly existence (Lost, 222). Instead, what 
the priests offer is obscured vision, providing in the form of a wax Christ-child “an inebriating 
glimpse of / something that a baby is supposed to look / like” (222). Here is Christianity in its 
role as opiate of the masses, a mollifying intoxicant dispensed as much through its unreal icons 
as through its teachings, confessions, and Communions. And just what is Loy’s solution to the 
Church-perpetuated problems of poverty, enforced motherhood, blurred vision, and the 
repression of meaningful erotic fulfillment?  
Blow out the candles— 
Throw away the wax-baby 
Use the churches as night-shelters 
Come into the Daylight & preach 
           a New Gospel 
 
           Let them eat— 
                                                 
21  “That’s in their theology,” Leopold Bloom observes in his inimitable way, “or they won’t give the poor woman the 
confession, the absolution. Increase and multiply. Did you ever hear such an idea? Eat you out of house and home” 
(U, 8.31-34). 
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O let them love— 
And let their babies be  
                        pink & white. (222) 
“The Prototype” is merely the earliest of Loy’s poems to link ecclesiastical repression to 
repressive secular ideologies of gender and sexuality. In fact, Loy draws frequently on the 
imagery of profanation both to figure such ideologies as sacrilege and to cast as blasphemy their 
vocal promotion in the rhetorics of political propaganda and church dogma. Deploying forceful 
biblical language, she blasphemes these frequent objects of her critique and also renders them, 
in specifically religious terms, as themselves blasphemies against what for her is the true spirit 
of Christianity.  
Consider the pointed  satire of “Der Blinde Junge” (1923), which begins by invoking 
“The dam Bellona,” goddess of war, who has “littered / her eyeless offspring / Kriegsopfer / 
Upon the pavements of Vienna” (Lost, 83). Always one for puns, Loy outdoes herself in this first 
stanza, leaving no potential connotation unexploited. Dam/n, litter, eyeless/I-less, Kriegsopfer 
(“war victim” but also an “opfer[ing]” to the war goddess): all contribute to the condensed 
irony and rage of the poem, with an economy that any Imagist would envy.22 The portmanteau 
“Kreigsopfer,” in conjunction with the poem’s German title, leaves little doubt which nation-
state Loy blames primarily for the blinding of the young war veteran. Yet it is Bellona, war 
itself, that Loy explicitly indicts for the existence of “this slow blind face / pushing / its virginal 
nonentity / against the light” (83). That word “virginal,” and the metaphorics of light and sight, 
link this poem to many of her others, which often lament the occlusion of vision, sexuality, and 
knowledge—for example in the case of those housebound women and girls who trim their 
                                                 
22  “Bellona” holds a dual personal significance for Loy, who elsewhere cited the Italian town of Bellona (in order “to 
show more clearly what the modern woman is not”—her interviewer’s words) as a prime example of the sexual 
repression and patriarchal mores against which the New Woman defines herself (quoted in Marisa Januzzi, 
“Mongrel Rose,” 430). As in so many of her poems, Loy works here to expose the mutual determinations of 
militarism abroad and of the political suppression of women and Eros at home.     
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lanterns’ wicks, “Virginal     to the bellows / Of Experience”; women whose “last little lust / 
Lost itself in a saucer of gruel,” and whose most “passionate breath” comes from “the 
bronchitis-kettle” (Lost, 53, 24, 10).  
Such repression is an inevitable consequence—as Loy writes in the early poem “Virgins 
Plus Curtains Minus Dots”—of allotting agency of desire to men only, while women are kept 
objectified and cloistered, allowed only to peep at the broader world from behind curtained 
windows. For “Somebody who was never / a virgin / has bolted the door” (Lost, 22). “Der 
Blinde Junge” rehearses a similar theme. Here is yet another case of the powers-that-be, the 
patriarchal governors of the world, enforcing “virginity,” this time through the onslaught of 
war and the literal deprivation of vision. They have “bolted the door” on this young soldier’s 
life and left him a “virginal nonentity”; his eyes, worse off than those of Loy’s virgin women, 
are not allowed even to “look out” (Lost, 83). As ever in Loy, both vision and sexuality are 
metonyms for knowledge.23 Like the girls and women blinded to self and sex and body by a 
British ethos of chastity and virtue, here is a young man blinded most literally, as well as 
figuratively, by the ideologies of war and empire. Loy thus begins in this poem to convey the 
linkage between the cultures of sexual repression, imperialism, and militarism that she will 
develop further in Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose.  
But what is most interesting for our purposes is the precise imagery Loy uses in “Der 
Blinde Junge” to suggest the extent of the blind youth’s deprivation and the culpability of those 
who contributed to it—“the black lightning,” in her words, that “desecrated / the retinal altar” 
(83). Here Loy draws on the imagery of specifically religious transgression to figure war as 
sacrilege—of which altar-desecration is the quintessential expression—and to suggest that war’s 
                                                 
23  Virginia Kouidis emphasizes this aspect of Loy’s epistemology, arguing that “the shaping I-eye” molds her poems 
and that they equate knowledge with “sexual experience and vision” (Mina Loy, 59, 33).  
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vocal promotion, in propaganda, militarism, and the rhetorics of nationalism and patriotism, is 
blasphemy. And because blasphemy against the Spirit is the unforgivable sin, the blind youth’s 
street music issues a forceful “damnation” of the sinners—of the purblind “illuminati,” that is, 
who are to blame for his, and the world’s, blindness: 
Listen! 
illuminati of the coloured earth 
How this expressionless “thing”  
blows out damnation and concussive dark 
 
Upon a mouth-organ (84) 
 
We begin to see here the way that Loy ushers discourses of religious transgression—
blasphemy, desecration, damnation—into the service of her ideological critiques, a strategy we 
can see at work more blatantly in a similarly vituperative poem, “The Black Virginity” (1918).   
In this case the object of Loy’s critique is the Catholic priesthood and, by implication, 
institutional religion in any form. From her vantage point, the hierarchies and dogmas that 
attend organized Christianities are anathema to real religious experience—yet her satires never 
lose sight of these institutions’ formidable power, their enduring ability to “put us,” as she says 
in this poem, “in our places” (Lost, 43). Like “Der Blinde Junge,” “The Black Virginity” angrily 
indicts a form of patriarchal power, depicting the Church as complicit in the same complex of 
imperial aggression and sexual repression that she critiques elsewhere.24 The poem begins by 
characterizing the priesthood as “Evangelical snobs” who find their “Union in severity” and 
“Intimidation,” and who pass their nights in   
Uneasy dreaming 
In hermetically-sealed dormitories 
                                                 
24  In her pamphlet touting “International Psycho-Democracy,” for instance, Loy denounces religious institutions as 
complicit in the repressive governance of society, contributing to those “inhibitive social and religious precepts 
that ordain that man must suffer and cause to suffer and deny the validity of Man’s fundamental desires” (Last, 
279). Her Psycho-Democratic “Party” aims to win over and rehabilitate “the Dummy Public originated by the Press, 
financed by the Capitalist: / For whom the politician legislates, / The army fights, / The church collects” (Last, 
278). 
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Not of me or you Sister Saraminta 
Of no more or less 
Than the fit of Pope’s mitres (Lost, 42) 
 
What grates on Loy, in addition to the priesthood’s apparently misplaced priorities (the Pope’s 
miters, of all things, disturb its dreams), is its impudent hubris in claiming special theological 
knowledge—for example, of “what ‘He’ is,” or of the nature of “the world flesh and devil” (43). 
Again this poem bears comparison with “Der Blinde Junge” for its indictment of sexual 
repression and, ipso facto, of the repression of knowledge—especially religious knowledge, 
which according to Loy comes to us always through our experience of the flesh. The priests’ 
celibacy, like the blind youth’s enforced virginity, symbolizes their lack of access to full human 
experience and to genuine knowledge, theological and otherwise.  
Loy concludes her thought in this poem with an allegorical image of the priests’ lust for 
unattainable knowledge—an image that reminds us of humankind’s original sin, and which 
also provokes us to wonder at the notion that of all sins, this first and most fundamental of 
them all is the one the Church insists on repeating endlessly: 
The last [priest] with apostolic lurch 
Tries for a high hung fruit 
And misses 
Any way it is inedible 
 
It is always thus 
In the Public Garden (43) 
 
The Public Garden replicates, in corrupted fashion, the original Garden; worth comparing with 
this vision of pompous priests jumping for apples is the speaker’s lament in Songs to Joannes that 
she and her lover missed their opportunity to go “apple stealing under the sea” (Lost, 59). Note 
the difference: for Loy, theological and, what is the same, erotic knowledge is accessible not to a 
privileged and celibate few but to all those who intuit bodily where to seek it, and how, and 
with whom. Such seeking is better undertaken by lovers, diving into an erotically suggestive 
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sea, than by a solitary celibate striving comically to grasp the unreachable. Hence institutional 
Christianity’s inability to impart genuine knowledge of self, sex, world, and God. When it 
claims to, it is really blaspheming against what for Loy is Christianity’s actual Spirit, which has 
much more to do with the flesh than these priests will acknowledge. Accordingly, this poem 
damns a blaspheming priesthood as forcefully as Loy’s blind veteran damns the secular 
“illuminati,” designating the Church as culpable in the larger matrix of aggression and 
repression that she finds at work in the ideological rhetorics of nation and empire.25 Hence that 
“imperial eye” at the center of the facetious prayer that concludes a section of Anglo-Mongrels: 
O may the hot-house purity—  
essence  
of English childhood—  
prolong itself  
into autumnal adolescence  — 
 
O may the fuddled blue  
of the imperial eye  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    muddle through  
bright with its bland taboo 
        from the nursery to the cemetery  
                    Amen (Last, 155-56) 
 
This passage’s closing word outdoes even the irony of the “Thank God” that ends Loy’s 1914 
poem “Parturition” (Lost, 8). Rarely has “Amen” sounded so caustic, or with greater reason; the 
bland taboos and orthodoxies that seek to prolong into a superannuated adolescence, even unto 
the grave, the stifling “purity” of Britain’s subjects—its literal and metaphorical virgins and 
soldiers—are for Loy a defilement of both flesh and spirit.  
                                                 
25  Echoing both this poem and “Der Blinde Junge,” in her unpublished “History of Religion and Eros” Loy interprets 
institutional Christianity’s whole “approach to Eros” as equivalent to military warfare. There she writes that the 
Church’s orthodoxy on sexual matters takes the form of a “savage terror, begetter of sadism,” in flagrant disregard 
for God’s having “endowed man with the Eros possibility” (“HRE”).25 The Church’s “tatters of tradition” “choke” 
the human mind, preventing it from recognizing its body as “a covered entrance to infinity”—in the process 
perpetuating what Loy calls “the filth-bliss confusion of the sin-centuries” (Lost, 71; SE, 249). 
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Loy’s literary eviscerations of British imperialism mark another of her affinities with 
Joyce that she acknowledges in her poem on Ulysses—a novel, in her words, that “satirize[s] / 
the imperial Rose / of Gaelic perfumes,” as “England / the sadistic mother / embraces Erin” 
(Lost, 89). It is striking how well these lines describe the figural matrix of Loy’s own critiques of 
empire; in her autobiographical poetry and prose, Loy casts her own “sadistic mother” as an 
“imperial Rose,” “often sadistic, always disdainful. . . . a Briton colonizing the alien attributes of 
her race”: “Imperial / trimmed with some travestied flesh / tinted with bloodless duties     
dewed / with Lipton’s teas.”26 For the English Rose, sexuality is associated with grime, 
pregnancy with “herd-housing”; she is a “Rose of arrested impulses / self pruned / of the 
primordial attributes” (Last, 121). The flesh is itself a travesty, the body “bloodless” in being 
duty-bound, acquainted with tea—that exemplary colonial export—but not with the body’s 
own more impelling fluids; Loy thus continues to hint at a homology or even a complicity 
between England’s imperial lust and its ideological suppression of actual lust, particularly that 
of English women.  
The English Rose remolds Nature, for Loy elsewhere an “irate pornographist” (Lost, 63), 
into  
the post-conceptional  
virginity of Nature  
Wiping  
its pink paralysis  
across the dawn of reason  
A World-Blush  
glowing from  
a never-setting-sun (Last, 121-22) 
 
This World-Blush is the transcendent blush of empire. It is the never-setting sign of its 
suppression of other cultures, the sign of its “post-conception” of their lands as “virgin” and 
                                                 
26  Loy, Goy Israels (quoted in Aimee L. Pozorski, “Eugenicist Mistress and Ethnic Mother,” 47); Last, 121. 
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also of the eternally innocent blush of erotic self-suppression—all in all a supposed innocence 
that subsequent lines expose as something else altogether, casting Rose as a “storage / of British 
Empire-made pot-pourri / of dry dead men” (122). Rose is depicted, moreover, not only as a 
subject and symptom of Empire but also as its authoritative representative in the home, 
reigning with “ineludable claws of dominion” (136). Analogous to British patriarchy’s 
ideological policing of its subjects, she exhibits “an agency / for . . . turning to shame / the 
nucleus / —in infantile impotence— / of Primeval Right” (136). Such is the context in which 
Loy casts her own championing of women’s erotic empowerment as not only a sexual matter 
but an urgent political and moral one. To lift the chains of repression, she suggests quite 
forcefully, would be to undo a complex of ideological subjugations and to counter patriarchy’s 
quelling of mind and body, of artistic expression, of Primeval Right, both in the metropolis and 
in the Empire’s farthest reaches.  
-    -    -     and for  
         Empire 
what form could be superior 
to the super-imposed  
slivers     
of the rose? (129)  
 
 
Pro-Creation Narratives 
Apart, however, from these acid depictions of her own mother and of the British 
motherland, Loy drew on her own reproductive experience—expressed in often starkly 
blasphemous terms—to depict maternity in a far more positive, indeed sacred, light. In 
accordance with her faith in “Xes,” the act of reproduction itself becomes for Loy the most 
significant form of production; procreation, the most significant form of creation. 
Demonstrative of reproduction’s centrality to Loy’s literary output and personal mythology is 
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the section of Anglo-Mongrels that narrates the young Loy’s own Fall, the loss of her Edenic 
innocence:  
The garden  
the child’s  
first place of purity  
is become defiled 
 
An egg is smashed 
a horrible  
aborted contour  
a yellow murder  
in a viscous pool  (Last, 164) 
Her loss of innocence, the “defilement” of her “purity,” occurs appropriately enough in a 
garden—the same garden which, in the poem’s previous section, was the sight of this child’s 
apparently religious “ILLUMINATION.” Importantly, Loy stages this Fall as an encounter with an 
abortion—that motif that will haunt her poetry, especially Songs to Joannes, and which is the 
ugly underside of what Loy views as women’s sacred capacity as procreators. The young Loy 
identifies with the egg (as her name in the poem, Ova, rather unsubtly suggests), and the lasting 
impact of this moment is made explicit in subsequent lines:  
She knows not Time yet 
it lies there  
for a thousand years  
of return    to puzzle  
over a defrauded race of chickens  
pecking the gravel in unconcern (Last, 164) 
The millennial “return” here augments the tableau’s theological resonance, while the implied 
possibility that the chickens may be cannibalizing their own broken egg among the gravel 
conveys Loy’s disgust at the unthinking, unrecognizing, or, worse, uncaring behavior of the 
hens, perhaps suggestive of Loy’s own uncaring mother.27 But the imagery of abortion itself is 
                                                 
27  It also resonates with one of Loy’s uglier evocations of orthodox Christianity’s God, that god of blood-lust and 
sexual denial whom Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus has such difficulty exorcising: “The cannibal God / shutters his lids 
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that of the defilement of what Loy calls “cosmic reproductivity,” an equation of sexual 
reproduction, artistic production, and the godlike power of Creation that recurs throughout her 
poetry and other works—as in “Apology of Genius,” where Loy conflates the artist’s 
“Legerdemain of God” with “Birth-Breaths and orgasms” (Lost, 7, 73).  
Julia Kristeva has reflected on the possibility for “maternity” to become “a true creative 
act, something that we have not yet been able to imagine”; Loy’s poetry and prose belie such 
imaginative failure.28 She defines the sexual act as “the creational caress,” and its issuance in 
reproduction as “the creative moment”: “the creation of a new being is the creation of a 
universe (a universe in reduction, yet one as mysteriously complex and, could we conform to 
other dimensions, as vast as the one in which we are at large)” (Last, 253; “HRE”). Such cosmic 
procreativity bears comparison with the “procreative truth of Me” in Songs to Joannes, where the 
capitalization of “Me” underscores the deific dimensions of reproduction as well as the wasting 
of that divine potential: “We might have” spilled and mingled our eucharistic blood at the 
profane communion table, “We might have given birth to a butterfly” that would have borne 
these lovers’ blood on its ascendant and transcendent wings (Lost, 62, 54).  
If in Songs to Joannes no such offspring has been allowed to take flight, Loy’s early poem 
“Parturition” imagines what this birthing process might look like—although what emerges 
from the womb in this text is no butterfly but rather an ambiguous embodiment both of a bestial 
crucifixion and of the messianic fulfillment and redemption that crucifixion inevitably implies 
in Christian iconography. In “Parturition,” blasphemous language and imagery elevate the 
speaker’s twin roles as mother and poet to the distorted, blasphemous planes of Madonna—
who here gives birth to “a crucified wild beast”—and Creator, producer of the poem that calls 
                                                                                                                                                             
of night      on the day’s gluttony / the partially       devoured humanity / warms its unblessed beds    with bare 
prostrations” (Last, 113). 
28  Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, 220. 
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that beast wildly into being (Lost, 5).29 That procreation here approaches such godlike creation 
ex nihilo is suggested by the poem’s strikingly neoteric venturing into uncharted formal and 
thematic regions. Its pseudo-Futurist typography and innovative use of spacing are 
unprecedented in English-language verse, as is the subject matter; both Roger Conover and 
Thom Gunn have argued that it is the first known poem to depict labor and childbirth from the 
woman’s point of view.30 To put the radical nature of its subject matter into perspective, it is 
worth recalling that the year Loy wrote and published “Parturition,” 1914, was the same year 
Margaret Sanger was indicted for the “obscenity” of her pamphlets on human reproduction. In 
later years, Alfred Kreymborg would remember fondly the stir caused by Loy’s “lewd and 
lascivious writing, in the same class as the pamphlets of Margaret Sanger or the lectures of 
Emma Goldman.”31 That the poem achieves these thematic and formal innovations in concert 
with its profane Christological imagery exemplifies how blasphemous modernism can work to 
articulate radically new kinds of poetic content and form. And as it takes poetry into new 
modernist directions, it also fuses Loy’s procreative concerns to her quintessentially modernist 
obsession with artistic production and deific creativity.  
“Parturition” represents Loy’s most sustained meditation on the figure, in Janet Lyon’s 
words, of “the experiential female body as a laboratory of creativity.”32 It is especially 
fascinating when considered alongside Loy’s own involvement with the Futurists, who, as she 
memorializes in the poem “Lion’s Jaws,” entertained their own notions of womanless auto-
reproduction, fantasies “of Man’s immediate agamogenesis,” “Insurance / of his spiritual 
                                                 
29  Loy’s syntax is ambiguous enough that one can also reasonably read the parturient mother as the “crucified wild 
beast”—yet another example of the Christic Mother-martyr. Alex Goody reads it this way, in fact (Modernist 
Articulations, 47). But certain of Loy’s notes, which resemble and evidently precede “Parturition,” clearly feature 
the newborn baby as “a massacred incubus”—an early version of the crucified beast that finally emerges in the 
published poem. See Aimee Pozorski, “Eugenicist Mistress,” 59.  
30  Conover, Notes to Lost, 177; Gunn, “Three Hard Women,” 48. Conover adds that it is “the first poem in English to 
use collage as a texturing device” (177).  
31  Kreymborg, Our Singing Strength, 488-89. 
32  Lyon, “Mina Loy’s Pregnant Pauses,” 382.  
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integrity / against the carnivorous courtesan” (Lost, 47). “Parturition” likewise merits 
comparison with the discourses of other prominent modernists (notably Eliot, Pound, and 
Joyce) who habitually figured literary production, often with surprising literalness, as the 
bringing to term and delivery of a child.33 Loy’s determinedly embodied poetics press this 
equation even further—as Alex Goody argues, the poem “attempts a linguistic enactment of 
childbirth, rather than a simple reflection or mimetic reproduction”—so that what is birthed in 
the poem coincides with the poem itself as an artistic product.34 Reproduction becomes the 
figure for production, as procreator rivals Creator and mother shoves aside God the Father.35  
At the very climax of the poem, the speaker begins to birth her child and to reach a pain-
fueled “climax in sensibility” (Lost, 5). Characteristically, Loy equates childbirth with another 
sort of climax, describing this birth in much the same language that she will use in Songs to 
Joannes and elsewhere to describe the sexual act: “the ego succeeds in unifying the positive and 
negative poles of sensation / Uniting the opposing and resisting forces / In lascivious 
revelation” (6).  There is something “blasphemous,” in a loosely secular sense of the word, 
about this equation of the erotic and the maternal, as well as the speaker’s frankly 
unsentimental distancing from her own child; its gurgling “Comes from so far away / And the 
foam on the stretched muscles of a mouth / Is no part of myself” (5).  But the poem’s real 
blasphemies inhere in the speaker’s willful adoption of the roles of Madonna and Creator and 
in her evocation of the baby as “a crucified wild beast,” some amalgam of the crucified Christ 
                                                 
33  Eliot wrote that the poet “is oppressed by a burden which he must bring to birth in order to obtain relief” (On 
Poetry and Poets, 98). Joyce used the birthing metaphor to describe his own literary efforts—see, for instance, a 1912 
letter to Nora Barnacle—and of course took the trope to unprecedented lengths in Ulysses’ “Oxen of the Sun” 
episode (Joyce, Selected Letters, 57). And in a December 1921 letter, Pound wrote some playful verse depicting The 
Waste Land as sired by the “Uranian Muse” and birthed by a maternal Eliot, while “Ezra performed the Caesarian 
Operation” (Pound, Selected Letters, 170).    
34  Goody, Modernist Articulations, 47.  
35  And where is the father while Loy’s speaker exercises her pro-creative powers? “Running up-stairs to a[nother] 
woman’s apartment,” singing, “All the girls are tid’ly did’ly / All the girls are nice” (Lost, 5).   
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and the “rough beast” of Yeats’s “Second Coming” that here stands startlingly, lasciviously 
revealed (5).   
 The speaker’s blasphemous climax additionally metaphorizes her role as both 
“mistress” and “mother,” a binary division that Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto” calls for women 
everywhere “to abolish” (Lost, 154).36 Much converges in this moment—structural climax and 
thematic climax, form and content, body and text, conception and childbirth—as the parturient 
woman assumes godlike dimensions. Her climax constitutes both an intensely erotic and a 
theological event, indeed a blasphemous replay of the Christ event, here rendered appropriately 
as an irruption of the divine into the mundane, or of kairos into chronos:  
Mother I am  
Identical  
With infinite Maternity  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The was—is—ever—shall—be  
Of cosmic reproductivity (Lost, 7) 
“Every woman has a right to maternity,” proclaims Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto”; here, by 
exercising that divine right, the woman becomes “identical” with the infinite, with the 
procreative spheres of the sacred, joining the ranks of those women who “wipe the nose of the 
universe and push it out to play while they attend to infinity in detail” (Lost, 155; “HRE”). She is 
the bearer not just of a child but of a cosmic reproductivity to rival the creation in Genesis, a 
procreativity that enlarges the deific sphere of the artist, “Exceeding its boundaries in every 
direction” (Lost, 4).  
                                                 
36  In another poem, a decorative Madonna keeps “a man / hidden beneath her hoop,” suggesting that even the most 
paradigmatic embodiment of maternity is no stranger to the role of mistress (Lost, 37). As Suzanne Churchill points 
out, this Madonna wears both red and blue, combining the iconographic colors of Mary Magdalene with that of the 
Virgin (The Little Magazine “Others,” 204). 
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 “Parturition” holds a central place in Loy’s erotically charged, divinely suffused 
universe, synced always to “the accoupling and germinal throb of the corporeal world” 
(“HRE”).37 In her early poem “Ignoramus,” Loy evokes this world as  
                        the heart-beating  
Accoupling 
of the masculine and feminine 
Universal principles 
Mating (Lost, 44) 
Men and women serve as the principles in this universal drama; their heartbeat, the very source 
of life, becomes here merely a participle to the apparently more fundamental fact of Accoupling. 
These lines immediately succeed a stanza that reduces the Book of Common Prayer’s hieratic 
grandeur of “dust to dust” to literal dust that gets shaken from the trousers of a Chaplinesque 
tramp and “dribble[s] out of his trouser-ends / In dust-to-dust / Till cock-kingdom-come-
crow” (Lost, 44). The momentousness of Kingdom Come here finds itself squeezed between the 
more pressing, more predictable arrival of cock-crow. “Cock” and “come,” meanwhile, finding 
themselves in suggestive proximity, index the erotic and procreative principle that in Loy’s 
cosmology suffuses and drives the universe; it is as much a part of everyday chronos (cock-
crow) as of eternal kairos (Kingdom Come).  
 The often startling poetic products of this sex-centric cosmology, those “gelatinous 
erogenous quiverings” that offended Conrad Aiken, stand in stark contrast to any “impersonal” 
variety of modernist poetics.38 Consider, for example, Pound’s representation of sexual love in 
the seemingly mistitled poem “Coitus,” which features “gilded phaloi . . . thrusting at the 
                                                 
37  “Urge and urge and urge,” wrote one of Loy’s most pertinent predecessors; “Always the procreant urge of the 
world” (Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 30).  
38  Quoted in Carolyn Burke, Becoming Modern, 7. Christina Walter persuasively traces Loy’s interest in and evolution 
toward a poetics of impersonality, culminating in Insel, “a novelized reflection on aesthetic impersonality” 
(“Getting Impersonal,” 665). But while this point is a useful corrective to critics’ tendency to focus solely on Loy’s 
investment in the personal, even Walter dates Loy’s impersonal turn only to the late 1920s, sometime after the 
years of her most significant poetic output and of the works I examine here.  
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spring air.”39 These lines celebrate only the phallic dimension of sexuality, depicting a futile but 
safely detached vision that conflicts wholly with Loy’s coital sense of the erotic. Given Pound’s 
apparent anxiety over the female body—his Cantos memorably depict “the female” as 
unassimilably abject, “a chaos / An octopus /  . . . A biological process”—and his assessment of 
Whitman’s portrayals of the erotic body as “disgusting” and “exceedingly nauseating,” it 
should hardly surprise us that he privileges an open-air pelvic thrusting over the messy 
intermingling of bodies that characterizes Eros in Loy’s poetry.40  
His uneasiness over Whitman makes Pound again worth comparing to Loy, who 
expressed in a letter to Carl Van Vechten her belief that “we’ll get more ‘wholesome sex’ in 
American art—than English after all,” precisely because the English “haven’t had a Whitman.”41 
Virginia Kouidis rightly sees Whitman as a crucial influence on Loy, not only for his portrayals 
of the “essential sexual dimension of selfhood” but also for “his deification of the self”—a pair 
of concerns that become inexorably intertwined in Loy’s blasphemous poetry.42 That her 
shockingly direct treatments of human sexuality are as important to Loy’s works as her 
figurations of the messianic artist-creator makes Whitman a doubly relevant precursor. For in 
addition to deifying “the self” in the abstract, Whitman memorably messianizes “the Me 
myself,” grandiosely capitalizing the personal pronoun as Loy does in Song to Joannes—a service 
he does not extend to Christ even as he “accept[s] him that was crucified, knowing assuredly 
that he is divine.”43 Whitman also anticipates Loy’s troubling of distinctions between profane 
                                                 
39  Pound, Personae, 113 
40  Pound, The Cantos, XXIX/144-45; Pound, Selected Prose, 146. In his Introduction to Ezra Pound: Selected Poems, T. S. 
Eliot too dismisses “the clap-trap in Whitman’s content” and writes of having “had to conquer an aversion to his 
form, as well as to his matter,” in order to read him (xi, viii-ix). 
41  Quoted in Virginia Kouidis, Mina Loy, 27.  
42  Kouidis, Mina Loy, 26. 
43  Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 32, 69. Like Christ, Whitman has suffered his “own crucifixion and bloody crowning,” 
and in echo of Christ’s return he “shall come again upon the earth after five thousand years” (64, 69).  Whitman 
presents himself, in short, as the fulfillment of Emerson’s messianic call in “The Poet” for the “liberating god,” “the 
timely man, the new religion, the reconciler, whom all things await”—the Poet who will harness “Logos” to reveal 
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and sacred, flesh and spirit: “Divine am I inside and out, and I make holy whatever I touch or 
am touched from; / The scent of these arm-pits is aroma finer than prayer, / This head is more 
than churches or bibles or creeds.”44 Loy’s poetry is thus markedly Whitmanian in its 
channeling of the voices of godlike creator and Christlike savior as well as in its championing of 
“cosmic reproductivity.” Her texts harbor “no nostalgia,” as Eric Selinger puts it, “for what 
Whitman aptly dubbed ‘this tepid wash, this diluted deferential love’ in which the body stayed 
unspoken.”45 Like Whitman’s, Loy’s is an erotic universe, one whose sunrises are so many “little 
rosy / Tongue[s] of Dawn . . . Licking the Arno” (Lost, 63).  
Equally erotic are Loy’s poetic bodies, both the bodies of her texts and the bodies 
depicted therein. Her poem “One O’Clock at Night” even makes a claim for the virtue of being, 
at times, “a mere woman / The animal woman / Understanding nothing of man” save “the 
security of imparted physical heat” (Lost, 15). In effect the poem gives a positive turn to 
Marinetti’s public pronouncements on the essential subhumanity or animality of women; Loy 
asserts women’s intellectual equality while at the same time implying the inferiority of 
masculinist intellection to an animal embrace of “physical heat.” From such a perspective the 
“cerebral gymnastics” of boastful men—with their masturbatory “theories of plastic velocity”—
can be safely regarded as “the self-indulgent play of children” (Lost, 15).46 There are times, the 
poem implies, when physical heat—even for this famously cerebral writer—must take a 
strategic precedence over intellectualism run amok, as embodied by the self-important 
phallogocentrism of Futurist discourse.     
                                                                                                                                                             
“the secret of the world” (Essays, 34-35, 40, 43, 19). Hence Whitman in “Song of Myself,” the self-proclaimed “poet 
of the body” and “poet of the soul” (Leaves 45); “acme of things accomplish’d,” “encloser of things to be” (71); 
worker of “the celestial laws” (47); “a creator” (68). 
44  Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 49. 
45  Selinger, “Love in the Time of Melancholia,” 26.   
46  “The genie of the womb,” Loy affirms elsewhere, need cede “no whit of instinct to the genie of the phallus” 
(“HRE”). Tellingly, although “the male initiative is set to the tempo of the phallus” (“HRE”), it is a tempo to which 
Songs to Joannes’s speaker is decidedly “not paced” (Lost, 54).     
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“Phallogocentrism” recalls a stage of feminist history whose time, perhaps, has largely 
passed. So too does the women’s writing, or écriture féminine, that Hélène Cixous called for in 
her 1975 essay “The Laugh of the Medusa.” But in the 1910s and early ’20s, when Loy was 
actively producing an embodied, erotic, and stridently “feminine” form of writing, such a 
vision of writing and of womanhood was far from passé, was indeed startlingly new—was as 
crucial to her modernism, and to her modernist identity as a New Woman, as were her many 
neoteric forays into the experimental regions of poetic genre and form. In this as in so many 
ways, Loy was decidedly ahead of her time. Just as French theory provided a lexicon with 
which to understand Joyce’s deconstructive texts—and indeed his own version of écriture, in 
Cixous’s account—so does Cixous provide a way to understand Loy’s poetry. If we are to come 
to terms with Loy’s idiosyncratic feminism, it is necessary to consider that language of the body 
which, unbeknownst to each other, both she and Cixous have had occasion to speak.    
 
Ecce Fe/Mina: Unmanning the Spirit 
Loy’s poetry uncannily anticipates the performatively essentialist vision in “Laugh of 
the Medusa” of women’s profound embodiment and cosmically libidinous pro-creativity. 
Indeed, Loy’s most memorable blasphemies result from the textual commingling of this sexual 
embodiment with Christian themes. Her poems’ aggressive interpolation of the female body, 
her assertion of the body as poetry, proleptically answers Cixous’s injunction to “Woman” to 
“put herself into the text.”47 Loy thus provides a potent example of “a feminist practice of 
writing” that “will always surpass the discourse that regulates the phallocentric system” (883). 
As Tim Armstrong notes, Loy “offers up the de-objectified body,” one whose “presence 
                                                 
47  Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” 875. I find it difficult to accept Cristanne Miller’s assertion of a “chasm 
between spirit and skin” in Loy’s texts; to me the “spirit” of such poems as “Parturition” and Songs to Joannes—
poems that hardly exhibit the “nongendered speaking voice” that Miller attributes to Loy’s poems generally—is 
inextricable from the texts’ viscerally somatic quality (Cultures of Modernism, 120).   
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insinuates itself into the rhythms of the poetry.”48 Her female voices speak through the medium 
of the body and become subjects precisely, if counter-intuitively, in and through their very 
embodiment. For Loy as for Cixous, “women are body,” an infinitely expansive body whose 
“libido is cosmic” (Cixous 886, 889). They are God-sized (their “eyelashes polish stars”), and so 
are their desires; accordingly, their “seismic orgasm[s]” can rend the earth (Lost, 72, 66).49 In 
both Songs to Joannes and Lunar Baedeker Loy enacts textually the “passionate and precise 
interrogation of her own erotogeneity” that Cixous endorses, “each stage of rapture inscribing a 
resonant vision, a composition, something beautiful” (876)—in Loy’s terms, “A cosmos / Of 
coloured voices / And laughing honey” (Lost, 56).   
Of course, Loy’s depictions of sexual intercourse are rarely as abstractly figurative as 
laughing honey and colored voices. The lines that immediately succeed these, in fact, give us 
“spermatozoa / At the core of Nothing / In the milk of the Moon” (Lost, 56). Abstract, still, but 
there is no getting away from those spermatozoa—just another messy component of Eros, Loy’s 
land of milk and (laughing) honey. Often the poet unflinchingly celebrates love’s corporeal and 
even abject qualities, its “wild oats    sown in mucous membrane,” its “rivers [that] run no 
fresher than a trickle of saliva,” its “humid carnage” (Lost, 53). Loy keeps the body in sight 
always; elsewhere she emphasizes the physicality of love as the meeting of lovers’ eyes 
“Trailing the rest of the animal behind them” (Lost, 16). She does not flinch even from noting the 
“ample sex” of a two-year-old girl, “Precocious coquette,” or the desire expressed toward her 
mutely by a “Bad little boy” (Lost, 24-25). Nor from the “wanton duality” of a man’s “skin-sack” 
(Lost, 53). Kenneth Rexroth memorably noted the effects of such details for Loy’s readers: “As 
                                                 
48  Armstrong, Modernism, Technology, and the Body, 120.  
49  Loy’s notes toward an essay on religion contain a fragment that conjoins religion and the body, creation and Eros, 
in a way that Cixous would surely appreciate: “Orgasm = the microcosmic projection of the Paroxysm of creation” 
(“Notes on Religion,” 16). Joyce offers much the same sentiment by equating sexual coupling with Creation in 
Ulysses: “They are entwined in nethermost darkness, the willer with the willed, and in an instant (fiat!) light shall 
flood the world” (14.1069-70).   
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one reads of Mina Loy’s babies, one’s sphincters loosen. Her copulators stay copulated. . . . 
Mina Loy, in her best known work, dipped her pen in the glands of Bartholin, and wrote.”50  
According to Cixous, the female writer dips her pen in a somewhat different well of the 
body: “a woman is never far from mother. . . . She writes in white ink” (881). And we have seen 
that the poem “Parturition” brings together what Loy similarly views as women’s essential 
maternity with the act of procreation, the divine and supremely artistic power to bring new life 
into an otherwise stagnant world. What I have not stressed about this poem, however, is how 
fully it co-opts and subverts male-privileging discourses, both sacred and secular. One of these 
discourses is the oft-invoked metaphor equating literary composition and completion with 
human gestation and birth—in and from the body of the poet. Susan Stanford Friedman has 
suggested that in contrast to a traditional association of the pen and phallus, hence of poetic 
creativity with masculinity, women writers’ use of the equally traditional parturition metaphor 
constructs not only a “discourse distinct from phallogocentric male use of the same metaphor 
but also a subversive inscription of women’s (pro)creativity.”51 Contrary to Maeera Shreiber’s 
reading (“With Love Songs, Loy lodges an attack on this line of thinking, arguing that these two 
kinds of making are absolutely distinct”), I would argue that Loy, like the women writers 
Friedman discusses, “unites motherhood and authorship into a new whole”; like male writers’ 
use of the childbirth metaphor, “her comparison of motherhood and authorship reminds the 
reader of their historical separation. But unlike the male metaphor, her analogy subverts that 
contextual resonance instead of reinforcing it.”52 Loy thus subverts a traditional division of 
labor—men produce, women reproduce—that has been licensed, in part, by Jewish and 
Christian theology; Adam and Eve’s punishment dictates the division of manual and mental 
                                                 
50  Loy, Lunar Baedeker & Time-Tables, 12-13. 
51  Friedman, “Creativity and the Childbirth Metaphor,” 49, 51.  
52  Shreiber, “Love is a Lyric,” 147; Friedman, “Creativity,” 60.   
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work (“the sweat of his brow”) from the pains of reproductive labor, so that in the Judaic and 
Christian traditions, “where God the Father supplanted the Goddess as Mother, the [masculine] 
mind became the symbolic womb of the universe. . . . The power of the Word became the 
paradigm of male creativity, indeed the foundation of Western patriarchal ideology” (52). It is 
precisely this Word, I suggest—the divine sanction of male authority—that Loy overthrows in 
works such as “Parturition” and Songs to Joannes.    
With “Parturition” Loy offers a gendered reversal of male writers’ appropriation of 
women’s fecundity to valorize their own forms of literary creation. In an act of transgressive 
tropology, Loy appropriates the traditionally male trope and offers as superior the combined 
force of artistic production and the uniquely female progenitive force, the Alpha and Omega, 
first and last, the “was—is—ever—shall—be / Of cosmic reproductivity” (Lost, 7). This 
displacement willfully subverts gendered religious hierarchy. The poem as a whole turns the 
gendered dynamics of Genesis and the gospels on their head, constituting a dramatically 
feminist reenactment of the biblical; Loy underlines this reenactment by appropriating both 
Jehovah’s and Christ’s declarative “I am” in the line “Mother I am”—a syntactic inversion that 
highlights  the line’s coadunation of Word and mother, God and woman (Lost, 7). The phrase “I 
am” appears seven times in “Parturition,” replicating Christ’s sevenfold such assertions in 
John’s gospel, as in such “blasphemous” of statements as “Before Abraham was, I am” (John 
9:58). (In Exodus, God gives His name to Moses as “I AM,” a construction that echoes 
pregnantly across the gospels [Exodus 3:14].) These Christic depictions of the female body also 
echo her characterization in “Brancusi’s Golden Bird” of the “Alpha and Omega” as a feminine 
“breast of revelation” and, in Songs to Joannes, of her female speaker’s spilling of the 
transubstantiated sacramental wine (Lost, 79, 54). She spills Christ’s blood; she writes in Red Ink.  
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 “I am,” she writes, “Identical / With infinite Maternity,” and we are asked, I think, to 
recall Coleridge’s definition of the artist’s “primary imagination”—a duplication of “the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM”—and to recognize this as a feminist trumping of such divine 
(pro)creativity.53 Loy hints at another coadunation of woman and Christ with her self-depiction 
in Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose as  
the rose  
that grows  
from the red flowing  
from the flank of Christ  
thorned with the computations  
of the old  
Jehovah’s gender (Last, 132)  
Is it Jesus or is it she, “the rose / that grows” from Christ’s blood, who is thus “thorned”? The 
indeterminate syntax leaves us to weigh both potential meanings, reading Loy’s 
autobiographical character as both a product of His redeeming blood and, in the other reading, 
inseparable from Christ himself—as indeed Loy’s speaker will become at the climax of Songs to 
Joannes. (Of which more below.) In contrast with the ambiguity of these lines is the clarity with 
which Loy genders the nature of women’s and Christ’s real afflicters. Men, after all (“Jehovah’s 
gender”), decided Christ’s fate; and men’s computations continue to be a crown of thorns for 
modern women. The former allegation additionally highlights the absurdity of blaming, for 
instance, “the Jews” for the Crucifixion, as one of Anglo-Mongrels’ characters does (Last, 158-59).  
One might with equal justice blame “the men.” If this latter inference is fallacious, though, it is a 
fallacy that Loy is more eager to commit—as when Songs to Joannes charges its male addressee 
with crucifying Loy’s female speaker, a transgressive embodiment of Christ:  
Crucifixion  
Of a busy-body 
Longing to interfere so 
                                                 
53  Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 304. 
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With the intimacies  
Of your insolent isolation 
 
Crucifixion  
Of an illegal ego’s 
Eclosion 
On your equilibrium 
Caryatid    of an idea 
 
Crucifixion  
Wracked arms 
Index extremities  
In vacuum 
To the unbroken fall (Lost, 67) 
Instead of the flesh-breaking Communion Loy imagines in Section III, her speaker’s flesh is 
broken by crucifixion. Like that of Jesus, her biblical predecessor, this woman’s “crime” has 
been blasphemy, the sensuously irreverent, biblically inflected declarations of the preceding 
stanzas combining with her professed desire for self-deification. In what is both a cruelly ironic 
and a fundamentally subversive move, Loy fulfills her speaker’s latter desire by crucifying her. 
Loy’s speaker here suffers the fate of the Son while Loy herself assumes the role of the 
properly deific artist, the god who creates—and who taketh away. Loy thus unmistakably 
stakes her claim to a position alongside not only Joyce but also such creators as Brancusi, Stein, 
and Wyndham Lewis, the order of artists for whom she reserves the appellation of Jehovah. 
Here it is illuminating to recall Loy’s comments on Sigmund Freud, in a passage that 
distinguishes the merely messianic from the wholly creative: “When the gentile world . . . 
required a savior they nailed up a Christ. When it required a second savior to counteract the 
effects of the first, Freud was at its service.”54 Such an immensely influential (and, in Loy’s own 
estimation, culturally redeeming) analytical mind as Freud’s earns him this messianic 
                                                 
54  Loy, “Notes on Religion,” 15. 
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distinction; however, lacking the essentially Creative force of the artist, he will not bear 
comparison with God the Father.55  
As we have come to expect, the crucifixion sequence in Songs to Joannes specifically 
underscores the Passion’s corporeal dimension. The same poet who in a 1920 closet drama 
invites us to “Observe the legs, the agony of the crucified . . . the tendons . . .” begins this earlier 
passage with the playful “busy-body” and ends tragically with the destruction of that body on 
the cross.56 In such instances Loy’s poem also betrays a remarkable self-consciousness, enacting 
a textual representation of blasphemy itself. For as David Lawton notes, blasphemy “insists on 
the corporeal body of the divine,” a fact attested by such medieval constructions as “by God’s 
arms” and “by God’s bones.”57 Indeed, “a conventional representation is that swearers injure 
and rend the body of Christ himself in what is tantamount to a re-crucifixion, an anti-Mass” 
(10). Loy has already given us, in the third section of Songs to Joannes, an erotic anti-Mass held at 
a profane communion table. Now, three sections from the end, she presents the re-crucifixion, 
again substituting her speaker’s own body for the body of Christ. In both cases Loy’s 
desecrations assume a relentless corporeality; in a move that mirrors the eucharistic 
transvaluation of symbol into body, these defilements—graven in the mock-transubstantiative 
language of Logopoeia—threaten to cross over from the textual realm of blasphemy to the 
physicality of sacrilege.  
In keeping with the principles of a somatic text, the poem sequence itself begins to 
splinter into fragments, the scattered limbs of a broken body. The next section reads, in full, 
“The moon is cold / Joannes / Where the Mediterranean — — — — —” (Lost, 67), and the 
                                                 
55  “Freud is unnecessary to the future,” Loy writes elsewhere; “His utile achievement lay in his solution of the 
problem, ‘To mention or not to mention.’ By making it, aided by the scientific aegis - - - fashionably polite to 
mention. Clearing a way out for inhibition” (SE, 252). 
56  Loy, “The Pamperers,” 65; ellipses in original. 
57  Lawton, Blasphemy, 10. 
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following two, with which the poem ends, read as articulations that have been similarly 
interrupted or aborted. Like these final stanzas, the speaker’s body has been mangled, her arms 
“wracked.” Moreover, her “unbroken fall” suggests that, unlike Osiris, she has little chance of 
being fully reassembled. Yet like the reduced but still gloriously embodied Golden Bird—whose 
own “extremities” have been “lopped” off, as Loy writes in her hymn to Brancusi—she remains 
the Alpha and Omega of the alternative, profane space that Loy has created, a space that 
mirrors but inverts the sexual politics of Christian orthodoxy, demonstrating the potential for 
texts to be determinedly Logos-centric without being phallocentric (Lost, 79). This is not to say 
that either Songs to Joannes or Lunar Baedeker provides any illusion that the Christian model can 
be so easily re-appropriated. The female Christ maintains her sanctity at great cost, and, she 
claims, was never anything but a “Caryatid” anyway; she is merely an icon (the female body-as-
pillar) in a radical textual space, the new and blasphemous ideology she supports only “an 
idea”—and one unlikely to gain much traction in the real world of 1917. 
A provocative statement from Christian Science founder Mary Baker Eddy may help to 
explain the religion’s appeal for a poet who so innovatively deploys the trope of deific 
becoming: “Human philosophy has God manlike; Christian Science makes man Godlike.”58 
Eddy’s wording makes dangerously explicit one of Christian orthodoxy’s central ambiguities, 
namely the fine line between the ultimate virtue of emulating God and the ultimate sin of 
desiring to become God—that is, the line between sanctity and blasphemy that Loy adroitly 
traverses. At the same time, Loy’s feminist poetics transcend Eddy’s radical notion of “making 
man Godlike” to make woman Godlike, rescuing the Spirit from the impaling phallus and 
granting it a new, and a wholly blasphemous, tongue.  
 
                                                 
58  Quoted in Cook, “The ‘Infinitarian,’” 459.  
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Coda: Return of the Oppressed 
That tongue reemerges with a vengeance in another of Loy’s unpublished manuscripts, 
an untitled draft that depicts an idiosyncratic Second Coming as sequel to both the seismic 
coming and the crucifixion of Songs to Joannes.59 Likely a product of Loy’s “Bowery period” of 
1948-1953, this manuscript concludes with a scorchingly apocalyptic evocation of outraged 
Woman—a return of the oppressed. Not requiring the “sharp twoedged sword” that protrudes 
from Christ’s mouth in Revelation 1:16, this vengeful demigoddess unleashes “a two-edged 
tongue in torrential indignation.”60 Her tongue “hollows its course through the lobes of man’s 
brain and erodes the quick of his nerves with the acids of old agony”; “it spreads a lasting blight 
on the crop of life which springs from it.” Here is Woman the Destroyer, rendered in the 
modernistic guise of the “one-woman-jazz-band of the female universe,” apocalyptic 
counterpart to the Genesis-like deity of pro-Creation. She comes to plague, and the plague is her 
tongue, unleashed. “For the womb is built of a long patience,” Loy writes, “but when the genie 
of it at last is weary of bearing together with its biological load the ghostly foeti of unsatisfied 
desires, it rouses from its apathy.”  
In the spirit of apocalyptic rhetoric, the temporality here remains enigmatic.61 Is this a 
vision of a time to come, for example, or a time that has come already? Such questions dog this 
passage as insistently as they do Revelation. And like Revelation, Loy’s text tells a grand 
narrative of righteous retribution:    
So in the everlasting cavern [i.e., “the Womb”] vast as the cave of the four winds, 
a cyclonic Voice in vengeance of the mute forbearing multitude of misspent 
women, blows up the dusts of life; the debris and detritus that man in helpless 
                                                 
59  Loy has elsewhere affirmed that woman “rises as the sun [and as the Son?], smiles from her beads and sets on the 
hither side of love - - - to rise again” (“HRE”; emphasis added). 
60  This untitled manuscript is filed with Loy’s notes and typescript for “History of Religion and Eros” in the Yale 
Collection of American Literature.    
61  In the language of revelation, writes J. Hillis Miller, “Apocalypse is never now. It is always to come, a thing of the 
future, both infinitely distant and immediately imminent” (Others, 117). 
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emulation of sadistic Nature has tossed there of his ethical logic, in vertiginous 
spirals of recrimination. 
 The rubbish of centuries crashes into words as the volume of all women’s 
Silence become audible, rolls upon us.  
 
Jesus Christ was Word become flesh; here is Woman, Silence become audible. But what, after 
all, does that silence say?  Its discourse is not rational, it refuses to make sense. It is “a 
preposterous music,” “a fuge [sic] of irrefutable illogic,” an “echoing indignation” that “persists 
unanswerable.” It simply “flows on,” leaving a “sentient wreckage in its wake.” It is, in the 
familiar sexist accusation, decidedly unreasonable.  
This long-repressed voice thus returns as an “incantation” that “like malefic secret rites 
of destructive magic strikes undertones in our social symphony omitted in orchestration.”  It 
speaks in tongues, a babble that conveys women’s trials, inequities, subordinations. It descends 
upon deaf ears but with the force of the Holy Spirit’s descent upon the Apostles, and in the 
same form, its speaker’s “two-edged tongue” recalling the Spirit’s “cloven tongues like as of 
fire” (Acts 2:3). We have seen Loy usurp the roles of Creator and Crucified, Father and Son; in 
this work she completes a trinity of feminist appropriations. The “Spirit” here becomes “the 
unconscious medium through whom the outraged spirit of the weaker sex pours forth an 
automatic monologue.” Her oracular cacophony erupts from a seemingly “dormant volcano,” 
voicing a long-delayed retribution for women’s historical silencing. She loosens the tongue, that 
is, whose discourse has been all too readily dismissed as unreasonable, illogical, and which has 
so easily been “absorbed by sanatoria & asylums with the connivance of official discretion 
which never listens behind closed doors.” Official discretion, and desecration: of woman, the 
body, the erotic, the holy. 
In this enigmatic late manuscript, Loy brings the female voice and body, her 
blasphemous speech and sacrilegious embodiment, inextricably to the forefront. Behold the 
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final, the cumulative damnation, a frightening female music that refuses to play by men’s 
orchestrations—a music made in part of those damning, unintelligible sounds that issue, for 
instance, from a blinded soldier’s harmonica, or from the mouths of women in the throes of 
childbirth, of women being nailed to their crosses. And made, in part, of those unintelligible 
silences: the damning silences of women locked behind closed doors and curtained windows, 
women reduced to dolls with glassy eyes: a silent cacophony of pain, indignation, and reprisal. 
Here, then, is another incarnation of the female Logos. The Word is the Creative principle but it 
is also, in the Bible, a principle that becomes flesh, and a principle that returns to destroy and 
then make new. Women’s special powers of creation remain for Loy a powerful force in her 
feminist poetry and prose, but what this unpublished manuscript adds is the polemical and 
inherently apocalyptic injunction to tear down before building up; to tear down patriarchy, that 
is, along with its discursive hegemony, so that women’s biological and aesthetic powers of pro-
Creation can issue in a new discourse and even, perhaps, a new social order. Such an aspiration 
may seem downright utopian, but it is not, I think, out of character—coming as it does from the 
writer of the “Feminist Manifesto” and the proponent of an International Psycho-Democracy, 
and a writer who knew as well as anyone the power of words to make sacred, to profane, and to 
accomplish both in one blasphemous breath.  
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Chapter Three 
 
BLASPHEMY AS DIALECTIC:  
DEFINING AND DEFILING “THE NEW NEGRO” 
 
 
If the chord of mutual Zionism is one of the last to be sounded in Joyce’s Ulysses—when 
Bloom imagines a “consummation” of both Irish and Jewish Zionisms—it is one of the first that 
Alain Locke strikes in his landmark 1925 anthology The New Negro: An Interpretation (U, 17.761-
64). In his introduction to the volume, Locke interprets Harlem as “the home of the Negro’s 
‘Zionism,’” then widens this observation’s scope and implications: “As with the Jew, 
persecution is making the Negro international” (NN, 14). Later, on the topic of American 
slavery and the “sorrow songs,” he writes that “the only historical analogy is the spiritual 
experience of the Jews and the only analogue, the Psalms” (200). Locke’s assessments here 
contribute to a deeply rooted cultural identification of African Americans with the “chosen 
people” of the Bible, a figuration of American slaves and their descendents as typological 
fulfillments of the biblical Israelites. Theophus Smith has termed the varied cultural and 
political uses of these Hebraic parallels “Exodus strategies”—imaginative identifications that 
allowed black Americans both during and after slavery to assemble their own sacred notions of 
peoplehood, in a process Werner Sollors calls “typological ethnogenesis.”1  
By arrogating and rewriting European interpretations and invocations of the Bible, 
Exodus strategies express African American resistance to white oppression. Such rewritings, 
moreover, figure centrally in the New Negro Renaissance of the 1920s and remain integral to 
our understanding of African American modernism. If, as Michael North argues, white 
                                                 
1  Smith, Conjuring Culture, 67; Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity, 57. Characteristically, the black Baptist preacher Absalom 
Jones drew on these strategies when, in an 1808 sermon commemorating the United States’ recent abolition of the 
transatlantic slave trade, he declared that God “has, as in the case of his ancient and chosen people the Jews, come 
down to deliver our suffering countrymen from the hands of their oppressors” (“A Thanksgiving Sermon,” 75-76; 
emphasis in original). For more on African American “Exodus strategies,” see Albert J. Raboteau, Canaan Land: A 
Religious History of African Americans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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moderns appropriated African aesthetics and the African American vernacular as “the dialect of 
modernism,” black blasphemous modernism reversed this flow of appropriation. While writers 
such as Stevens, Eliot, Pound, and Williams were busy stealing black stereotypes and voices, 
black modernists seized the cultural, aesthetic, and political capital inherent in constructions of 
the biblical and the theological—constructions that are “normatively the property of white 
mythology.”2 Examples abound in the New Negro anthology and in countless other Harlem-
Renaissance texts, as well as in some of the period’s most memorable visual art: Charles 
Cullen’s drawings for Countée Cullen’s The Black Christ, for example, and Aaron Douglas’s 
illustrations for James Weldon Johnson’s God’s Trombones. The latter depict a variety of biblical 
figures, including Adam, Gabriel, the Prodigal Son, Simon of Cyrene, the Nativity shepherds, 
and the very hand of God—all portrayed as black. 
Strategic revisions of existing typologies served African Americans as an important 
means of distinguishing and building their own intelligible nationhood. We nonetheless turn 
now to important fissures within black culture, in particular within the Harlem Renaissance 
community of artists, intellectuals, and writers. In one corner we find perhaps the most 
important document of the renaissance, Locke’s New Negro anthology. In the other we have that 
young coterie of avant-garde Harlem writers and artists who called themselves “the 
“Niggeratti,” including Douglas, Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, Wallace Thurman, 
and Richard Bruce Nugent. Excepting Thurman, who arrived in Harlem only after the 
anthology’s publication, all were New Negro contributors. Nevertheless, in the following months 
and years, several of these figures went on to oppose their politicized and often stridently 
blasphemous art to that anthology’s typological ethos—to its particular “interpretation,” as its 
                                                 
2  Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Genders, Races, and Religious Cultures, 132. 
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subtitle declares, of what the New Negro was and would become, and to its prophecy of a 
messianic and specifically Christ-like racial redeemer.  
Begin with two visual bookends to the Harlem Renaissance: “The Brown Madonna,” 
Winold Reiss’s frontispiece to The New Negro (1925), and “Mary Madonna,” a 1930 drawing by 
Bruce Nugent (Illustrations 1-2). Despite their similar titles, these pictures could hardly be more 
different. Reiss’s Madonna, clearly labeled as such in the picture’s caption, wears blue in 
keeping with traditional iconography of the Virgin. A pale nimbus, likewise rendered in blue, 
radiates from her figure, contributing to the portrait’s sacramental valence. She directs her gaze 
modestly away from the viewer and holds in her arms the (Christ)child who seems to incarnate  
that “New Negro” announced in large letters on the adjacent title page—herald of the race’s 
 
 
        
 
Fig. 1. Winold Reiss, “The Brown Madonna,” 1925.  Fig. 2. Richard Bruce Nugent, “Mary Madonna,” 1930. 
Fisk University Galleries, Nashville, Tennessee.  Reproduced with permission from the collection of 
Reproduced by permission of Renate Reiss. Thomas H. Wirth. 
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cultural renascence in and through art. (Locke himself likely chose the image’s typological 
caption.3) Nugent’s Mary, in contrast, gazes directly and immodestly at us with weary, 
licentious eyes. Naked, languid, without child, this racially indeterminate woman seems more 
Magdalene than Madonna, more erotic than maternal; an exaggerated divot below her throat 
hints at a slightly misplaced Adam’s apple, a suggestion of androgyny that accords with the 
sexual ambiguities inherent in many of Nugent’s other works. A distended blonde nipple 
matches the subject’s hair, and two colorful interlocking triangles call attention to what may or 
may not be a site of holy reproduction. In either case, this transgressive Madonna hardly 
conforms to the ideal of bourgeois respectability endemic to programs of “racial uplift” 
generally and to the ethos so carefully crafted five years earlier by Locke’s anthology—not least 
by means of its frontispiece, what Marlon Ross has aptly called an “allegory of spirituality 
purified of suggestive sexuality.”4  
 Nugent’s drawing is just the opposite. Its suggestive sexuality is so insistent as to 
“purify” the image of its allegorical and spiritual freight, even if it does belong to his Salome 
series—a sequence of biblically inspired images that also includes “Mary Magdalene,” “Mrs. 
Herod,” “Mary Sister of Martha,” and an untitled depiction of what appears to be John the 
Baptist.5 The whole series has been taken to be, as Ellen McBreen argues, “in keeping with 
Wilde’s subversive project—to reveal queerness within the very pages of the Bible.”6 One must 
ask, though, in what way this drawing can claim to depict the Madonna at all, especially given 
the perplexing absence of a child—a requisite complement, it would seem, to even a secularized 
Madonna figure. The baby that functions in the earlier Reiss portrait as emblem of the nascent 
                                                 
3  Locke appears to have provided the captions for Reiss’s portraits, in response to a written request by Charles Boni, 
Jr., of October 21, 1925 (Alain L. Locke Papers, box 164-122, folder 12). 
4  Ross, Manning the Race, 87. 
5  Other drawings from this series include “Hagar,” “Mrs. Lot,” “Lucifer,” and “Naomi and Ruth.” See Nugent, Gay 
Rebel of the Harlem Renaissance, plates 1-7.   
6  McBreen, “Biblical Gender Bending,” 24. 
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New Negro has disappeared from Nugent’s vision, in what we might read as a cynically 
allegorical depiction of that New Negro—of a certain orthodox vision, that is, of the anticipated 
racial redeemer.  
That redeemer, as pictured by Reiss, has moreover disappeared from The New Negro 
itself; along with his sixteen other sketches and portraits that appeared in the anthology’s first 
two printings (1925, 1927), “The Brown Madonna” has been expunged from subsequent 
editions, including the only one currently in print.7 One consequence of this erasure has been to 
vitiate the volume’s originally insistent aura of messianic expectation—a messianism heralded 
by the “Brown Madonna” and her baby as well as by the beatific and oracular effect of many of 
Reiss’s other portraits of prominent New Negro figures: Locke, Du Bois, Countée Cullen, Paul 
Robeson, James Weldon Johnson, Elise McDougald, Roland Hayes, and others. These lush, full-
color plates create a veritable renaissance iconography, one that establishes an almost sacred 
iconicity. In some of the portraits, the subjects’ heads float disembodied, evoking a spiritual 
transcendence; in many, foreheads gleam with accentuated effect, suggesting haloes. Jean 
Toomer glows with a radiance that exceeds even that of “The Brown Madonna,” in keeping 
with the fact that he, more than any other New Negro contributor, is held to promise a 
fulfillment of its messianic hopes. (William Stanley Braithwaite concludes his New Negro essay 
by invoking Toomer as “the very first artist of the race” and, echoing Christ’s own self-
identification at the close of Revelation, as “a bright morning star of a new day of the race in 
literature.”8)  
As readers familiar with its first edition can attest, then, to encounter the New Negro 
anthology as it was originally conceived is an experience akin to that of perusing a lushly 
                                                 
7  George Bornstein discusses the way Reiss’s work “has been airbrushed out of [The New Negro’s] successive 
imprints” in Material Modernism, 149-52.  
8  Braithwaite, “The Negro in American Literature,” NN, 44. Compare Rev. 22:16.  
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illustrated Bible.9 It is also to wonder whether The New Negro offers itself, rather more literally 
than is commonly acknowledged, as “the Bible of the Harlem Renaissance.”10 A careful reading 
of The New Negro tends to confirm these suspicions, as though Locke’s anthology not only 
participates in scriptural typology but actually fulfills itself as an antitype of scripture, 
emulating a biblical tradition and adopting a biblical idiom as it compiles a highly selective 
canon of renaissance texts—in the process providing a kind of New Testament for African 
American culture. Accordingly, the volume’s messianic expectations simmer palpably beneath 
the surface of its words and images, coming to a boil in the concluding essay by Du Bois—a 
document whose Revelatory character was partly determined by Locke’s own editorial hand, as 
we shall see.  
“The ideal anthologist,” wrote Laura Riding and Robert Graves in their Pamphlet Against 
Anthologies, “is a priest of Poetry to the people, ready to give them any acceptable god.”11 Alain 
Locke was such an ideal anthologist. He was, however, less a priest of poetry than of a whole 
culture, partly existent and partly imagined; the god his anthology sets out to give its readers is 
both announced on its cover and pictured in the arms of its frontispiece Madonna. The 
Niggeratti will rework to their own ends The New Negro’s messianic tropes. In sum, they pit an 
aesthetics of sacrilege, calculated to shock, against the anthology’s more conservative but still 
transgressive typologies, its reworkings of scripture to herald the imminent arrival of a 
nonetheless ever-elusive New Negro.  
                                                 
9  A reviewer in Opportunity observed that The New Negro’s “physical side,” “utterly apart from its reading matter, 
makes the volume a valuable possession—one to be treasured” (quoted in Martha Jane Nadell, Enter the New 
Negroes, 178).  
10  Purveyors of this timeworn phrase include Arnold Rampersad, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Nathan Irvin Huggins. 
Rampersad, Ralph Ellison, 79, and Introduction to NN, ix; Gates, quoted in Michael Soto, “Teaching The New Negro,” 
169; Huggins, Harlem Renaissance, xviii. 
11  Riding and Graves, “A Survey of Modernist Poetry” and “A Pamphlet Against Anthologies,” 177.    
 121 
    
We shall return to the meaningfully blasphemous character of Bruce Nugent’s writings 
and art; “Mary Madonna” merely scratches the surface of a tenacious impulse to transgress the 
sacred. More particularly, we will consider how the works of Nugent’s fellow “Niggeratti” 
engage and challenge both orthodox Christianity and the orthodoxy of the New Negro that 
Locke’s anthology extols and exemplifies. The pages that follow explore The New Negro’s auto-
sacralizing bid to consolidate, through a forceful rhetorical appropriation of prophetic 
messianism and biblical revelation, this renaissance orthodoxy that the Niggeratti will so 
delight in defiling. To attend to these dynamics is to recognize a hitherto obscured theological 
core of Harlem Renaissance politics and poetics—to see, in short, how The New Negro and its 
less pious literary successors produce a cultural dialogue out of the dueling rhetorics of 
consecration and desecration, of prophecy and profanation. 
 
The New Negro as New Testament 
Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth have recently interpreted The New Negro as a 
determinedly modernist, thus essentially “secular,” document.12 Such a ready identification of 
modernism with the secular makes this a problematic observation, to say the least; for one 
thing, African American modernism offers one of the more obvious refutations of the 
“secularization thesis” as applied to modernism and modernity generally.13 For another, The 
New Negro’s privileging of a modernist aesthetic is inextricably bound up in its devaluing of the 
                                                 
12  Harris and Molesworth, Alain L. Locke, 180.  
13  Citing perceptive observations by Zora Neale Hurston, James Baldwin, Richard Wright, and others about the 
abiding political and social consequences of Christianity in the ostensibly secular West, Michael Lackey notes that 
“Black writers, in particular, have been rejecting the secularization hypothesis for some time” (“Zora Neale 
Hurston’s Herod the Great,” 117). According to E. Franklin Frazier’s seminal study, religion remained for most of 
the twentieth century the “most important institution” in the lives of African Americans (The Negro Church, 74). 
And as Caroline Goeser has observed, “the experience of religion and spirituality formed an integral component of 
black modernism”; black modernists “denied normative polarities between religion and the modern world that 
began during the Enlightenment and continued into twentieth-century scholarship in art and cultural studies” 
(Picturing the New Negro, 209).  
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secular, the profane, and the material—categories better represented by the anthology’s 
predecessor, the March 1925 “Harlem number” of Survey Graphic—in favor of an emphasis on 
the sacred, the aesthetic, and the ethereal. More generally, The New Negro’s putative secularism 
is amply belied by its contents, whose investment in the biblical tradition as a fund of both 
inspiration and subject matter is extensive. Locke’s anthology in fact rehearses Christian themes 
throughout, in its nonfiction as well as its imaginative elements. Contributor Rudolph Fisher 
(who wittily christened his own son, b. 1926, “the new Negro”) makes perhaps the most 
sustained use of the Bible throughout his two stories in the volume.14 Then there are Aaron 
Douglas’s illustrations, which consistently foreground biblical themes, and the stories of John 
Matheus, Eric Walrond, and Zora Neale Hurston, all of which brim with scriptural quotations 
and allusions.  
The New Negro’s biblical indebtedness can further be witnessed in its inclusion of the 
musical scores and lyrics of the spirituals “Father Abraham” and “Listen to de Lambs”; in James 
Weldon Johnson’s versified sermon, “The Creation”; in J. A. Rogers’s reflections on African 
American revival meetings; in Langston Hughes’s irreverent “Jazzonia”; and in the poetry of 
Claude McKay and Countée Cullen. (Years later, Wallace Thurman would caustically portray 
Cullen’s writing process thus: “eyes on a page of Keats, fingers on typewriter, mind frantically 
conjuring African scenes. And there would of course be a Bible nearby.”15) We have seen, too, 
that Locke himself opens the anthology by invoking the historical African American 
identification with the biblical Israelites. Such sentiments are not surprising; throughout African 
American history, as Theophus Smith argues, “all corporate liberation efforts can be configured, 
in the manner of ritual performances, as dramatic reenactments of Exodus, and their leaders 
                                                 
14  John McCluskey, Jr., Introduction to Fisher, The City of Refuge, xv.   
15  Thurman, Infants of the Spring, 236.  
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envisioned as approximate types of Moses.”16 What bears remarking is that, in The New Negro’s 
cultural moment—in the wake, for one thing, of a decade-long and continuing Exodus of 
African Americans from the rural South to the urban North—an updated messianic presence 
appears to have been called for. If God, in the words of one of Jean Toomer’s narrators, had “left 
the Moses-people for the nigger,” Locke’s anthology likewise left Moses behind in favor of 
another biblical leader (NN, 96). The new New Negroes, especially those African American 
writers and artists who had already established themselves in “the promised land” of Harlem, 
were through with needing a Moses (NN, 281). They desired a Christ. 
The New Negro is not entirely alone here. An air of messianic expectation—no longer of a 
Moses to free them from bondage, but of an artistic Christ who will redeem a putatively 
underdeveloped African American culture—is an insistent presence in the period. Reverdy C. 
Ransom’s 1923 poem “The New Negro” casts its eponymous figure as being charged with “a 
sacred trust” that sounds not a little like Christ’s redeeming mission:  
To wear God’s image in the ranks of men  
And walk as princes of the royal blood divine. . . .  
He is the last reserve of God on earth, 
Who, in the godly fellowship of love,  
Will rule the world with peace.17  
 
Similarly, at a 1925 gathering of the New York Urban League, Heywood Broun prophesied the 
coming of “a supremely great Negro artist, who could catch the imagination of the world.”18 
Such expectation suffuses The New Negro, as in Locke’s own deceptively cautious avowal that 
“the Negro may well become what some have predicted, the artist of American life,” or as in the 
                                                 
16  Smith, Conjuring Culture, 69. Given this tradition, it is hardly surprising that John Henry Adams would introduce 
“the real new Negro man,” in a 1904 essay, as having “a face as strong and expressive as Angelo’s Moses” (“Rough 
Sketches,” 67). 
17 Ransom, “The New Negro,” 12. 
18 Quoted in Henry Louis Gates Jr., “The Trope of a New Negro,” 148. “Brown concluded,” Gates writes, “by saying 
that this artist-redeemer could come at any time and asked his audience to remain silent for ten full seconds to 
imagine his coming!” (148). 
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book’s telling epigraph—“O, rise, shine for Thy Light is a’ com-ing”—which serves to dispel 
any doubts one might entertain about the Christological import of “The Brown Madonna” on 
the previous leaf (NN, 258, vii).  
The redeeming artist also appears as an avatar of Jesus Christ in Montgomery Gregory’s 
New Negro essay on “The Drama of Negro Life.” Praising African American stage actor Opal 
Cooper for his early development of “serious” acting, Gregory observes that, “like John the 
Baptist, he proved to be only the forerunner of one who was to touch the peaks of histrionic 
accomplishment” (NN, 156). Gregory thus leaves little doubt about the intended biblical 
analogue of Cooper’s successor, Charles Gilpin. In the ensuing discussion, Eugene O’Neill and 
Gilpin emerge as Father and Son, respectively (highlighting a focus on interracial collaboration 
that recurs throughout The New Negro), who with their play The Emperor Jones have produced a 
“tour-de-force of genius” that “will tower as a beacon-light of inspiration”—a city on a hill, as it 
were (156). O’Neill is the creator, his medium the Word; Gilpin the actor incarnates that Word, 
in the process redeeming black drama from its fallen minstrel state. (Gregory goes on to dismiss 
the “false gods” of the “old leadership,” while proclaiming the younger artists’ “divine plan” 
[159].)  
The texts that make up The New Negro are not always so explicit, but Locke and other 
contributors return time and again to the New Negro’s role as redemptive prophet. “The black 
scholar, seer, sage, prophet sings his message,” declaims Albert Barnes in his prominently 
positioned essay (23).19 Du Bois’s New Negro essay likewise calls forth “the black apostle” who 
must “devote himself to race uplift . . . by the lure of inner vision” (397). According to Locke, the 
new black cultural figure must serve as a “vehicle” to channel the “spiritual kinship” of his folk 
                                                 
19  Barnes in fact reads “the Negro” as embodying the very spirit of religion: “Poetry is religion brought down to earth 
and it is of the essence of the Negro soul. . . . The white man in the mass cannot compete with the Negro in spiritual 
endowment” (NN, 20).  
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art, offering “arresting visions and vibrant prophecies” in “rhapsodic Biblical speech” (207, 47, 
52). (Hughes is praised in particular for his poems’ “Biblical simplicity” [52].) The redeemer 
promises to afford African America “a new soul . . . a fresh spiritual and cultural focusing . . . a 
renewed race-spirit . . . a spiritual emancipation”: in short, “a spiritual quickening and racial 
leavening such as no generation has yet felt and known” (xxvii, 4, 50).  
This lexicon of the sacred offers a useful, if not wholly satisfying, way to understand the 
seemingly contradictory obligations with which Locke’s anthology burdens the shoulders of the 
New Negro: to express his or her stake in the direction of the race through a paradoxically 
disinterested art, and to be best “representative” of that race by not striving to be representative. 
“The newer motive, then, in being racial is to be so purely for the sake of art” (NN, 51). For 
Locke it is a matter of abandoning the artist’s profane materials and media—“the shambles of 
conventional polemics, cheap romance and journalism”—and embracing a sacred calling in “the 
domain of pure and unbiassed art” (49). The way Locke reconciles that seeming disjunction 
between, on one hand, the New Negro’s social and political functions of advancing the race, 
and, on the other, this figure’s necessary commitment to a “pure,” transcendent, disengaged art 
is to unite both commitments as a sacred cultural project; given the sacral character of the New 
Negro’s sociopolitical struggle, his or her art must likewise aspire to the conditions of the 
sacred. It must transcend, that is, precisely those worldly matters it is tasked with 
complementing.    
  Hence The New Negro’s near-biblical exhortations, the most insistent of which Locke 
reserves for last, in a further echo of the New Testament—for Du Bois’s contribution, “The 
Negro Mind Reaches Out,” is the anthology’s Revelation, its most overtly and hauntingly 
apocalyptic text. Granted its own special section (“Worlds of Color”), this concluding essay is 
also The New Negro’s most sustained discussion of international politics and race relations, and 
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an inherently prophetic one.20 Du Bois fits perfectly the part of Revelator; a generation older 
than Locke, and a further generation removed from writers such as Hughes, Hurston, and 
Nugent, his prophetic voice trumpets alongside the younger voices as the movement’s resident 
sage and seer. Signaling this prophetic character is the essay’s portentous, vatic register: “With 
nearly every great European empire to-day walks its dark colonial shadow, while over all 
Europe there stretches the yellow shadow of Asia that lies across the world”; “What prophet 
can tell what world-tempest lurks in these cloud-like shadows?” (NN, 386, 389). Further, in 
asserting that “the day faintly dawns when the new force for international understanding and 
racial readjustment will and must be felt,” Du Bois invokes the paradoxical temporality of 
revelation, the blend of imminence (“The day dawns”) and elusiveness (“The day faintly 
dawns”) that characterizes all apocalyptic texts. 
Du Bois opens the piece by recalling his famous pronouncement in The Souls of Black 
Folk—“The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line”—and by asking 
rhetorically whether this constitutes “prophecy or speculation” (385). His own answer, 
evidently, is “prophecy,” for in the essay’s closing words he will reiterate with confidence his 
vision of “the problem of the 20th century as the Problem of the Color Line” (414). Here at the 
outset, though, Du Bois already touches the prophetic chord that the genre of apocalypse 
demands. He goes on to warn of the false religion of white-governed industry and empire, 
whose doctrines make “even intelligent men . . . believe almost religiously that white folk are a 
peculiar and chosen people. . . . Color hate easily assumes the form of a religion” (407). That 
religion’s purveyors—the essay’s Antichrists—assume responsibility for “the salvation of the 
world,” but theirs is a perverted salvation achieved through colonial subjugation and coercion 
                                                 
20  As Gayatri Spivak writes, Du Bois’s text “gives us the first taste of colonial discourse studies and even a preview of 
what was to follow from it—postcolonial criticism” (Death of a Discipline, 97).  
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(410). The future’s hope, Du Bois proclaims, rests with a redeeming representative of the race 
who will be “the black apostle.” Naturally gifted, and also nurtured by an educational and 
institutional effort that will avoid “the pitfalls of American and English race leadership,” this 
apostle will “devote himself to race uplift not by the compulsion of outer hate but by the lure of 
inner vision” (397). 
Du Bois, of course, has inner visions of his own to share. One of these, which first 
emerges in the opening paragraph, resonates with the apocalyptic tenor of the essay as a whole: 
“the great event of these great years, the World War” (385). That event, in words that ring 
tragically prophetic from this side of World War II, has left behind its “fatal seed,” one destined 
to pullulate into further “world dissension and catastrophe” (385). The War returns in the 
essay’s subsequent arraignment of France for its use of black men as “‘shock’ troops” who were 
thrown “ruthlessly into horrible slaughter” in a large-scale “blood sacrifice” (392-93). The 
subject returns most forcefully, however, in the unsettlingly eschatological vision of Du Bois’s 
conclusion, which invokes a great cleansing holocaust and the heavenly city that lies just 
beyond it: “there came during the Great War, during those terrible years of 1917 and 1918, a 
vision of the Glory of Sacrifice, a dream of a world greater, sweeter, more beautiful and more 
honest than ever before; a world without war, without poverty and without hate. I am glad it 
came. Even though it was a mirage it was eternally true” (413). Itself prompted by the 
apocalyptic violence of a world war, this vision of a New Jerusalem that lies on the other side of 
yet another annihilation has been as fleeting, historically (merely “a mirage”), as it is “eternally 
true.”  
Though the vision itself is eternal, our access to it comes only in vague and intermittent 
spurts. Du Bois nonetheless senses its return: “To-day some faint shadow of it comes to me 
again” (413). He locates his prophesied Holy City in Liberia, the nation founded by freed 
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American slaves. It is a land of “Silver and Gold and Ivory” that echoes Christ’s Sermon on the 
Mount—and John Winthrop’s famous self-sanctifying trope—in being “a little thing set upon a 
Hill” (414; cf. Matt. 5:14).21 Though small, Du Bois writes, Liberia 
represents to me the world. Here political power has tried to resist the power of 
modern capital. It has not yet succeeded, but its partial failure is not because the 
republic is black, but because the world has failed in the same battle; because 
organized industry owns and rules England, France, Germany, America and 
Heaven. And can Liberia escape the power that rules the world? I do not know; 
but I do know unless the world escapes, the world as well as Liberia will die; and 
if Liberia lives it will be because the World is reborn as in that vision splendid of 
1918. (414) 
 
That it has taken the violence of a horrific war to elicit this “splendid” vision of the world’s 
rebirth—a vision that itself anticipates and seems even to require another violent “cleansing,” a 
further letting of baptismal blood—is as chilling as it is true to the rhetorical tradition of 
apocalyptic eschatology. 
It is worth comparing this essay with its initial version, an article entitled “Worlds of 
Color” that had appeared in the April 1925 issue of Foreign Affairs. Du Bois’s New Negro essay is 
notably different from this prior publication, and the differences are telling. Consider, first, the 
opening paragraph of each version of the essay, where Du Bois addresses the “catastrophe” of 
World War I: 
1 How deep were the roots of this catastrophe entwined about the color line? 
And of the legacy left, what of the darker race problems will the world 
inherit?22  
 
2 Fruit of the bitter rivalries of economic imperialism, the roots of that 
catastrophe were in Africa, deeply entwined at bottom with the problems of 
the color line. And of the legacy left, the problems the world inherits hold the 
same fatal seed; world dissension and catastrophe still lurk in the unsolved 
problems of race relations. (NN, 385) 
 
                                                 
21  There is an “unintended irony,” as George Hutchinson has observed, in Du Bois’s invocation of Liberia as paradise: 
“For Du Bois, Liberia foretells African liberation. ‘Tribal’ Africans in Liberia might have told a different story” (The 
Harlem Renaissance in Black and White, 432).  
22  Du Bois, “Worlds of Color,” 423. 
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The metaphor of roots remains, but it, and the passage as a whole, have dilated noticeably in the 
New Negro version. At the same time, the mode of address has changed from query to assertion, 
and from uncertainty to the total certainty we expect of our prophets. The register has also 
changed considerably, with the addition of some nice apocalyptic touches (“that same fatal 
seed”; “world dissension and catastrophe still lurk”). Then, to the end of his section on “The 
Shadow of Portugal,” a similarly apocalyptic sentence has been appended that has no precedent 
in the earlier version: “What prophet can tell what world-tempest lurks in these cloud-like 
shadows?” (NN, 389). Liberia, earlier merely “set upon a hill,” is in The New Negro “set upon a 
Hill,” emphasizing the biblical allusion and its grandiloquence. And whereas, in the earlier 
article, Du Bois warns that “world democracy as well as Liberia” may “die” (44), in the New 
Negro version it is “the world” itself that may die (414)—a more patently apocalyptic scenario.   
 Still more significant, perhaps, is a lengthy portion of the New Negro essay (409-13) that 
does not appear in the earlier published article, and which has gone unremarked by scholars of 
Locke as well as of Du Bois. Locke himself seems to have chosen to include this section from 
among the drafts and fragments Du Bois produced in preparation for the Foreign Affairs piece. 
(Or more precisely, from a typescript currently catalogued under “Articles not known to have 
been published, 1900-1930,” among the Du Bois Papers held by the University of 
Massachusetts.23) Locke would later characterize his midwifery of “The Negro Mind Reaches 
Out” as an actual “rewriting”: “[Du Bois’s] article in The New Negro I rewrote for him from two 
old articles of his that he contemptuously tossed over his desk top to me, saying if you can find 
anything to use in either of these, go ahead and use it. He refused to write anything fresh.”24 
Certainly Locke revised “Worlds of Color” throughout, as evidenced by the numerous slight 
                                                 
23  Du Bois, “(World Racial Developments) / 1924 / Fragments,” W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, series 3c, box 212, folder 20. 
24  Quoted in Harris and Molesworth, Alain L. Locke, 318. 
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and seemingly trivial emendations of Du Bois’s prose—its punctuation, for example—as it 
appears in Foreign Affairs and in the drafts. Given that Du Bois’s participation in the anthology 
was “somewhat clenched”—the two men were not on the best of terms in 1925, in part because 
of their differences over the production of the anthology—Locke’s recollection of Du Bois’s 
indifference to The New Negro’s presentation of his own work deserves our attention if not our 
outright credulity.25 In his Pulitzer Prize–winning biography of Du Bois, David Levering Lewis 
reaffirms Locke’s version of events while also denigrating “The Negro Mind Reaches Out” as “a 
rehash of Du Bois’s African travels.”26  Lewis says nothing more about the essay, perhaps 
unmindful of the fact that it was a revised version of Du Bois’s “Worlds of Color,” which Lewis 
praises elsewhere (116). 
In any case, it is clear enough that Locke had final say—partly in his capacity as editor, 
partly as a result of Du Bois’s indifference, and partly because of the mutually chary 
relationship that provoked that indifference—over the essay that would bring The New Negro to 
its close. And it is striking to reflect that much of this essay’s most plainly apocalyptic language 
appears in the several pages that do not appear in Du Bois’s Foreign Affairs article: “the day 
faintly dawns”; “a vision of a world greater, sweeter, more beautiful and more honest than ever 
before; a world without war, without poverty, and without hate”; “I am glad it came. Even 
though it was a mirage it was eternally true. To-day some faint shadow of it comes to me again” 
(NN, 413). In concert with the others mentioned above, these additions demonstrate a concerted 
effort on Locke’s part to ratchet up the apocalypticism of Du Bois’s article for its inclusion as The 
                                                 
25  Harris and Molesworth, Alain L. Locke, 211. A decade later, Du Bois would again find his prose being manipulated 
by Locke. The former protested, in a letter of May 1936, against many of Locke’s “corrections” of his manuscript 
“Social Reconstruction and the Negro”—a “booklet” solicited by Locke and the Association for Negro Folk 
Education as part of a series on “Adult Education”—and against certain revisions in which “my meaning has been 
toned down, and my style of writing unnecessarily changed.” Locke wrote six months later to reject the booklet 
outright, citing “the additional trouble and work of the extensive revision that . . . would be necessary to make this 
manuscript appropriate for publication now.” It would never be published. (Alain L. Locke Papers, box 164-26, 
folders 8-9.) 
26  Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, 162. 
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New Negro’s Revelation. As elsewhere in his stewardship of The New Negro—his handling of 
Countée Cullen’s “Heritage,” his unauthorized inclusion of excerpts from Jean Toomer’s Cane, 
and his equally unauthorized re-titling of a Claude McKay poem—Locke here took a heavy 
hand.27 And no less than the suggestive placement of “The Brown Madonna” cradling the New 
Negro at the book’s beginning, the apocalypticism at its end helped to ensure that the entire 
volume would cohere in New-Testament fashion. 
That The New Negro’s biblicization was intentional is further suggested by the ways it 
differs from its predecessor, the Harlem number of Survey Graphic that Locke also edited—but 
with far less latitude, given the overriding editorial policies of the magazine. At a fundamental 
level, The New Negro’s departure from the Survey Graphic issue emerges in its downplaying of 
Harlem as a material and historically locatable space and time; James Weldon Johnson’s Harlem 
piece remains, but otherwise the word “Harlem,” and any reference to the place—“the city” or 
“the community,” for example, phrases that recur in the Graphic’s table of contents—drops out 
of The New Negro’s titles.28 Winthrop D. Lane’s essay on “The Grim Side of Harlem” disappears 
altogether, as do Winold Reiss’s “Harlem Types,” and as do all of the photographs of Harlem 
life that appeared in Survey. Mahonri Young’s drawing of “The Laborer” likewise disappears, as 
though The New Negro could accommodate only aesthetic forms of production (hence, for 
example, the inclusion of photos of art objects but not of people or places); there may be some 
                                                 
27  See Jeremy Braddock, Collecting as Modernist Practice, on “the strongly mediating character of Locke’s editorial 
presence” (195). Locke’s controversial re-titling of McKay’s “The White House” (as the more benign “White 
Houses”) is well known, but “Locke was also an exacting editor of [“Heritage”], repeatedly returning Cullen’s 
drafts for correction and revision. By the end of 1924, Cullen would pleadingly write to Locke for permission to 
cease his revisions” (185). On the evidence of the “substantially revised version of ‘Heritage’ that would be 
published in Color” the following year—and of a letter in which Cullen asked Locke to return a copy of “Heritage” 
“in the form in which he intended to use it”—Braddock speculates that Locke may have played an especially 
formative role in shaping the presentation of this particular poem, in many ways the centerpiece of The New Negro 
(186). As for Toomer’s intended New Negro contribution, Locke rejected it in favor of the more ideologically useful 
Cane excerpts; see George Hutchinson, In Search of Nella Larsen, 186. 
28  Fisher’s “City of Refuge” is an exception here—but Locke’s own essay on “Harlem” from Survey Graphic is not 
included; W. A. Domingo’s “The Tropics in New York” becomes “Gift of the Black Tropics”; and Charles S. 
Johnson’s “Black Workers and the City” becomes “The New Frontage on American Life.” 
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work going on in Douglas’s woodcuts, but it is all work that has been safely aestheticized and 
sacralized as acts of “Creation.” Reiss’s distinctly profane “Interpretations of Jazz,” two 
impressionistic sketches of Harlem’s raucous nightlife, likewise fail to appear in the later 
volume; their presence would hardly accord, after all, with the lushly iconic Reiss portraits that 
dominate The New Negro. In these various ways Harlem itself, as an identifiable and quantifiable 
time and place, recedes in Locke’s anthology, while a different Harlem emerges: a mythopoetic 
time-space, or, in Joseph Allen Boone’s phrase, “a spatially realized spiritual goal” better suited 
to The New Negro’s sacred undertaking—as well as to its efforts to produce what is an essentially 
messianic temporality.29     
For according to a somewhat convoluted logic, the New Negro’s presence is felt 
throughout the anthology as both incipient and awaited, already in evidence but as yet 
unrealized: a Word not quite made flesh, even if its incarnation can be glimpsed in the arms of 
“The Brown Madonna” and in the promise of a Jean Toomer or a Langston Hughes. This 
temporally ambivalent logic actually abets The New Negro’s messianism, since the literature of 
revelation always relies on a conjoining of imminence and deferral. Further, in proclaiming its 
subject as both brand-new and not-quite, The New Negro aligns itself with what Joseph J. 
Murphy calls the historical “double meaning of African American theology,” according to 
which the “freedom promised in the scriptures . . . is ‘already but not yet.’” Therein lies the 
rhetorical strength, as well as the frustrating limitation, of The New Negro’s thesis. As Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr., eloquently states the problem, the very notion of a New Negro was a  
culturally willed myth. . . . Just as utopia signifies “no-place,” so does “New 
Negro” signify a “black person who lives at no place,” and at no time. It is a bold 
and audacious act of language, signifying the will to power, to dare to recreate a 
race by renaming it. . . . [The New Negro] does not exist as an entity or group of 
                                                 
29  Boone, Libidinal Currents, 221. 
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entities but “only” as a coded system of signs, complete with masks and 
mythology.30   
 
The problem with The New Negro’s Good News is that it is still only prophetic. Practically 
speaking, it continues to await the Chosen One, the real flesh-and-blood New Negro. The 
referent of the anthology’s title remains protean and elusive, a lacuna at the core of its own 
biography, which itself remains a proleptic, provisional invocation of the New Negro’s nativity. 
The New Negro is a New Testament without (yet) a Christ, although it rhetorically makes its 
messiah’s presence felt throughout. That presence is suggested so frequently—in the image of a 
brown Madonna’s child, in the reiterated promise of certain young writers and talents, in the 
biblical parallels that its stories and poems rehearse—that many readers must have been sorely 
tempted, in 1925, to accept its glad tidings as an article of faith. Which, perhaps, is all they ever 
were.  
 
Apostasy of the “Niggeratti” 
From the Exodus strategies of American slaves to the biblically emulative New Negro 
anthology, black appropriations of the religious have sought to create from an institutionalized 
instrument of suppression and quietism a unique, liberative cultural mythology. Yet it is one 
thing for the black community in America to speak to itself, as it always had, in the biblical 
language of messianism, exodus, crucifixion, resurrection, and the rest. It is another thing 
altogether, in a work of such importance as Locke’s anthology, to articulate a group identity by 
those means to a larger American and even international audience—and to do so as part of a 
conscious effort to introduce a New Negro that will (a) appeal to white and black readers alike, 
(b) impress the one and lift up the other, and (c) league itself artistically with broader trends in 
                                                 
30  Murphy, Working the Spirit, 153; Gates, “The Trope of a New Negro,” 132-35. 
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aesthetic modernism. White Americans had, historically, had their own political aims in 
presenting (often highly selective versions of) Scripture and the Christian mythos to black 
Americans; with The New Negro the direction of this discourse is reversed. By presenting their 
Bible, the voices of the renaissance—as presented, organized, and edited by Alain Locke—stake 
a new claim to control of a privileged discourse.  
 In doing so, the anthology presents the “New Negro” as a messianic but disembodied 
trope, policing or omitting a more controversial poetics of sacrilege in favor of a best-foot-
forward claim to cultural recognition. The poetries and fictions of the “Niggeratti” respond by 
throwing bodies, often illicit ones, onto the contested terrain of Harlem-Renaissance politics and 
aesthetics. Additionally, works such as the little magazine Fire!! and the novels of Wallace 
Thurman and Bruce Nugent often denigrate rather than incorporate the notion of a messianic 
New Negro or black Christ, or else rework that notion to more radical ends. In sum, the 
Niggeratti proffer emphatic depictions of the body, of sexuality, and of satiric scriptural figures 
that blaspheme both organized Christianity and the New Negro enterprise as sacralized by 
Locke’s anthology. 
Thurman’s 1932 roman à clef, Infants of the Spring, stands as one of the most memorable 
satires of the Harlem Renaissance and of its artistic and political aspirations. One passage in 
particular showcases the novel’s determined irreverence, both toward our “Father in heaven” 
and toward the carefully crafted ethos of The New Negro: 
“Beloved, we join hands here to pray for gin. An aridity defiles us. Our 
innards thirst for the juice of juniper. Something must be done. The drought 
threatens to destroy us. Surely, God who let manna fall from the heavens so that 
the holy children of Israel might eat, will not let the equally holy children of 
Niggeratti Manor die from the want of a little gin. Children, let us pray.” 
All heads were bowed, according to a familiar ritual. Reverently, Eustace 
patted his foot and rolled his head heavenward. . . .  
“. . . Father in heaven, we bend before thee. Hear, oh hear, our plea. Send us 
some gin, Lord, send us some gin.” 
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The prayer finished, the circle remained intact with bowed heads and joined 
hands. A low moan escaped, a moan such as is often heard at darky camp 
meetings. It grew in volume and swelled melodiously through the room. 
Abruptly it stopped. Eustace had spoken: 
“And, Lord, send me a little sandwich too.” (IS, 102)  
 
This passage recalls Mina Loy’s playful conflation of sacrament and gin-thirst—portraying an 
“abbess-prostitute” who dispenses “the gin-fizz eucharist” at a “Jazz-Mass”—in a poem 
published the year before Infants of the Spring (Lost, 98). More significantly, Thurman’s passage 
signals unmistakably that we are in a different Harlem altogether than the sanitized and 
mythopoeticized “promised land” of The New Negro. For one thing, there can be no doubt that 
this blasphemous plea for deliverance from sobriety is taking place at a geographically locatable 
site—267 West 136th Street, “Niggeratti Manor”—a site, moreover, whose “various intrigues,” 
which “surrounded the house like a luminous halo,” caused not a little consternation for older 
renaissance figures such as Locke and Du Bois (GJ, 75). Locke’s published review of Infants of the 
Spring worries that Thurman has not fully accounted for the extent to which “the attitudes and 
foibles of Nordic decadence have been carried into the buds of racial expression.”31 Yet already 
in Infants, Thurman casts Locke’s counterpart Dr. Parkes as worrying incessantly over the 
impact on the renaissance of the Niggeratti’s “decadent strain,” their tendency to “wallow in the 
mire of post-Victorian license” (234). This is not the Harlem The New Negro wanted us to see; as 
J. Martin Favor has put it, “Thurman turns Harlem from an imagined site of redemption into a 
kind of sideshow.”32  
Characteristically, the above “prayer” plays on clever inversions and perversions of 
Christian values. The desert through which these “holy children” are condemned for a time to 
wander has afflicted them with a thirst, not of souls for grace, but of “innards” for their profane 
                                                 
31  Locke, “Black Truth and Black Beauty,” 16. 
32  Favor, “George Schuyler and Wallace Thurman,” 206. 
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nectar. According to their blasphemous value system, gin is not a sin, it is manna; sobriety 
“defiles.” Richard Bruce Nugent’s own novel Gentleman Jigger—written contemporaneously, for 
the most part, with Thurman’s Infants, though not published until 2008—presents a very similar 
picture of the irreverent goings-on at Niggeratti Manor. In Nugent’s telling, gin is a form of 
absolution: “Everybody brags about their sins here. And then absolves themselves in gin” (95). 
Compared to the baptismal blood invoked by Du Bois in his Revelatory conclusion to The New 
Negro, this absolving gin appears either a refreshingly unserious or a politically quietist 
alternative—but in any case an alternative.  
As memorably depicted in Infants of the Spring, “the first and last salon” that Locke’s 
avatar Dr. Parkes organizes for the Niggeratti and other young artists descends almost 
immediately into a babel of bitter infighting and “blasphem[ies]” (234-35).33 As in the biblical 
story of the Tower of Babel, this effort at triumphal cooperation—with goals comparable, at 
least in Parkes’s mind, to the aspirations of the tower’s builders—disintegrates into a cacophony 
of alien and untranslatable discourses: realist, modernist, Marxist, primitivist, militant, 
aestheticist, Decadent, “paganist”—to say nothing of Raymond’s (Thurman’s) derisive snorts.34 
It is not simply a matter of their having different opinions about their roles as artists and 
cultural figures; the point is that each tongue remains utterly incomprehensible to the others. 
Communication is impossible, because no one speaks the same language. “Pandemonium 
reigned,” Thurman writes, and the Miltonic echo is telling, for as Thurman recreates Babel he 
                                                 
33  It is interesting to note how frequently the word blasphemy and its variants appear in Infants of the Spring, often in 
surprising contexts (64, 154, 162, 205, 244). Outmoded blasphemous oaths such as “god’s teeth” also make jarring 
appearances, recalling the origins of modern curses in the rhetorical rending of God’s body (36, 191). 
34  A brief sampler of the communicative failures: “you should develop your inherited spirit.” “I ain’t got no inherited 
spirit.” “That’s nothing to brag about.” “We must be militant fighters.   . . .” “Remember, a beautiful sonnet can be 
as effectual, nay even more effectual, than a rigorous hymn of hate.” “Spoken like a true capitalist minion.” “why 
not let each young hopeful choose his own path?” “art holds a mirror up to nature. No mirror would reflect a man 
composed of angles.” “we must look at Matisse, Gauguin, Picasso and Renoir for guidance. They get the feel of the 
age. . . . They . . .” “Are all crazy and so are you” (IS, 237-44). 
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also restages another biblical narrative: the Fall of the Rebel Angels (242). It is an apt metaphor 
for the renegade Niggeratti’s renunciations of Locke’s New Negro vision.   
That renunciation is made especially clear in Nugent’s and Thurman’s satirical re-
inscriptions, in Gentleman Jigger and Infants of the Spring, of The New Negro’s indebtedness to 
biblical rhetoric, structure, and trope; its casting of the Harlem Renaissance as a sacred 
undertaking; and, most especially, its announcement and expectation of the New Negro’s 
messianic arrival. Thurman and Nugent send up Locke’s sacramental project and exploit the 
notion of the New Negro as a Christ; indeed, both of their novels feature Christ figures 
prominently and unsubtly. And the way they do this—for both authors figure their Christs as 
real and specific, as already present rather than imminent, and, in the final analysis, as bathetic 
wastes of artistic potential—contrasts so stridently with Locke’s vision as to profane the entire 
New Negro enterprise.  
With an indeterminate blend of earnestness and satire, in Gentleman Jigger Nugent 
depicts himself and his fellow Niggeratti, especially Thurman, as deities. While their 
disapproving upstairs neighbor at the “Manor” keeps up a constant refrain of pious malediction 
(“Sin and destruction—sin and destruction. God’s in his heaven. No good can come from it”), 
little does she know that beneath her feet are “gods” in their own right, “the Creators” (83-84, 
86). “[T]he great god Rusty” (Thurman’s avatar), the “godhead inspiration of the group,” 
preaches in his “Godalmighty tone” to his fellow “leaders of the New Order” (109, 88, 100, 26). 
Thurman’s Infants contributes to this mock-deification by casting Nugent’s character, Paul 
Arbian, as a potential artistic messiah, “aglow with some inner incandescence” (44). In his 
bizarre letters to Gabriele D’Annunzio and the Shah of Persia, Nugent’s character announces 
himself as an apostle whose coming is foretold and inevitable: “I await your answer. Ignoring 
me will not appreciably delay my coming. It is written” (224). And in his extravagant self-
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sacrifice at novel’s end—a purely fictional invention on Thurman’s part, of course—Nugent 
fulfills his role as the novel’s half-baked Christ. Having covered the bathroom floor with his 
novel manuscript (soon to be rendered illegible by overflowing bathwater), he cuts his wrists 
with “a highly ornamented Chinese dirk,” so that his friends will later find him “a colorful, 
inanimate corpse in a crimson streaked tub” (283). He dies a decadent martyr to Art.  
In Gentleman Jigger, Nugent also casts himself as an aestheticized Christ. Coupled with 
his “walking-on-the-waters attitude,” “his grin was almost a benediction”; elsewhere he smiles 
“beatifically” (68, 107, 138). The “saintly-looking” Stuartt (Nugent’s name in the novel) likes on 
occasion to call himself God and to intone Christ’s words as given in scripture, sometimes 
verbatim—“by their works shall ye know them”—and other times in paraphrase: “But the 
blackest of these was Rusty” (57, 59, 66-67). The novel’s more pertinent Christ figure, however, 
is Stuartt’s brother and alter ego: Aeon, “the greatest of living American poets,” whose 
“apostolic” gait gives him “the dignity of a priestly dancer” (63). Clearly modeled after the real-
life Jean Toomer, Aeon has eyes that seem forever to be “beholding visions” (63, 67). With “glib 
sacrilege,” Stuartt refers to Aeon as “God” and as “The Christ-tainted one whose drink seems a 
cup of blood” (62). Stuartt’s sacrilege evidently inheres, not in the irreverence of deifying a mere 
mortal—a transgression of God’s sovereignty—but rather in his irreverence toward Aeon 
himself (62). Nugent describes Aeon almost obsessively as “haloed with fine gossamer hair,” 
hair “so soft it caught and held a nimbus of light around his head” (67, 149). And again:    
a halo was cast about his head. . . . He accepted his drink with long, slender 
fingers, as though accepting a chalice. His face was saintly with calm and 
understanding, his eyes bright and soft with an almost universal love. . . . Myra 
thought he looked like— . But even her thoughts fumbled at the comparison, 
shutting her mind against its entrance. . . . But the man did look like Jesus. (62)    
 
The Christ figuration becomes increasingly satirical and surprisingly explicit. Later, Aeon 
“confesses” to Myra, with much apparent gravity, that he is in fact the Son of God:  
 139 
    
You see, Myra, as Jesus, it was the desire of God, my Father, that I, by my deaths, 
expiate the sins of the world. . . . God had me sin, and die, that I might be born 
again from the womb of the woman with whom I sinned. . . . To me was it a great 
thing that the hands that caressed me on that cross between thieves should give 
sensations that were the loving hands of a mother with her just-born babe. . . . 
And always was I afraid that at some time would I love a woman and in 
procreation die again. Always I knew that I could not suffer alone. And that is 
the way in which I atone for the sins of the world. (151-52)  
 
Christ’s story, transplanted onto this parodic figure of the messianic poet, becomes an 
erotic tale of love and death through countless generations. The savior’s own “sin” begets his 
next incarnation in this irreverent conflation of mother-love, agape, and sexual desire. At the end 
of Gentleman Jigger’s Part I—which corresponds to the story told in Infants of the Spring—Aeon 
dies in a “terrible traffic accident” (161). One wonders, though, whether the real cause of his 
death was his “sin” with Myra, the love that would cause Aeon “in procreation [to] die again.” 
Whereas Locke’s anthology cast Toomer as the most likely candidate for the fulfillment of a 
messianic New Negro, Nugent makes Toomer a figure of the doomed, failed messiah—one 
more likely to be crushed beneath the wheels of a car than to redeem his race through literature. 
Likewise, while Thurman’s Infants casts Toomer as the only African American artist with “the 
elements of greatness,” it also portrays him as one of the many “Negroes of talent [who] were 
wont to make one splurge, then sink into oblivion” (221, 62).  
Thurman’s and Nugent’s separate invocations of Toomer as the model, yet failed, Negro 
redeemer are particularly telling, because by the time Infants was published, Toomer had not 
only apparently failed to make good on the promise he’d exhibited in Cane nearly a decade 
earlier; he had also essentially repudiated any racial affiliation with “Negroes,” let alone New 
Negroes. If he was to be a messiah, he wanted to herald the dawn, not of a new day in the black 
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race, but of a brand-new “American” race at whose coming he had already hinted in Cane.35 In 
their satirical treatments of Toomer, Infants of the Spring and Gentleman Jigger both participate in 
the tradition established by The New Negro of heralding Cane’s author as The One. But given all 
that had changed between 1925 and the early 1930s, their appropriations of Toomer take on a 
decidedly cynical and disillusioned flavor. By 1932, Thurman seems to be saying, the elusive 
New Negro can be pinpointed, but it is of the nature of a dying star: one that refuses to be 
tethered to any racial program, let alone a sacred African American calling. Gentleman Jigger 
takes the implicit commentary a step further by making its Toomer character, Aeon—the closest 
thing the novel has, artistically, to a messianic New Negro or “black apostle”—so light-skinned 
that he in fact “passes” with great success, writing “Negro poetry” as a visually and socially 
white man (64). 
The fissures between Locke’s typological New Negro and the Niggeratti’s sacrilegious 
aesthetics occur along the fault lines dividing the two operative strains of Judeo-Christian 
blasphemy—appropriation of the Word, on one hand, and profanation on the other. The New 
Negro embodies the former strain, arrogating to itself the kind of sacred authority reserved, 
ordinarily, for divine revelation. It is against this kind of blasphemy that both Gentleman Jigger 
and Infants of the Spring aim their own version of derogatory blasphemy, denigrating and 
defiling the notion of a messianic New Negro or black Christ. To adapt the influential terms of 
Houston Baker’s Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance, if The New Negro “mastered the form” of 
scriptural typology—exploiting the Bible’s cultural, political, and literary capital in a carefully 
                                                 
35  “That rumble comes from the earth’s deep core. It is the mutter of powerful underground races. . . . The next 
world-savior is coming up that way. . . . The new-world Christ will need consummate skill to walk upon the 
waters” (Toomer, Cane, 78). By 1931, Toomer would write, “Now is the time of the birth of a new order, a new 
vision, a new ideal of man. I proclaim this new order” (A Jean Toomer Reader, 105). The previous year he had 
refused James Weldon Johnson’s request to anthologize some of his work; the “Negro art movement,” he wrote to 
Johnson in response, “is not for me. My poems are not Negro poems. . . . they spring from the result of racial 
blendings here in America which have produced a new race or stock” (ibid., 106).  
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calculated bid for cultural recognition—these novels work to “deform” that very mastery.36  The 
New Negro typologically exploits the cultural, political, and literary capital of scripture but in a 
carefully calculated, elegantly unassuming way that rarely draws attention to its own 
blasphemous appropriation. Leaving it to others to describe it as the Bible of the Harlem 
Renaissance, The New Negro “conceals, disguises, floats like a trickster butterfly in order to sting 
like a bee”—as Baker characterizes “mastery of form” (50).  
The Niggeratti, then, perform the second kind of blasphemy (profanation) and the 
second kind of modernism (deformation of mastery). If mastery of form emulates the praying 
mantis or rabbit—Baker’s examples—then deformation of mastery emulates the gorilla, 
“advertising, with certainty, his unabashed badness. . . . Deformation is a go(uer)rilla action in the 
face of acknowledged adversaries”—those adversaries being, in the case of the younger Harlem 
artists, the very hand that feeds (50). With an explicitness that is blasphemous in more ways 
than one, the Niggeratti expose the mantis-like strategies of Locke’s anthology, sending up its 
cagey scriptural investments and the barely muted messianism of its titular figure. What The 
New Negro tacitly exploits, the Niggeratti openly profane; where The New Negro plays black 
Christ, the Niggeratti play blaspheming trickster, “signifying” on the more earnest blasphemies 
of the New Negro project.37 And where The New Negro presses its urbane appropriative 
blasphemy into the service of cultural and political recognition, the Niggeratti’s blasphemies are 
a form of irreverent iconoclasm. As Michael Cobb has argued, in their eyes Locke represented 
“the icon who needed to be broken.” Along the way we even find black writers willing to risk 
                                                 
36  Baker, Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance, 15. 
37  The trickster is inherently, after all, a profaner, embodying “incest, murder, and the destruction of sacred 
property,” as Baker observes in Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature (184). The African trickster god Esu, 
whom Henry Louis Gates, Jr., regards as a relative of the Signifying Monkey, is “master of that elusive, mystical 
barrier that separates the divine world from the profane. . . . Esu is the ultimate copula, connecting truth with 
understanding, the sacred with the profane” (The Signifying Monkey, 6).  He is profanatory also in the sense of 
breaching thresholds between profane and sacred; the Esu figure marks “the penetration of thresholds, the 
exchange between discursive universes” (ibid., 27).  
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blaspheming white Redeemers; Hughes’s 1931 poem “Goodbye Christ,” for example, produces 
such a critique in tandem with a politically irreverent embrace of Communism. Blasphemy is 
thus one way to chart the “upward” cultural progress, facilitated by mastery of form and 
deformation of mastery, that Baker identifies. In this case, blasphemous modernism is the form 
to be mastered as well as the discursive terrain on which one seeks to deform that mastery.38  
Locke’s strategies may have been the stronger. The success of his endeavor at canon-
formation, and of that canon’s ability to quash heretical counter-discourses, can be measured by 
the relative popularity and availability in the decades since of The New Negro and of the 
Niggeratti’s most notorious platform, the short-lived but incendiary little magazine Fire!!39 The 
publication’s one and only issue was helmed by Thurman and published in 1926 with the 
intention, said Nugent, to “shock the hell out of them.”40 Fire!! continues to beg descriptors such 
as “scandalous” and “outrageous,” principally but not exclusively because of its inclusion of 
Nugent’s story “Smoke, Lilies and Jade.”41 As A. B. Christa Schwarz notes, while Thurman and 
Nugent receive the most attention for having “opted for the extreme of transgressive sexuality,” 
it is also true that “[t]ransgression of moral and aesthetic boundaries linked most contributions” 
in their collaborative effort “to cause outrage among black critics.”42 In his autobiography, 
Langston Hughes recalls the magazine’s treatment as rank heresy by black intellectuals beyond 
the Niggeratti coterie: 
                                                 
38 Cobb, “Insolent Racing, Rough Narrative,” 330; Baker, Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance, 101. 
39  Michael Cobb remarks the seemingly inexplicable exclusion of Fire!!’s most noteworthy text, Nugent’s “Smoke, 
Lilies and Jade”—and even of any editorial mention—from the Norton Anthology of African American Literature: 
“This editorial choice suggests that a literary object like Nugent’s, important for its perceived groundbreaking 
engagement with a previously taboo queer theme, is not a special concern in the fraught, but nevertheless 
important, work of consolidating a canon of African American literature” (“Insolent Racing,” 329). 
40  Quoted in Tyler T. Schmidt, “‘In the Glad Flesh of My Fear,’” 161.  
41  Bruce Kellner, “‘Refined Racism,’” 126; Martha Jane Nadell, Enter the New Negroes, 77. 
42  Schwarz, “Transgressive Sexuality,” 144. 
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None of the older Negro intellectuals would have anything to do with Fire. Dr. 
Du Bois in the Crisis roasted it.43 The Negro press called it all sorts of bad names, 
largely because of a green and purple story by Bruce Nugent, in the Oscar Wilde 
tradition. . . . Rean Graves, the critic for the Baltimore Afro-American, began his 
review by saying: “I have just tossed the first issue of Fire into the fire.” . . . So 
Fire had plenty of cold water thrown on it by the colored critics.44  
 
Rusty, the Thurman character in Gentleman Jigger, argues that Locke and Du Bois “and that gang 
of outmoded reactionary tyrants have reigned long enough! This [magazine] is going to be ours. 
Body and soul” (28). In real life, Locke proclaimed Fire!! “a manoeuvre of artistic secession,” 
while in his “Dark Tower” column in Opportunity, Countée Cullen—himself a Fire!! contributor, 
though a poet by no means wholly simpatico with the Niggeratti—obliged Thurman’s desires 
by recognizing “a wish to shock in this first issue,” adding that, “though shock-proof ourselves, 
we imagine that the wish will be well realized among the readers of Fire.”45  
 This shock value has much to do with the magazine’s brazen use of biblical and other 
Christian materials, a strategy that conspicuously recalls while at the same time departing from 
Locke’s strategies in The New Negro. Fire!! opens with a “Foreword” that moves swiftly from 
demonic imagery to a “pagan” invocation of flesh and soul—and finally to a quotation from a 
Langston Hughes poem that mines the language and cadences of the Spirituals and of the black  
church: 
        FIRE . . .  melting steel and iron bars, poking livid tongues between stone 
apertures and burning wooden opposition with a cackling chuckle 
of contempt. 
         
        FIRE . . .  weaving vivid, hot designs upon an ebon bordered loom and 
satisfying pagan thirst for beauty unadorned . . . the flesh is sweet 
and real . . . the soul an inward flush of fire . . . Beauty? . . . flesh 
on fire—on fire in the furnace of life blazing. . . .       
  
                                                 
43  The remark about Du Bois is evidently inaccurate, as David Levering Lewis points out, although it does seem aptly 
to communicate the older intellectual’s personal response to the magazine: “A friend wrote Countée Cullen that 
merely mentioning Fire!! to Du Bois hurt the editor’s ‘feelings so much that he would hardly talk to me’” (When 
Harlem Was in Vogue, 197, 194). 
44  Hughes, The Big Sea, 237. 
45  Locke, “Fire: A Negro Magazine,” 563; Cullen, “The Dark Tower,” 25. 
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 “Fy-ah, 
   Fy-ah, Lawd, 
   Fy-ah gonna burn ma soul!” (F, 1)  
The preacher’s traditional invocation of hellfire, a fire which the unsaved parishioner imagines 
will “burn ma soul,” undergoes in Hughes’s lyric a blasphemous transvaluation. This fire, or 
Fire!!, instead metaphorizes a heretical form of unabashed expression that will rage against the 
“wooden opposition” of bourgeois cultures both black and white. Its “livid tongues” of flame 
befit blasphemy’s long association with this organ of the body, both as the source of rhetorical 
profanation and as the site of the blasphemer’s traditional punishment. They also connote a 
nexus of flesh and Word, and of flesh and Spirit, that aptly conveys fire’s figuration in these 
lines as the element shared by the soul (as fire’s “inward flush”) and the flesh (“on fire in the 
furnace of life blazing”). Surely, too, the writer of these lines had in mind Acts 2:3, in which the 
Spirit descends upon Christ’s apostles in “tongues like as of fire.” Far from the idealized and 
fleshless messiah invoked by The New Negro—with its emphasis on the soul, minus the body, of 
African America’s new cultural dawn—the desire expressed in Fire!!’s foreword is to forge in 
some fiery smithy an uncreated amalgam of flesh, soul, spirit, and word.46 
Immediately following Hughes’s hymn to “Fy-ah!” is Thurman’s short story “Cordelia 
the Crude.” The very title signals that such a story could not have found a home in The New 
Negro; it is indeed, as Thurman and Nugent intended it, something of “a shocker” (GJ, 31). 
Illustrated by an appropriately “crude” nude executed by Nugent, the story commences with an 
invocation of the sexualized body that stands in profanatory relation to The New Negro’s 
disembodied messianism. “Physically, if not mentally,” the story begins—already a suggestive 
opener—“Cordelia was a potential prostitute” (F, 5). By the end of the story, that potential will 
                                                 
46  These lines thus reflect the influence of certain uniquely African American Protestant traditions in which, as Joseph 
Murphy writes, “the Christian split between the body and the soul is overcome” (Working the Spirit, 174).  
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become fully realized. Thurman clearly desired this text to depict the seamy side of Harlem 
black life that The New Negro had papered over: at age sixteen, the title character is already 
“matronly mature,” a “fus’ class chippie” with no sense of her actions’ “moral import” (5). Her 
“wanton promiscuity,” like Fire!! itself, burns with “the rebellious flame” (5-6). She trolls 
Harlem’s theaters in search of nakedly “physical pleasure,” attained in the most animalistic 
terms: “if successful, the approached female will soon be chatting with her baiter”; “our lips met 
in an animal kiss” (5-6). In keeping with this bestial theme, Cordelia has left behind a pig-
farming boyfriend in her South Carolina hometown; in a line dripping with innuendo, we are 
told that she has had to “leave her lover to his succulent porkers” (5). The salaciousness that 
attends those liquid l’s and “succulent porkers” characterizes the whole story. With passages of 
elliptical free indirect discourse (“one could always have the most delightful physical contacts    
. . . hmm . . .”), Thurman’s male narrator places us in the mind of a woman who desires, and 
who acts on those desires, with seemingly no discrimination (5). 
Except that she does discriminate, a little: “In a short while she learned how to squelch 
the bloated, lewd faced Jews” (5). So much for “Exodus strategies.” Far from identifying with 
the Jew as a figure of mutual oppression, Cordelia, like the story that contains her, views the 
figure’s otherness as absolute and un-assimilable—a move perhaps calculated to align 
Thurman’s fiction less with anything in The New Negro than with high modernist antisemitism 
as it appears in the poetry of Eliot and Pound, and in the contemporaneous novels of Fitzgerald 
and Hemingway. In any case, while Thurman’s foreword to the magazine deploys the religious 
language of scripture, damnation, prophecy, and hellfire, neither that foreword nor “Cordelia 
the Crude” has any truck with The New Negro’s typological investments—either its invocations 
of Hebraic parallels or its more emphatic rewriting of those parallels to promote its Christ-like, 
messianic New Negro.          
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Resurrecting the Crucifixion 
There is something else worth noting, though, about The New Negro’s anticipated black 
Christ and about Fire!!’s revisions of that figure. For while the tragic but potentially redemptive 
figuration of the suffering black body as Christ has its own rich tradition in African American 
literature, both before and after The New Negro, Locke’s anthology offers something very 
different: a bowdlerized Christological typology that manages quietly to ignore this tragic 
figuration. Without addressing Locke or The New Negro specifically, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 
speaks to the motivations behind this strategy when he traces a coherent line of thought—from 
William Dean Howells to William Stanley Braithwaite, from Du Bois to Carl Van Vechten and 
many others—which held literature and the arts to be the foundations on which the 
“apocalyptic notion” of a New Negro would be sustained. “The Black Christ would be, in short, 
a poetaster”: a de-thorned and sanitized redeemer, assimilable to white and black tastes alike, 
minus the connotations of a lynched black body.47 The Lockean trope of the “New Negro” is 
essentially the black-Christ figure shorn of its negative valance, a fact nowhere more evident 
than in Locke’s systematic pruning of lynching references from the anthology. Neither the word 
lynching nor any of its cognates appears in its 450 pages: this at a time when lynching remained 
a persistent element of the United States’ racial landscape, and when some of The New Negro’s 
most celebrated contributors (Toomer, McKay, Cullen) had already searing literary documents 
of these atrocities. 
Had Locke had only literary merit in mind when selecting the poetry for his anthology, 
after all, he would surely have included Toomer’s “Portrait in Georgia” (1923). This most 
powerful and condensed poem from Cane depicts the attributes of a white woman in the terms 
of a white-on-black lynching: her hair “coiled like a lyncher’s rope,” her eyes like “fagots,” her 
                                                 
47  Gates, Figures in Black, 23.  
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lips like scars and blisters, her “slim body, white as the ash / of black flesh after flame.”48 
Toomer here takes a European lyric tradition of devising a lengthy conceit to portray the body-
parts of a beloved—Robert Herrick, for instance, “Upon the Nipples of Julia’s Breast”—but uses 
these means to dramatize the horrors of mob violence. Even to look upon the “slim body” of a 
white woman could mean capital punishment for a black man in the South. Thus the poem 
projects the evil of lynching upon the putatively sacred body of the white woman, whose purity 
must be protected and revenged at all costs and by the most profane means. The poem’s 
connotations of sacrificial violence and more subtle suggestion of lynching as Crucifixion make 
it an impossible candidate for inclusion in The New Negro. It would sit uneasily, to say the least, 
next to the wholly positive, Christic New Negro trope that Toomer himself is said to herald as 
“a bright morning star of a new day of the race” (NN, 44).  
Nor did The New Negro make room for one of Claude McKay’s best known poems, “The 
Lynching” (1922), with its more overt allusions to the Crucifixion: “His Spirit in smoke 
ascended to high heaven. / His father, by the cruelest way of pain, / Had bidden him to his 
bosom once again.”49 Nor Countée Cullen’s “Christ Recrucified” (1922), which depicts a 
lynching victim as wearing a crown of thorns and “purple robe of ridicule,” then describes the 
victim directly as Christ: “Christ’s awful wrong is that he’s dark of hue, / The sin for which no 
blamelessness atones.”50 Such invocations of the black Christ were not what Locke needed for 
The New Negro, which instead proffered the optimistic flipside to this tragic tope—a trope which 
the Niggeratti would resurrect with insistent force in the years immediately following The New 
Negro’s publication.  
                                                 
48  Toomer, Cane, 29.   
49  McKay, Harlem Shadows, 51.  
50  Cullen, “Christ Recrucified,” 221. 
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Among Fire!!’s suite of ten poems, for example, Helene Johnson’s “A Southern Road” 
violates Locke’s twin refusals to brook any references to lynching or to the tragic or politically 
charged aspects of the black Christ figure. Johnson invokes both, depicting a lynched black 
body as the “sacrificial” offering at an altar (“predella”) to the “raff” of white supremacy:   
A blue-fruited black gum, 
Like a tall predella,  
Bears a dangling figure,— 
Sacrificial dower to the raff, 
Swinging alone, 
A solemn, tortured shadow in the air. (F, 17)  
Three of the other nine poems contain ambiguous but nonetheless suggestive allusions to trees 
and to their occasionally strange fruit; Cullen’s reference, for instance, to the “bursting fruit” 
that white Americans “reap” inevitably calls forth the similar imagery he invokes in poems 
such as The Black Christ (1929) to connect Christ’s sacrificial offering on the Cross to the utterly 
unredemptive suffering of lynching victims (F, 16). In works beyond Fire!! these same writers 
reclaim the tragic and political dimensions of the black Christ. Cullen’s “The Litany of the Dark 
People” figures African Americans explicitly as crucified Christs, wreathed with thorns, spear-
wounded, and crucified “on white wood from a scented bough”—a lynching image, of course, 
the “white wood” leaving little doubt about the racial identification of these modern crucifiers.51 
Elsewhere in Cullen we find a “twisted tortured thing hung from a tree, / Swart victim of a 
newer Calvary.”52 Calvary, for this Christian poet, “Was but the first leaf in a line / Of trees on 
which a Man should swing.”53  
                                                 
51  Cullen, Copper Sun, 13. Crucifixion reemerges as a theme in another poem in the same volume (36); African 
Americans, Cullen asserts, “own His cross” (67).  
52  Ibid., 11. This stanza is immediately followed by another that insists on recognizing a black contribution to the 
story of Christ: “Yea, he who helped Christ up Golgotha’s track, / That Simon who did not deny, was black” (11). 
The juxtaposition of these two stanzas makes a double argument: The whites who crucify blacks deny Christ by 
doing so, and thus resemble Simon Peter, the biblical denier, while forgetting the darker—and, perhaps, more 
faithful—Simon of Cyrene.  
53  Cullen, The Black Christ, 69. Further examples from the period following The New Negro are not hard to come by. A 
poem by Melvin Tolson depicts daily life for blacks in America as playing out atop a “Golgotha” where they have 
 149 
    
Each of these works reanimates the tragic Christ figure banished from Locke’s 
anthology. But no one more eagerly and provocatively reclaimed the black Christ as an overtly 
politicized figure than Fire!! contributor and Niggeratti member Langston Hughes, whose 
searing “Christ in Alabama” (1931) states the point bluntly in its opening lines: “Christ is a 
Nigger, / Beaten and black.” The poem proceeds to depict this Christ as the product, not of a 
Virgin Birth, but of a white man’s rape of a black woman, equating God the Father with the 
white tyrant of a plantation: 
Mary is His mother— 
Mammy of the South, 
Silence your mouth.  
 
God’s His Father— 
White Master above, 
Grant us your love. 
 
Most holy bastard 
Of the bleeding mouth: 
Nigger Christ 
On the cross of the South.54  
 
Unlike Cullen’s more diffuse Crucifixion poetry, Hughes’s poem aims for a blunt economy of 
diction and of the poetic line, driving its conceit home with alliterative associations (Mary/ 
Mammy/Master) and using twice the controversial word “nigger.” Here is no idealized black 
Christ but rather a “Nigger Christ / On the cross of the South,” presented with the sort of 
shocking candor that characterizes Fire!!  
When the poem was first published in Contempo, accompanied by a Zell Ingram 
silhouette of a black man bearing white stigmata, it instigated an immediate public “furor,” 
making this his most controversial work behind the equally blasphemous and even more 
politically incendiary “Goodbye Christ.” Politicians and newspaper editors denounced “the 
                                                                                                                                                             
had their “manhood crucified,” while Frank Horne reminds “Two Brown Boys in a Catholic Church” that their 
future suffering is bound to “exceed” Christ’s (Hughes and Bontemps, eds., The Poetry of the Negro, 137-38, 146-47). 
54  Hughes, “Christ in Alabama,” 1.  
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insulting and blasphemous” Hughes in ways that prove the success of the poet’s calculation to 
provoke: “It’s bad enough to call Christ a bastard . . . but to call Him a nigger—that’s too 
much!”55 Hughes’s poetry draws on Christ and the Crucifixion nearly as often as Cullen’s does, 
though always with a more militant emphasis. His poem “Scottsboro” invokes “Christ, / Who 
fought alone” as predecessor for the Scottsboro Boys’ suffering, while “Lynching Song” draws 
an unspoken comparison between the Resurrected Christ and a pseudo-resurrected lynching 
victim (CW, 207). For in a reversal of the life-taking dynamics of lynching, the victim in 
“Lynching Song” finds his voice as he comes to life—and to a truer “life,” evidently, then the 
spiritually “dead” whites who persecuted him: “the white folks die,” while “That black boy’s / 
Still body / Says: / NOT I” (CW, 149-50). Hughes’s 1927 poem “Song for a Dark Girl” likewise 
features a black body that has been “hung . . . to a cross roads tree” (CW, 106). That unlikely 
preposition, to rather than from, emphasizes the Crucifixion framing: one is generally hung from 
a tree, or nailed to a cross—or, as here, to “a cross roads tree,” an image that blends Calvary and 
rural crossroads in a striking conflation (106). The poem continues, “I asked the white Lord 
Jesus / What was the use of prayer”—for that same “white” Jesus, whose death this lynching 
duplicates, is as readily invoked by the perpetrators of these crimes as by the families of the 
victims (107).  
While Hughes presses the lynching/Crucifixion analogy into the service of political 
propaganda, he reserves the more optimistic Redeemer trope for equally radical purposes, 
imagining its birth as a violent “kick” from within the belly of a fed-up mob: “Hail Mary, 
Mother of God! / the new Christ child of the Revolution’s about to be born / (Kick hard, red 
baby, in the bitter womb of the mob)” (CW, 211). Elsewhere Hughes extends the Crucifixion 
                                                 
55  Quoted in Arnold Rampersad, The Life of Langston Hughes, Vol. I, 225. The word “furor” is Elmer Carter’s, who 
expressed in a letter to Hughes his fear that the poem’s publication “might cause some of the more hot-headed of 
the cracker type to attempt to do you bodily harm” (ibid.). 
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trope beyond the African American sphere: “Czechoslovakia lynched on a swastika cross! . . . 
Nails in her hands and nails in her feet” (CW, 261; emphasis added). Here the lynching-
Crucifixion equation has become so reified, so automatic, that what might otherwise seem a 
mixing of metaphors—Czechoslovakia as lynched black person, Czechoslovakia as crucified 
Christ—instead serves as a complex metalepsis that shores up and hypostatizes the original 
analogy: an equation that ceases, in such a work, to be merely figurative.56  
Hughes thus makes for an especially apt figure to prepare Fire!!’s readers—via his 
prominently foregrounded poem “Fire”—for the varieties of New-Negro sacrilege to follow. 
Like Thurman’s and Nugent’s romans à clef, Hughes’s poem echoes the biblical rhetoric and 
sacramental idioms of Locke’s anthology. It sets a precedent, moreover, for the self-conscious 
emulation of those idioms that Fire!! itself employs—its concluding article being a striking case 
in point. Recalling with an eerie precision the rhetorical strategies of Du Bois’s closing 
apocalyptic essay in The New Negro, Thurman’s coda to the issue (“Fire Burns”) begins by 
invoking a “prophecy” he made “some time ago” and by offering that prediction’s prophetic 
status as indeterminate—even as he forecloses such ambiguity by referring to it repeatedly by 
the word prophecy: “So far my prophecy has failed to pan out, and superficially it seems as if it 
never will. . . .” (F, 47). The prophecy in this case has less to do with the future of race relations 
broadly considered, as in Du Bois, than with a foreseen vindication of Carl Van Vechten’s 1926 
novel Nigger Heaven. Like Du Bois, however, Thurman returns to the questionable status of his 
earlier prophecy only to offer it again with even greater confidence in his prognosticating 
prowess: “Thus I defiantly reiterate that a few years hence Mr. Van Vechten will be spoken of as 
                                                 
56  The Crucifixion topos thus becomes in this instance a form of Signifyin(g), the figure of figures; one reason Cullen’s 
1929 poem “The Black Christ” succeeds so little as poetry (a “flaccid” poem, Eric Sundquist has called it) is that its 
whole conceit has long since solidified into cliché, into a metaphor so often invoked that, by the end of the ’20s, it is 
best used as a vehicle for other, fresher tropes (To Wake the Nations, 593). For a more positive reading of “The Black 
Christ,” see Qiana Whitted, “In My Flesh Shall I See God.” 
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a kindly gent rather than as a moral leper exploiting people who had believed him to be a 
sincere friend” (47). That Fire!! ends by rushing to the defense of a prominent renaissance 
patron newly vilified for his sensationalist depictions of black life in Harlem—as well as for 
manifesting that “decadent strain” that Locke worried had penetrated the Niggeratti’s own 
work (IS, 234)—testifies to the magazine’s efforts to upset the black intelligentsia. (Du Bois 
memorably dismissed Nigger Heaven as “a blow in the face”—nothing but “gin and sadism,” 
and “one damned orgy after another”—which rather echoes Locke’s characterization of Infants 
of the Spring as just another of Thurman’s “prolonged orgies of exhibitionism.”57)  
It is further significant that Nigger Heaven, this novel that Thurman has chosen to defend 
as the final word in Fire!!, climaxes—like Joyce’s Ulysses—with an explicitly sacrilegious rite. 
Toward the end of the novel, the black would-be writer Byron finds himself in a taxi—at six 
a.m., following a long night of drinking, carousing, and occasional powder-sniffing—and tells 
the cab driver his destination: “Drive to hell!” To which the driver responds, not illogically, “I 
guess you means duh Black Mass.”58 Soon we find ourselves in a strange, dark interior of secret 
doors and passwords, of “uncanny, horrible laughter” and “wild music, music that moaned and 
lacerated one’s breast, . . . shrieking, tortured music from the depths of hell. . . . [Byron] joined 
this witch’s Sabbath. Demoniac saxophones wailed like souls burning in an endless torment. 
Triumphant trumpets called to a profane glory” (253-55). A naked girl appears, with “savage 
African features” and hair “like a lanate halo”—“she could have been no more than sixteen”—
and commences “to perform her evil rites” (255-56). These rites, only elliptically evoked, involve 
a knife, a woman’s scream, and a body—the girl’s—turning purple. What exactly transpires is 
left tantalizingly mysterious, but one can perhaps fill in the gaps with reference to Huysmans 
                                                 
57  Du Bois, “On Carl Van Vechten’s Nigger Heaven,” 516-17; Locke, unpublished review (Alain L. Locke Papers, box 
164-134, folder 17).  
58  Van Vechten, Nigger Heaven, 252. 
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and de Sade. The novel ends with Byron’s firing two bullets into the body—apparently already 
dead, or close to it—of his rival, Randolph Pettijohn. Van Vechten’s choice of words is 
suggestive: “He drew his revolver and shot once, twice into the ugly black mass” (284). Thus 
does Van Vechten link a blasphemous ceremony—the Black Mass—to the corporeality of this 
African American corpse, as well as to that other black mass, the African American population 
at large. Blasphemy here emerges as nothing less than the discursive mode in which the novel 
articulates Harlem life and black identity—and blasphemy likewise serves the Niggeratti, led by 
one of Van Vechten’s more vocal defenders, as the preferred mode in which to articulate their 
irreverent perspectives on that life and that identity.   
 
On the Sanctity of Mergers 
 Fire!!’s most transgressive work is also its most well-known: Bruce Nugent’s “Smoke, 
Lilies and Jade,” a polymorphously avant-garde short story that queers race, gender, and 
sexuality while making a mockery of the Protestant work ethic. It also, in the words of Marlon 
Ross, “makes more explicit” Nigger Heaven’s “blasphemous gesture” by “intertwin[ing] the 
singing of a spiritual with homosexual imagery.”59 The passage Ross has in mind samples the 
very Hughes poem quoted in the magazine’s foreword: 
Beauty’s lips had pressed hard . . . cool . . . cool . . . fy-ah Lawd . . . his breath had 
trembled . . . fy-ah’s gonna burn ma soul [. . .] Beauty’s body had pressed close     
. . . close . . . fy-ah’s gonna burn my soul [. . .] Beauty’s lips touched his . . . 
pressed hard . . . cool . . . opened slightly [. . .] Beauty’s lips pressed hard against 
his teeth . . . Alex trembled . . . could feel Beauty’s body . . . close against his . . . 
hot . . . tense . . . white . . . and soft . . . soft . . . soft . . . . . . . . . (F, 38)  
 
Nugent’s elliptical effects here exceed Van Vechten’s in Nigger Heaven’s Black Mass, and the 
interweaving of Hughes’s sermon-cum-Spiritual “Fire” with a passage that is not only erotic but 
                                                 
59  Ross, Manning the Race, 417. 
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utterly without precedent in its treatment of interracial same-sexuality makes this one of the 
most iconoclastic moments in African American modernism. Indeed, the transgressions of 
“Smoke, Lilies and Jade” inhere largely in its modernism—its experimentations with form, 
interiority, and subject matter—and in what it makes modernism do.60 
 This penchant for mingling the sacred with the erotically transgressive emerges in much 
of Nugent’s visual art. It also drives his poem on Adam and Eve that appears in Gentleman Jigger 
(32-33), a heteroglossic affair that interweaves quotations from Genesis with ruminations on 
such matters as modernity, liquor, the Charleston, and sex: 
Kisses-in-the-evening-hey-hey 
AND WHEN THE WOMAN SAW THE TREE WAS 
GOOD FOR FOOD 
[. . .] 
Maybe . . . gimme another kiss, baby . . . 
Wine . . . gin . . . 
Wine-of-life noise 
Light . . . half-pint-gin smoke? 
SHE TOOK OF THE FRUIT THEREOF 
What was life? 
Kisses . . . perfume . . . noise . . . 
Light . . . pappa-love-mamma? 
 
One would know life . . . . . . . 
 AND DID EAT           
Nugent’s “Bible stories,” written in the late 1920s and early ’30s, effect similarly transgressive 
mergings of erotics and scripture, putting Nugent squarely in league with the idiosyncratic 
religious ethos expressed in the work of Mina Loy—such as her poetic depictions of sex (or 
“Xes”) as a sacred communion cast in the language and imagery of Christian ritual, or in her 
stated opinion that, at its root, “the divine mission of Jesus was to invite us to a party” (“HRE”). 
                                                 
60  Noting the story’s resonance with important precedents in the works of Joyce, Proust, and Faulkner, David A. 
Gerstner locates the story “squarely within the so-called stream-of-consciousness style and Bergsonian inquiries 
about the relationship between space and time. But Nugent brings these modernist interests into queer interracial 
territory. . . . Nugent's wisps of space and time are specifically put into service—in 1926—to bring to life panracial 
and pansexual sensations” (Queer Pollen, 45).  
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For these Bible stories present markedly queer rewritings of scripture, making them, as Thomas 
Wirth asserts, “even now as unsettling to the conventionally minded reader as [they are] 
exhilarating to the iconoclast.”61 
In one of Nugent’s stories, Carus—Herod’s fourteen-year-old, “fabulously white” 
catamite, “the most beautiful boy of his age”—holds an instructive conversation with Caspar, 
the black-skinned Magus for whom Carus nurses a forbidden desire.62 On their journey home 
from visiting the newborn Jesus, Caspar reminds his young charge that “God is love,” but 
Carus insists instead that “love is God” (127). Caspar explains that Carus’s notion of love is “an 
active thing, and that of which I teach thee is a name” (128). Their dialectic turns on the 
equation of desire with the divine: if God is love, then does not love equal God? And if so, how 
can desire—even between a black man and a white boy, regardless of its status as “active” or 
inert, profane or platonic—be anything but holy?63 Nugent continues his erasure of distinctions 
between Eros and agape in another Bible story, “Tree with Kerioth-Fruit,” which tells of Jesus 
and the disciples. Here Nugent focuses again on God and on love—as well as jealousy, 
commitment, betrayal, and grief—between men. The story mingles scripture and Decadence, 
presenting a distinctly Wildean vision of the Apostles: they “caress” one another with their 
voices, finger each other’s necklaces, and take turns pouting over their jealousy of the beloved 
newcomer called Jesus.64 The tale’s opening finds the Disciple Simon admiring John as he basks 
in the sun, “comparing with his artist’s eyes the gold of John’s hair with the brown of his own” 
(139). John is nude here, evidently, as only several lines later do we find him “putting on his 
                                                 
61 Wirth, Introduction to Nugent, Gay Rebel of the Harlem Renaissance, 45. That Nugent was familiar with and even 
influenced by Loy’s poetry is attested by a single line in an untitled holograph manuscript. Written in the elliptical 
manner of “Sahdji” and “Smoke, Lilies and Jade,” this brief short story by Nugent summons forth an unmistakably 
Loyan “saxophone . . . yielding inebriate hiccoughs” (Alain L. Locke Papers, box 164-188, folder 1).  
62  Nugent, “Beyond Where the Star Stood Still,” Gay Rebel of the Harlem Renaissance, 119.  
63 This denial of separations and limits is characteristic of other Nugent texts as well. See Tyler Schmidt, “‘In the Glad 
Flesh of My Fear,’” on Nugent’s “uncoded exploration of sex between father and son” and of “cross-dressing, 
public sex, and gay desire” in his still unpublished novel Geisha Man (162). 
64  Nugent, Gay Rebel of the Harlem Renaissance, 141. 
 156 
    
robe.” Yet John does not reciprocate Simon’s desires; it will require the physical beauty of Jesus 
to awaken these feelings in John, who has “never indulged in the Greek refinement. ’Tis not 
according to the laws of Moses, nor truly to my desire. But the stranger [Jesus] does fascinate 
me . . .” (139).  
John soon finds that “a pleasant tremor [is] vibrating his young knees and excitement 
painting his face with even greater beauty,” a beauty to which Jesus reacts in like fashion: “It 
excited him strangely and left him embarrassed for words” (140). In Nugent’s telling, Christ 
offers an end to the inhibiting “laws of Moses” that would still John’s quaking knees, and soon 
John becomes one of the twelve men with whom Christ lives and, presumably, sleeps. John in 
fact becomes, not just one of the twelve, but a special favorite, “the beloved” (143). Yet Nugent 
presents the real love story as taking place between Jesus and Judas, “so alike in thought and 
desire were they” (143). Jesus gives John much of his “affection,” true; “But Judas, Jesus knew” 
(143). Whether the word knew here is meant to operate in the biblical sense is not perfectly 
clear—but these are Bible stories, after all.65  
Nugent takes pains to emphasize Christ’s erotic physicality: “He liveth completely in the 
physical beauty he hath inherited from his father’s fathers—the sons of David” (141). 
Reminiscent of Mina Loy’s Christic vision, this Jesus seduces with his voice; for Nugent, the 
poet in Christ subsumes and trumps His godhood: “it was as a poet that Jesus said, ‘I am the Son 
of God’” (140, 144; emphasis added). Touched by “divine madness,” he is “the poet of man,” 
“through whom all things became living words” (142, 146, 140). But perhaps it is more accurate 
to say that Jesus’ divinity becomes in Nugent’s hands a datum to suggest and hint at, then 
teasingly retract. This epistemological flirtation occurs between Jesus and his apostles, but also 
                                                 
65  The sexual implications of “knowing” operate subtly throughout “Tree with Kerioth-Fruit.” After John and 
Andrew begin to share “the poet’s home,” John advises Simon, “Thou must come and know this man” (140). And 
perhaps Jesus has erotic knowledge in mind when he counsels Judas that “Knowledge is greater than belief” (145).  
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between Nugent and the reader; Nugent’s vacillation on the decision whether to capitalize 
pronouns relating to Jesus—a sometime “he” who often becomes a “Him”— highlights the 
teasing back-and-forth of Jesus’ godhood that we find in the narrative sequence. For instance, 
fast on the heels of Christ’s seeming dethronement—in Nugent’s assertion that it was merely 
“as a poet” that Jesus figured himself as the Son—comes the statement that “John, because he 
loved Jesus, knew that Jesus was God” (144). Yet this knowledge, seemingly sanctioned by the 
author, is again undercut by the following sentence: “Jesus spread his poetry; it became the 
word of God” (144). Rather than fulfilling and embodying God’s Word, Nugent’s Christ is a 
poet whose words retroactively inscribe God’s lowercase “word.”  
The story’s conclusion seems to reaffirm Jesus’ status as mere man and symbol, rather 
than God’s manifestation. Nugent imagines the Last Supper and its aftermath as follows: 
While breaking bread Jesus stayed his hand and said, with that certainty and 
sadness of the poet’s tongue, “One of you present will betray me.” . . . And his 
hand, as always in trouble, rested on Judas’s shoulder. And Judas shuddered, for 
he knew that Christ believed his own word. Knew that they all believed his 
word. . . . And Judas knew that none of them would betray their teacher, and 
that Jesus would have spoken false. Knew that after that one false word, there 
would be ever doubt in their eleven souls. . . . Then Judas knew the great thing 
that he would do. (145)   
 
There is theological precedence for a sympathetic reading of Judas—his betrayal, after all, was 
necessary to Christ’s mission of redemption—but Nugent’s revision of that betrayal offers a 
more radical reading of Judas as in some sense a redeemer of Jesus himself. Were it not for 
Judas’s decisive action, the story suggests, Jesus would have been exposed as a liar and his 
ministry would have failed, as Christ himself recognizes. Having been traded in for thirty 
pieces of silver, “Jesus saw that each coin was proof that the betrayal had been bought so that 
the poet’s word would be true. And Jesus wept also that he had betrayed Judas” (145).  
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 Nugent here lifts from the contexts of the Lazarus story the Bible’s famous and shortest 
verse, “Jesus wept” (John 11:35)—or, here as in the Douay-Rheims Bible, “And Jesus wept”—in 
order to reimagine Christ’s tears as an expression of regret tinged with homoerotic remorse. 
And so the story ends, it seems, by elevating Judas and stripping Jesus of divinity. Yet as both 
men are elevated onto their respective trees in the final paragraphs, we might consider these 
events from another angle: even if Judas thinks that he has played his own hand (“Thou 
knowest, Jesus, that had I saved thy life, thou wouldst be even more dead”), from a theological 
perspective one might readily say that he has merely played into the hands of “the poet” (146). 
Perhaps Jesus foreknew all. Hermeneutically, we are left in the queer morass of Nugent’s 
teasing ambiguities—of profane and sacred love, poetry and prophecy, betrayal and 
redemption, mortal and divine humanity. Our last image of Judas, the would-be poet, informs 
us that he has inherited finally “the poet’s tongue,” and we are left to ponder whether this is 
mere serendipity or a gift from the god whose Crucifixion he has just enabled—though “love,” 
as they say, seems finally to conquer all: 
As Jesus on the Hill of the Skull murmured, “Forgive them, they know not 
what they do,” Judas drew the cord from around his waist and hanged himself 
from the olive tree. And whispered with the poet’s tongue he finally had been 
given:  
“I did but love thee.” (146) 
 
In these texts as well as in his contribution to Fire!!, Nugent assaults taboos while breaking, in 
particular, many of the unspoken editorial rules of The New Negro: that one must elide those 
“decadent” displays of eroticism that characterized “the naughty nineties”—Locke’s words—
and that one must at least tacitly valorize the necessity for hard artistic work on behalf of “the 
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Negro.”66 For one thing, dandyism requires a steadfast commitment to leisure, decadence, 
artifice, queerness—and Nugent played the role of the black dandy to the hilt.67  
Nugent’s friend Zora Neale Hurston, another Fire!! contributor and member of the 
Niggeratti, offers her own commentary on the figure of the black dandy in her one-act play, 
“The First One” (1927). Like her novels Moses, Man of the Mountain (1939)—which rewrites 
Moses as a figure of godlike power and Creativity—and the unfinished Herod the Great, this play 
radically revises Western interpretations of scripture while also transvaluing traditional 
Western conceptions of race, as well as of work and progress.68 Here Hurston takes as her 
subject the supposed Curse of Ham, recasting Ham’s blackness as not a curse but rather a 
misunderstood gift. This Nugent-like Ham, youngest son of Noah, likes to “caper and prance”; 
wearing a goatskin and wreathed in flowers, he plays a “rude” instrument that evokes Pan’s.69 
“I am as a young ram in the Spring,” he sings, “Or a young male goat. / The hills are beneath 
my feet / And the young grass. / Love rises in me like the flood” (54). He is singer, artist, 
aesthete: a young Dionysus or Pan, here evoking nothing so much as Nugent “capering and 
prancing” tardily into a gathering of unamused Harlem elites—the sort of thing his fictional 
avatars do in Gentleman Jigger and Infants of the Spring. This Ham takes things in stride, 
including the inevitable darkening of his skin, telling Noah and his brothers: “Oh, remain with 
your flocks and fields and vineyards, to covet, to sweat, to die and know no peace. I go to the 
sun” (57). The echo here of Tennyson’s “Ulysses” (“To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield”) 
suggests the centuries of restless imperial questing that lie ahead of the whites whom Ham 
                                                 
66  Locke, “Fire: A Negro Magazine,” 563. 
67  On Nugent (and his avatar in Infants of the Spring) as a paradigmatic dandy figure, see Monica L. Miller, “The Black 
Dandy as Bad Modernist,” 199-200.   
68  Moses, Man of the Mountain takes the traditional Hebraic homology in a radically unconventional direction, with 
implications of black strength and empowerment that exceed the normal bounds of African American “Exodus 
Strategies.” In effect, its unorthodox fictionalization of Moses constitutes a proleptic vision of Black Power. 
69  Hurston, “The First One,” 53. 
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leaves behind. He and his black progeny, it seems, will not be tethered to avarice and ambition; 
they will “go to the sun” and live in peace. Such is the preferred attitude of the Niggeratti, 
privileging aestheticism and leisure over the more pragmatic ambitions of a Locke or a Du Bois.  
Hurston’s rewriting of the Hebrew Bible finds a corollary in Thurman’s Infants of the 
Spring, as Bruce Nugent’s character regales an assembled crowd with his tale of a recent 
dream—which seems to have taken the form of a prelapsarian erotic fantasy (“I was in Eden       
. . .” [44-45]). Whereas in “Smoke, Lilies and Jade” Nugent’s narrator allegorizes an attractive 
lover as “Beauty,” in this dream the reverse occurs: Beauty itself is personified as an erotic 
partner of indeterminate sex.  
I became aware of a presence. An ivory body exuding some exotic perfume. 
Beauty dimmed my eyes. The physical nearness of that invisible presence called 
to me, lured me closer. . . . My hand reached out and clutched a silken forelock. 
Involuntarily my eyes closed and I was conscious of being sucked into it until 
there was a complete merging. For one brief moment I experienced supreme 
ecstasy. (45)  
 
The ecstatic experience of this “complete merging” signals a momentary suspension of all 
distinctions and boundaries, an encounter with the divine or sacred—with “an immanent 
immensity, where there are neither separations nor limits,” as Georges Bataille defines the 
sacred in his Theory of Religion. Bataille is worth mentioning here because of his insistence that 
only through concerted transgression—in the form perhaps of ambiguous erotic fantasy or, 
better, of an eroto-socio-racially transgressive orgy—can one breach the realm of divine 
continuity and immanence. If, as Bataille maintains, “the sacred and the forbidden are one,” 
then “the sacred can be reached through the violence of a broken taboo.”70 It is thus appropriate 
that the phenomenon of merging should recur in Thurman’s Infants in the context of its 
                                                 
70  Bataille, Theory of Religion, 42; Erotism, 126. 
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climactic rent party, where “Shouts of joy merged into one persistent noisy blare” (184; emphasis 
added).  
Compare Thurman’s story in Fire!!, where “at a Saturday night house-rent party in a 
well known whore house,” there arises “a chaotic riot of raucous noise and clashing color all 
rhythmically merging”; there, as is Infants, the colors merge, as all racial (and sexual) distinctions 
become “completely eradicated. Whites and blacks clung passionately together as if trying to 
effect a permanent merger. Liquor, jazz music, and close physical contact had achieved what 
decades of propaganda had advocated with little success” (F, 6; IS, 186). That this raucous 
party’s “merger” miraculously outpaces the efforts of mundane propaganda highlights 
Niggeratti Manor’s ritual and symbolic function as a space where boundaries and limits become 
porous, where sacred and profane, angelic and forbidden, are allowed to interpenetrate and 
meld. It is, in the contexts of Christian mores and New Negro orthodoxy, a profanatory space 
that nonetheless functions as an appropriate setting for what Bernard Bell has called the “Afro-
American canonical story”: “the quest, frequently with apocalyptic undertones, for freedom, 
literacy, and wholeness.”71 The Niggeratti share, that is, the desire for the sacred that we see in 
The New Negro; their texts nonetheless betray far less reverent notions about how to get there.      
 
                                                 
71  Bell, The Afro-American Novel and its Tradition, 341-42. 
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Chapter Four 
 
BLASPHEMY AS INVERSION: 
GO DOWN, DJUNA 
 
 
Queerness . . . is both abject and exalted.   —Heather Love, Feeling Backward 
 
Ah, yes—I love my neighbour. Like a rotten apple to a rotten apple’s breast  
affixed we go down together, nor is there a hesitation in that decay. . . .  
 —Djuna Barnes, Nightwood 
 
 
 The competing aesthetic and political strategies of the New Negro Renaissance recall 
another cultural exchange from the period, one similarly characterized by biblical appropriation 
and the discourse of blasphemy. Like Harlem’s heated debates over classicism versus 
decadence, discreet versus open sexuality, and so on—with Alain Locke urging a virile, 
Whitmanian expression of Eros while lamenting the “Niggeratti’s” resuscitation of the 
“naughty nineties”—this other exchange likewise has to do with the problem of same-sexuality 
and of how best to treat the subject in literature and in life.1 Playing The New Negro’s part is 
Radclyffe Hall’s classic lesbian novel The Well of Loneliness (1928), which, like Locke’s anthology, 
exploits Christian typology in a bid for cultural recognition and acceptance. The “stigmata” of 
the homosexual, Hall writes, are “verily the wounds of One nailed to a cross.”2 Hall accordingly 
casts her protagonist, Stephen Gordon, as an elaborate Christ figure who begs the reader’s 
mercy for those afflicted from birth with “sexual inversion,” the period’s dominant paradigm 
for same-sex desire.3  
Echoing, meanwhile, the satiric or “signifying” role of such Niggeratti productions as 
Fire!! and Infants of the Spring is The Sink of Solitude (1928), a parodic pamphlet that writes back 
                                                 
1  Locke, “Fire: A Negro Magazine,” 563. 
2  Hall, The Well of Loneliness, 246. 
3  Named after the first Christian martyr and born on the night of Christmas Eve, Stephen is “absurdly self-
sacrificing,” a fervently masochistic “martyr” who yearns to “give light to them that sit in darkness.” As a child, 
she prays for her nanny, saying she “would like to wash [her] in my blood” (Hall, The Well, 433-34, 21, 437). 
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to Hall’s novel while also engaging the public discourse that surrounded its suppression on 
charges of obscenity. Comprising a polemical preface by P. R. Stephensen, drawings by 
Beresford Egan, and an anonymous “verse lampoon” in heroic couplets, The Sink of Solitude 
directs its satire in two directions: on one hand it rails against the suppression of The Well of 
Loneliness “in the land of the Areopagitica,” while on the other it pokes fun at the “silly novel” 
itself and at the pathologization of homosexuality by Hall as well as by the likes of Havelock 
Ellis and Sigmund Freud. Ellis, the period’s most prominent sexologist and documenter of 
inversion, had helped to set the pleading tone of Hall’s novel in his preface to that work; in The 
Sink of Solitude, P. R. Stephensen uses his own preface as an occasion to call “upon the Home 
Secretary as a christian to enforce the blasphemy laws” against the editor of the Sunday Express, 
James Douglas—who had written in that paper that he “would rather give a healthy boy or a 
healthy girl a phial of prussic acid than this novel.” Hall’s portrait of inversion, Douglas wrote, 
“cannot be reconciled with the Christian religion.”4  
These successive rhetorical posturings bear remarking. First, The Well of Loneliness makes 
“brazen, blasphemous” use of biblical typology in its moral defense of homosexuality—which 
some of its readers nonetheless decry as blasphemous for its perceived immorality.5 Then The 
Sink of Solitude calls for blasphemy charges to be brought against the novel’s detractors for 
having profaned one of modernity’s secular gods, Freedom of Speech. Finally, Hall herself was 
considerably upset by what she considered the “blasphemy” of The Sink’s frontispiece, which 
depicts the author’s body nailed to a crucifix; no doubt Hall’s moralizing critics would have 
concurred in characterizing the image as blasphemous.6 The similarity of this dialectic—a 
blasphemous response to blasphemy, which itself elicits charges of blasphemy—to the New 
                                                 
4  The Sink of Solitude, unpaginated; Douglas, “A Book That Must Be Suppressed,” 38. 
5
  Sally R. Munt, “The Well of Shame,” 202. 
6  Sally Cline, Radclyffe Hall, 280. 
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Negro/Niggeratti agon demonstrates that divergent minority constituencies in the modernist 
period experienced similar kinds of infighting over how best to deploy religious and 
blasphemous tropes.  
In writing back to Hall’s novel, moreover, The Sink of Solitude is joined by the works of 
Djuna Barnes, most especially Ladies Almanack (1928) and Nightwood (1936). The former, which 
appeared in the same year as both The Well and The Sink, casts Hall herself as “Tilly-Tweed-in-
Blood,” who “sported a Stetson, and believed in Marriage” (LA, 18). The book’s heroine, “Saint 
Musset,” the larger-than-life prophet of lesbianism, duly rebuts Tilly’s moralizing advocacy of 
monogamy between women; like Christ, whose atonement for humankind’s sins inaugurated a 
new dispensation, Musset preaches a new Law—in this case one that sanctions promiscuity and 
dismisses the righteousness of monogamy (36, 80). “‘Girls, girls,’ said she, ‘pause now to listen, I 
bring no Trumpet but that of my Message. . . . I have come to deliver you from Love and Love’s 
Folly” (77). Such is the Good News she brings to those, like Hall, who have assumed that once 
two women unite as “Wife” and “Bride,” to lie with another is a “Sin,” “an Evil so exactly of a 
piece, that the Judgement Call must be answered in a Trembling Tandem!” (19).  
At least superficially, Barnes’s Nightwood more closely resembles The Well of Loneliness 
than does Ladies Almanack. Readers, after all, can hardly fail to detect “the melancholy hidden 
beneath every jest and malediction” in the novel, from Felix Volkbein’s “laborious melancholy” 
to Matthew O’Connor’s “melancholy that had no beginning or end” (N, 8, 39, 110). Yet 
Nightwood’s brand of melancholia differs in important respects from that of Hall’s novel, 
sharing neither its sexological essentialism nor its pious pleading. Nightwood resists our 
sympathy, is anything but sentimental. At the same time, it resists our reading its depictions of 
homosexuality as either tragic or liberative—even if critics have often attempted to claim them 
as one or the other. Take, for example, the angst-ridden confrontation inside a cathedral 
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between a weeping Matthew O’Connor—cross-dresser, tortured Catholic, homosexual—and 
Tiny O’Toole, his penis or “ruined bird” (132-33). In a particularly influential reading, Jane 
Marcus interprets this evocation of physical and spiritual impotence as “one of the novel’s most 
hilarious scenes,” then waves away Robin Vote’s religious inclinations in the same sentence: 
“Robin laughs in church and goes home to read de Sade. . . .”7 Such observations ignore the 
pathetic and decidedly un-humorous dimensions of the scenes under discussion, as well as the 
earnest desires that accompany them. In pursuit of “some inscrutable wish for salvation,” after 
all, Robin seeks out churches—Catholic ones initially and, in the end, an abandoned Protestant 
chapel—and even takes the Catholic vows (46). Her attraction to religion, in other words, is 
stronger, more complex, and more compelling than the scene of her laughter suggests when 
cited without context. Barnes does not make a joke of religion, or empty it of its sacred value, 
such that we should laugh at O’Connor’s private moment in the cathedral. On the contrary, her 
blasphemies resonate precisely because she refuses to do so.8  
Barnes professed an interest in only three topics, “beauty, art and religion”—this last a 
telling disclosure of her veneration for religion itself, despite her irreligious upbringing and lack 
of any clear religious identification. “What do we know of [God’s] design,” Barnes wrote in a 
1936 letter; “it is His, and for that we should be a little reverent” (D, 221, 305). This reverent side 
of Barnes, and of Nightwood, has not been heeded by critics eager to hear peals of liberating 
laughter throughout a darkly comic novel that nonetheless prohibits our laughter at every 
turn—unless perhaps we feel compelled, like O’Connor, “to scream with sobbing laughter,” or 
                                                 
7  Marcus, “Laughing at Leviticus,” 248.  
8  Unlike, say, the novels of Ronald Firbank, Nightwood hardly represents what Ellis Hanson has called “ecclesiastical 
camp”—the sort of fiction in which “Eroticism collapses into aestheticism, and so for that matter does religion” 
(Decadence and Catholicism, 355, 359).  Where Nightwood ends with a scene combining dog, chapel, and erotic 
communion, for example, Firbank’s Eccentricities of Cardinal Pirelli begins there, its first pages depicting a male 
puppy copulating with its father throughout its own baptism—a ceremony that takes place in a church, at the 
hands of a priest, though with white menthe in place of water (Five Novels, 290-91). (“Sticky stuff,” an onlooker 
reflects [311].) For Firbank, little is at stake in such a scene beyond its mischievous drollery; in Nightwood’s 
conclusion, as we will discover, everything is at stake. 
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like protagonist Nora Flood to “lean forward and laugh with terror” (141, 165).9 Yet I would 
also caution against the reading, common in an older generation of critics and more recently 
espoused by Barnes’s biographer Phillip Herring, that Nightwood’s “satirical thrust” serves 
merely as a distraction from what is “essentially a tragic novel” (D, 203). I would suggest rather 
that such a hierarchy of terms does not find sanction in Nightwood.  Like the striking tableau 
with which it ends—and like Matthew O’Connor in the sanctuaries of the religion that he loves, 
fears, and profanes in equal measure—Nightwood “essentially” is both tragedy and satire, 
lamentation and affirmation, “obscene and touching” (N, 170). 
The danger of both Marcus’s and Herring’s critical positions—what we might call the 
manic and the depressive—lies partly in the way they lend themselves to a reading of the novel 
that reifies the pseudoscientific concept of sexual inversion as much as Krafft-Ebing did, and 
Havelock Ellis, and Radclyffe Hall. Inversion, in such readings, becomes either a rallying cry or 
a source of the kinds of anguish familiar from The Well of Loneliness. The reality is that in 
Nightwood, inversion and related concepts become sites of contestation, resistance, and by-turns 
playful and sardonic profanation; Barnes recasts the sexological bywords for non-normative 
desire in blasphemously sacramental terms which transcend and critique the lexicon of 
inversion. Whereas The Well of Loneliness “mimetically scripts an easily identifiable—and all too 
easily policed—homosexual underworld,” as Scott Herring argues, “Barnes dares disown this 
progress.” She “battle[s] against—not over—homosexual legibility and recognition.”10 
Blasphemy, I submit, is Barnes’s preferred weapon in this battle, the principal means—in 
accordance with its trademark inversions of the sacred—by which Barnes turns contemporary 
sexology on its head. 
                                                 
9  Or, for that matter, to share “the amused grim chuckle of a person who looks up to discover that they have 
coincided with the needs of nature in a bird” (N, 53).  
10  Herring, Queering the Underworld, 174, 155. For a more sympathetic reading of Hall’s use of the “essentialist 
discourse” of inversion, see Heather Love, Feeling Backward, 100-28. 
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Likewise, it is blasphemy’s ambivalent tendency to affirm, while desecrating, the sacred 
that produces the tonal ambivalences in much of Barnes’s work. As Kenneth Burke recognized 
in his seminal reading of Nightwood, Barnes makes “lamentation a source of pleasure for the 
reader”—since, after all, “a literary jeremiad must somehow be fun.”11 In a related recognition, 
Emily Coleman observed that Barnes’s “greatest gift” was to “make horror beautiful”—a less 
religious formulation than Burke’s, ironically, given Coleman’s insistence in an unpublished 
review that Nightwood be read as “the religious book of their generation,” even “a Catholic 
sermon” (D, 254).12 In any case, both observations get to the heart of the world as Barnes depicts 
it: “damned and undamned, blessed and cursed,” “holy unholy,” “clean and unclean” (R, 133-
34). Barnes seeks, in the registers of profanation, to convey these eternal ambivalences, 
“blaspheming in fairness and foulness” (134). Nightwood especially is a work of “gross 
splendour,” “cold yet hysterical abandon,” and “awful happiness,” a novel in which down 
means up, in which dirt cleanses and “obscurity . . . illuminates” (1, 2, 64). In this novel Barnes 
sounds tirelessly the motif of inversion, construed variously as anatomical, sexual, and 
theological—not to mention syntactical.13 Inversion is the form, finally, that Nightwood’s biblical 
typologies take: the birth of Robin Vote’s son, Guido, issues in an inverted travesty of the 
Nativity, while Robin’s relationship with Nora Flood—and especially that relationship’s 
shocking conclusion—inverts the typology of Resurrection such that “going down” equates to 
transcendence. These thematics of abjection, of going down, are moreover inextricably 
conjoined to a spiritual or religious narrative of rising up: of “a perverse ‘ascent,’” in Burke’s 
words, “whereby corruption and distinction become interchangeable terms.” Both trajectories 
                                                 
11  Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 241; emphasis in original.  
12 Burke likewise seems to have shared Coleman’s sense of Nightwood’s essential religiosity, arguing that it “takes the 
step from book to Bible” (Language as Symbolic Action, 241)—though a Bible of a radically unorthodox kind, marked 
as it is by a “pervasive overtone of the profane and sacrilegious” (Deborah Parsons, “Djuna Barnes,” 165). 
13  For example: “The autumn, binding him about, as no other season, with racial memories, a season of longing and 
of horror, he had called his weather” (N, 2). 
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will conflate in Nightwood’s final scene, as Robin Vote’s “position of human-to-animal collapse” 
coincides with her “spiritual ascension.”14  
These are the narrative and theological forms of inversion which finally overwhelm any 
of Barnes’s provisional trafficking in the secular vocabularies of early twentieth-century 
sexology. We would nonetheless do well, before turning to Nightwood’s blasphemous 
apotheosis, to consider those vocabularies and the ways Barnes challenges them directly in 
Ladies Almanack and beyond. For if Western societies, as John Addington Symonds wrote in 
1896, have traditionally classed “inverted sexuality . . . among crimes against God, nature, 
humanity, the state,” it is likewise true that blasphemy—a crime ostensibly against the first 
article in that series—has often been perceived, and frequently intended, as a crime against the 
others.15 Thus it was that Joyce, in Ulysses, aligned queer genders and sexualities with 
blasphemous expression and sacrilegious ritual, posing them as allied discourses in critiquing 
repressive ideologies both sacred and secular; and thus it shall prove in the case of Djuna 
Barnes.  
 
The Uses of Inversion 
 “Wried and Awander”: Combating Essentialism 
If for Krafft-Ebing, Ellis, and others, inversion was by and large a matter of innate 
disposition, an inexorable biological aberration, Barnes refused such essentialist constructions of 
sexual identity. “I might be anything,” she wrote to Emily Coleman, reaching, characteristically, 
for a bestial example; “If a horse loved me, I might be that” (D, 59). We can imagine Nightwood’s 
Nora Flood saying much the same thing, and for that matter her lover, Robin Vote, who indeed 
                                                 
14  Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 246; Dana Seitler, “Down on All Fours,” 550. 
15  Symonds, A Problem in Modern Ethics, 6.  
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seems finally attracted to a nonhuman animal. (A dog, let us note: god’s inversion.) Insofar as 
Robin and Nora are “inverts,” in other words, it is a result of what they do—carrying on a 
sexual relationship with each other and, in Robin’s case, with other women—not of what they 
are. Nora, in part a portrait of the author herself, is like Barnes not strictly homosexual; in an 
early draft, she even has two sons (D, 209). For her part, Robin marries a man and bears a son—
even if that child’s nativity seems a slyly blasphemous rewriting of the Virgin Birth, as we have 
seen.16 Moreover, when her most significant erotic encounter with another of God’s creatures 
takes place between herself and a male dog, Robin engages in a theologically inflected 
communion of a sort that secular sexology is not well equipped to explain.17  
Where Nightwood does hint at congenital homosexuality, it does so in an exaggerated 
manner that burlesques the very notion of an inverted or “third” sex. The unsubtly named Frau 
Mann, for example, is a human doll; the impenetrable “bulge” in her “tightly stitched crotch” 
conveys the impression that the “needle that had made one the property of the child made the 
other the property of no man” (13). Here a matter of seemingly biological essentialism is 
overtaken by an emphasis on performance and outward display—Frau Mann is, after all, a 
circus performer—which problematizes her ontological status as invert. Of course, there is also 
Matthew O’Connor, who surrounds himself with feminine paraphernalia, occasionally dresses 
like a woman, and even imagines he is “the last woman left in this world, . . . the bearded lady” 
(N, 100). But Barnes makes O’Connor’s tragicomic flamboyance into a kind of sideshow, one 
that makes a sideshow also of inversion as queer sexuality’s governing trope. Consider the 
satiric literalism of O’Connor’s inversion in Ryder, where he professes to embody “a reversal of 
established order,” being “one of those creatures who have their bottom up instead of their 
                                                 
16  See Introduction. 
17  It does however accord, ironically enough, with Krafft-Ebing’s commentary on women and bestiality in 
Psychopathia Sexualis: “The intercourse of females with beasts is limited to dogs” (375). 
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head” (235). As he says all this, a nearby chamber pot stands inverted, spilling its contents into 
the soil: an implicit commentary, perhaps, on the sexologists’ reifications of sexual identification 
and desire.  
 Barnes additionally lampoons sexual inversion and its overdeterminations via the figure 
of Amelia Ryder’s provincial, conservative sister, whose habits of mind are hopelessly ensnared 
by the vocabularies of inversion and perversion. In a letter that treats the subjects of anal and 
oral sex, for example (“The Royal Guards, ’tis said, can be got at a pound the hour at either 
end”; “Such-like it was, or I am much mistaken, which aroused the attention at Gomorrah”), she 
regrets that Amelia herself could “so inverse her mind” as to endure like treatment at her 
husband Wendell’s hands—as though such sodomy, whether between man and man or man 
and woman, constitutes an inversion of nature that Amelia’s sister quickly links to an inversion 
of the Last Things: “Those bent on heaven and those bent on hell have got fearfully confused as 
to direction, so they do stumble into each other on the way. . . . Therefore imagine, dear sister, 
where we will all land in the end,—somewhere in mid-air, no doubt” (71-74). 
Consider also Ladies Almanack’s Saint Evangeline Musset, born “an Inch or so less” than 
the boy her parents desired (7). As Susan Sniader Lanser observes, Barnes here “rewrites 
Stephen Gordon’s birth in The Well of Loneliness: she too was ‘meant’ to be a son (and like 
Evangeline named with saintliness in mind), but Stephen’s phallic lack becomes Evangeline’s 
signifier of superiority.”18 For Musset blithely declines to regret her lesbianism in any way, 
becoming instead a crusader and merry martyr for “the Single Beatitude” of Sapphic sexuality 
(11). As a young girl she consoles her father: “Am I not doing after your very Desire, and is it 
not the more commendable, seeing that I do it without the Tools for the Trade, and yet nothing 
complain?” (8). No mere Freudian substitution, Musset’s trusty whip more than suffices for the 
                                                 
18  Lanser, Introduction to LA, xxxv. 
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lack of such tools; paying “no Heed to the Error” of her birth, “she took her Whip in hand, 
calling her Pups about her, and so set out upon the Road of Destiny” (7).  
On the whole, Ladies Almanack—“which all Ladies should carry about with them,” 
Barnes writes, “as the Priest his Breviary”—seeks to recast Radclyffe Hall’s novelistic 
presentation of homosexuality, even as it echoes Hall’s interest in biblical typology (9). 
“Written,” Karla Jay observes, “at a time when The Well of Loneliness took an apologetic and 
modest tone toward the subject of lesbians, the Almanack tackles it with frank glee.”19 And 
tackles it, let us add, with a more gleeful adoption of Christian typology and theological tropes. 
Barnes offers a rigorous accounting of Dame Musset’s sainthood (14-17), and of the successes of 
her “Crusade” (34). Musset and her circle speak of themselves as “converts” and “martyrs,” 
“Sisters of Heaven” (35, 38). They even adopt the biblical “I AM” of Jehovah and Christ, while 
enhancing that statement’s inherent egocentrism with an additional affirmation of the first 
person; “I am I!” is their rallying cry (29). In their eyes, Musset—whose visage conveys 
alternately “the look of the Pope” and “the Cunning of a Monk in Holy Orders”—becomes 
“first God, then God Almighty, then God Dumbfounding, and still later God help us, and 
finally God Damn”—this last making her both deity and blasphemy at once (34, 66).  
“I come,” Musset proclaims, “to give you Word”: a formulation that puts an erotic spin 
on the Word of Christian theology (78).20 “What joy has the missionary,” she elaborates, “when 
all the Heathen greet her with Glory Hallelujah! before she opens her Mouth, and with an 
Amen! before she shuts it!” (34). The services her mouth performs are of course not limited to 
the rhetorical, and she extends them democratically to each of those rising “priestesses” who 
                                                 
19  Jay, Foreword to LA, xiii.  
20  Accordingly, Musset dispenses conspicuously Christlike parables: “Recall, and remember, my Love, that the Camel 
is forever facing a Needle, but cannot go through it, and a Woman is much nearer the needle’s proportion in her 
probabilities than a Man” (LA, 50). Musset is a more vengeful redeemer, though, than Christ was, having “hanged, 
cut down, and re-hung Judas a thousand times” (26). 
 172 
    
worship at “the Temple of the Good Dame Musset” (3, 19). Apparently she gives very good 
Word indeed, and even from beyond the grave: this, at least, is the implication of Ladies 
Almanack’s climactic conclusion, an irreverent reiteration of the Holy Spirit’s descent upon the 
Apostles in “tongues like as of fire” (Acts 2:3). As Barnes explains in the paratactic rhythms of 
the King James Bible, Musset’s tongue- and lip-service continues even after her disciples have 
set her deceased body ablaze:   
all had burned but the Tongue, and this flamed, and would not suffer Ash, and it 
played about upon the handful that had been she indeed. . . . Señorita Fly-About 
came down upon that Urn first, and beatitude played and flickered upon her 
Face, and from under her Skirts a slow smoke issued, though no thing burned, 
and the Mourners barked about her covetously. . . (84) 
 
As though taking a cue from her friend Mina Loy (who appears in this text as one Patience 
Scalpel), Barnes stages the Almanack’s structural climax as coterminous with a climax of another 
sort.21 “Beatitude” here is a product of miraculous cunnilingus; “no thing” is a typically 
Elizabethan reference to Señorita Fly-About’s genitalia, which here burns in an ecstasy just this 
side of St. Theresa’s. Observe, too, Barnes’s play on the biblical Burning Bush, which likewise 
flamed without itself being corrupted.  
 If all of this constitutes blasphemy of a playful and highly inventive sort, it also stands as 
a rebuke to the apologetic, melancholic evocations of lesbianism that mark Hall’s 
appropriations of scripture and theology in The Well of Loneliness. For all the tonal ambiguity of 
Ladies Almanack—readers have long debated its status as fond parody or more devious satire of 
Natalie Barney and her circle—the Pentecost which brings this strange book to a close is 
unquestionably affirmative, a joyous communion whose theological dimension is indexed by 
the title of the facing illustration. “MASS,” the caption reads; the picture itself shows Musset’s 
                                                 
21  Patience Scalpel alone, Barnes writes, “could not understand Women and their Ways”—yet her fellow-less 
fellowship with the faithful earns her a qualified sainthood (LA, 11). As she speaks “in that divine and ethereal 
Voice,” her “Ankles are nibbled by the Cherubs” (30). 
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tomb, attended by two disciples-cum-mourners. Inscribed on the tomb is a promise of 
resurrection (“WHEN IVE RISEN / SAY THE PRAYER . . .”), and Musset’s flame burns on: “they took 
the Ashes and the Fire, and placed it on the Altar in the Temple of Love. There it is said, it 
flickers to this day, and one may still decipher the Line, beneath its Handles, ‘Oh ye of little 
Faith’” (84-85).  
By the time she writes Nightwood, Barnes will no longer content herself with depicting 
inversion in such unabashedly affirmative lights, preferring to undermine, to deconstruct the 
dogma of inverted sexuality. But it is in the discourse of yet another Almanack character, Low-
Heel (“bride” of a woman named High-Head), that Barnes most directly skewers the period’s 
conventional understandings of sexuality between women—especially the equation of 
transgender with same-sex desire that the rubric of inversion implies. Indicting the sexologies of 
Ellis and Krafft-Ebing along with their forebears (who treat of such matters “in Tomes with the 
Quill of the Goose that has, with her, been dead a million years, and is Dust with her doings”), 
she wonders, “what have These Scriveners said of her but that she must have had a Testes of 
sorts, however wried and awander; that indeed she was called forth a Man” (53).22 “Wried,” as 
in being wired awry: an essentialist position Barnes pointedly refuses to endorse.  
 
 “Unholy Covenant”: Inversion and the Law of the Father 
According to Ladies Almanack, “The Fourth Great Moment of History”—successor, 
apparently, to the Three Moments Matthew O’Connor describes in Ryder—consists of a biblical 
conversion to lesbianism, as Jezebel seduces the Queen of Sheba and in turn is seduced away 
                                                 
22  Such assumptions are of a piece, High-Head responds, with overarching androcentric ideologies of gender, which 
at best can “admit [women] to sense through the masculine door” (LA, 53). To the faculty of “Good Woman’s 
reasoning,” as Ryder’s narrator laments, “no Credence has been given by Philosopher or Scribe down through the 
very ageless ages” (28). In Amelia Ryder’s curt formulation: “To man is the vision, to his wife the droppings!”—
even if, in her opinion, “reason” is a thing “born from between two women” (114, 148).  
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from men forever (41).23 This theme of converted royalty recurs in the Almanack in the form of  a 
“Queen, who in the Night turned down / The spikës of her Husband’s Crown / Therein to sit 
her Wench of Bliss” (60). This monarch’s nocturnal turn to sexual inversion involves a 
metonymic, and at the same time literal, inversion: the upending of man’s crown, and with it of 
phallic authority and enforced heterosexuality. On the facing page, a woodcut depicts a literally 
inverted angel, a woman—unlike the male angels that predominate in Jewish and Christian 
scriptures—hanging upside down, one breast bared, her halo dangling below her at the bottom 
of the picture (61). The juxtaposition of image and text here bespeaks Barnes’s persistent use of 
theological inversion—of blasphemy—to frame her critiques, not just of modern sexology, but 
also of androcentrism, of heteronormativity, and of the religious structures that underlie and 
enforce them.    
Hence the Almanack’s founding myth of Creation, “the part about Heaven that has never 
been told” (25). “After the Fall of Satan,” Barnes writes, all the heavenly Hosts  
gathered together, so close that they were not recognizable, one from the other. 
And not nine Months later, there was heard under the Dome of Heaven a great 
Crowing, and from the Midst, an Egg, as incredible as a thing forgotten, fell to 
Earth, and striking, split and hatched, and from out of it stepped one saying 
“Pardon me, I must be going!” And this was the first Woman born with a 
Difference. (25-26) 
 
“A thing forgotten,” a story “that has never been told”: here is a genesis narrative left out of 
Genesis along with the tail of Lilith, another woman born not, like Eve, “out of a man with his 
rib sticking in her side!” (R, 44). In this case we are given Woman with a Difference, a difference 
that indexes both her erotic inclinations and her difference from biblical idealizations of woman 
subordinated to man. This creature’s first utterance expresses agency, independence, non 
                                                 
23  The first “Great Moment” occurs when Cleopatra, her “mother instinct” kicking in, lifts an asp to her nipple as 
though to breastfeed it. When it delivers its fatal bite, she emits a blasphemous moan both of surprise and of 
pleasure: “ooooooooOOOO Jesus!” (R, 229). That Cleopatra’s death preceded the birth of Jesus does not seem to 
bother O’Connor in the slightest. 
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serviam. Her Fall, unlike Lucifer’s or Adam and Eve’s, is originary; she is its product, in other 
words, not its agent or victim, and she is free to strike her own course—a bit like Saint Musset 
or, for that matter, like writers such as Barnes and Mina Loy.  
 Ryder features yet another rewriting of Creation, this one from the mouth of one Molly 
Dance, a happily promiscuous woman whose many sons are all given to “blaspheming,” and 
who herself specializes in drawing portraits of Christ “in a gunny sack” (192). Molly authors her 
own pseudo-Christian theology. It begins, like the Bible, “In the beginning,” but from that point 
diverges sharply (195). Jonah here is “the First Man, all decked out in olive branches and briars, 
and a crown of thorns”; Caesar, not Judas, is “the betrayer of Jesus” (194-95). Evolution becomes 
an easy component of this tale, as Jonah’s original exterior of fish-scales turns to feathers, then 
fur, and finally “skin, which was as good as a hint at the human” (195). Most pertinently, Molly 
insists that Original Sin “was not a woman’s”; the episode involved an apple, she affirms, “but 
man it was who snapped it up, scattering the seeds, and these he uses to this day to get his sons 
by” (197-98).  
If, in Molly’s cosmology, men’s malignant urge to procreate supersedes any sinful desire 
for Knowledge on women’s part, the same can be said for the private passion-plays Barnes 
constructs in her works around figures of the lustful and predacious father—especially Wendell 
Ryder and, in her 1958 drama The Antiphon, the dead patriarch Titus Hobbs. The latter work’s 
title, ecclesiastical in origin, speaks rather directly to the play’s objective: to articulate, in 
frequently theological and often blasphemous fashion, an irreverent counterdiscourse aimed at 
male-dominated institutions of oppression. Its setting conflates two such institutions, the 
Church and the family home; like Nightwood’s finale, The Antiphon plays out in a decayed holy 
space, but in this case it is also the former home of the Hobbs family, Burley Hall, once “a 
college of chantry priests” (A, 80). It is stewarded by Miranda Hobbs’s uncle, who “Studied for 
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the ministry . . . and didn’t make it”; “The wall is chapped where once the altar stood, / The 
basin dry” (103, 82).  
At the center of this pseudo-Jacobean drama is an “unholy covenant,” one “Sealed by 
the jaw-bone of an ass” (97). The covenant in question is that of the Hobbs family, modeled 
quite clearly on Barnes’s own; the ass in question is Titus, the deceased father on whose sinister 
memory the play frequently hinges. In notes she wrote for The Antiphon’s first staging, Barnes 
explained that all the Hobbs children “had been brought up on the faith,” by which she meant 
the doctrine of free love that Barnes’s own father and grandmother, Wald and Zadel, had so 
zealously espoused (D, 271). Espoused, that is, even to the point of inducting a teenaged Djuna, 
against her will, into its ranks—and at the hands of a much older man, possibly Wald himself, 
though more likely a neighbor recruited to the task.24 Calling himself “Titus Adam” and his 
home “Hobb’s Ark,” making each of his wives and lovers a “Carrion Eve,” Titus is said to have 
cast himself as both Adam and Noah, seeking to populate the world with his progeny (193-94). 
In his own eyes, he was also crusader and martyr for this sacred undertaking, no less than was 
St. Stephen to his:  
Titus, self-appointed bray of heaven; 
Wived in righteous plenty; populated. 
Thought himself as dedicate as Stephen 
That crusading infant long before him. (208) 
His son Dudley remembers him as a “Puritan too close to his apostasy, / A moralist!”—an 
ironically puritanical zealot for the polygamous doctrine whose sanction he found, conveniently 
enough, in such biblical passages as Gen. 30:26—while another son, Elisha, wonders, “Is it 
possible we’re father’s blasphemy?” (160, 144, 100). Titus’s wives, in any case, adhered readily 
enough to the family dogma, “Swallowing, at a gulp, the Trinity— / Father, son and most 
                                                 
24 Although she always blamed the rape to some degree on her father, Barnes gave conflicting accounts of the actual 
perpetrator’s identity (D, 268-71). 
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unholy cause” (161). Much of this chimes readily with Ryder’s depiction of Wendell, “Prophet in 
the wilderness,” who frames his reproductive compulsion as a divine mission: “I replenish the 
world. I have the spirit and the works” (18, 160). The result, purportedly, of an immaculate 
conception, the spirit of Ludwig van Beethoven having played the Holy Spirit’s part (“it was no 
cohabitation,” his mother says of the miracle, “it was an infusion”), Wendell bestrides the novel 
as a larger-than-life figure portrayed in eschatological terms (36). His “thundering male parts” 
resemble “a terrible anvil, whereon one beats out the resurrection and the death” (42)—death 
here pointedly replacing the life of John 11:25.  
It is The Antiphon, though, that serves as Barnes’s most damning response to 
Titus/Wald’s warped liturgy of patriarchal violence, and to the self-righteous enforcement of 
“free” love. An early draft portrays a version of Barnes’s own childhood rape with chilling 
effect, describing a young Miranda Hobbs—the play’s protagonist—“crawling” away from the 
scene of her defilement, “Dragging small blood, and her fathers laughter. / Who, having failed 
to make her mutton to himself, / That impious, and unhallowed man, / Tossed her a Cockney, 
thrice her age” (D, 272). The play’s final text works more explicitly to cast the rape as sacrilege, a 
profanation like that of the Black Mass, and like the Black Mass it turns “up-side-down” the 
object of its desecration—in this case Miranda’s violated body:  
As in a profaned monstrance, see conspire 
The fighting shadow of the Devil and the Daughter.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Miranda damned, with instep up-side-down, 
Dragging rape-blood behind her, like the snail (185) 
Miranda later echoes the imagery of a profaned monstrance, indicting her family for having “set 
the canine tooth / Into the Host; / I’ve heard them lapping at the wound” (216). “Canine” puns 
on the pack of dogs, her father and mother and brothers, that snap at her heels from beginning 
to end; given the hell into which Miranda was born, that very birth constituted her personal 
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Fall, as she explains to her mother: “A door slammed on Eden, and the Second Gate, / And I 
walked down your leg” (195). Now, as she walks onto the stage of The Antiphon, she returns as 
both “Inquisitor” and “scapegoat,” bringing with her a “Day of Wrath” (195-97). She returns, 
that is, in the form of a “damned dark Beatitude,” to indict her tormentors and also to fulfill her 
role as sacrificial victim (203). The play ends, as Louise DeSalvo rightly observes, with a 
substitution of “the murdered and molested body and rape-blood of Miranda for the body and 
blood of Christ.”25 Yet Miranda’s sacrificial going-down at play’s end—as her mother brains her 
with the curfew-bell and both women fall to their deaths—provides not the slightest glimmer of 
hope or transcendence (223). Evidently the sins of the father cannot be redeemed, at least not 
when that father is Titus Hobbs.   
 
Nightwood’s Paradoxy  
The Antiphon is without question a very dark work, utterly devoid of redemption as well 
as of the comic spirit that animates Ladies Almanack and even much of Ryder. Nightwood is a 
different matter altogether. Tonally and generically, it conjoins the comedy of the Almanack and 
the tragedy of The Antiphon; thematically and stylistically, it fuses the latter work’s pervasive 
concern with degradation and profanation to the vision of transcendence that terminates the 
former. In keeping with blasphemy’s essential ambivalence, Nightwood both affirms and 
desecrates, culminating with a sacrilegious rite which, as in The Antiphon, comprises a profane 
act of “going down”—though this time with the paradoxical implication of coming up—or at 
least, in Kenneth Burke’s inspired phrase, of a “transcendence downward.”26 
                                                 
25  DeSalvo, “‘To Make Her Mutton at Sixteen,’” 315. Miranda’s brother Dudley seems to register her role as sacrificial 
lamb when he tells her (“Hypocritically”), “Don’t misunderstand, we loved the  lamb— / Till she turned mutton” (A, 
147; emphasis added).  
26  Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 244. 
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Paradox likewise attends Nightwood’s Matthew O’Connor, as it does the novel his voice 
so often dominates. Here is a man, Ryder tells us, whose Catholic piety is so great he cannot help 
blaspheming a priest who asks him if he was brought up in the church: “No, and damn your 
eyes! says I, I’ve come to it with a free heart” (137). A “Sodomite,” “abominable among the 
filthy people,” a local convent’s go-to abortionist, O’Connor is at the same time an abject Christ 
figure whom Nightwood last depicts in a crucifixion pose, “his arms spread, his head between 
them, his eyes wide open and crying” (N, 93, 114, 165). He longs, at least, to be Christ’s favorite 
saint (“I have read that John was his favourite, and it should have been me, Prester Matthew!”) 
or, failing that, his brother: “Mother of God! I wanted to be your son—the unknown beloved 
second would have done!” (96, 150). In an unforgettable image we are told that he bathes in a 
church’s “holy water stoup as if he were its single and beholden bird” (29). And yet he stands in 
a decidedly vexed, even fatalistic relation to the religion he loves and fears, as to the God he 
both worships and resents. During the nights he can be found “staring up at the huge towers of 
the church . . . running a thick warm finger around his throat,” as though the Church is his 
inevitable guillotine—a gesture echoing his traumatic experience with a literal executioner who 
made this same gesture to O’Conner’s throat (29-30, 24). Similarly, he makes a kind of parable 
out of his recollection of an Irishman sending up pious avowals (“Glory be to Jesus!”) while 
being defecated upon by a cow: for O’Connor, being a good Christian requires such personal 
degradation (22). Accordingly, in spite of his Catholicism, he living among “incredible . . . 
disorder” in an “appallingly degraded” room redolent of “venery”; a “swill-pail stood at the 
head of the bed, brimming with abominations” (78-79).  
“None of the doctor’s methods being orthodox,” O’Connor’s innumerable heresies 
emerge, often, as simple inversions of orthodoxy (33). His “great virtue,” he explains, “is that I 
never use the derogatory in the usual sense”—for according to his largely inverted order of 
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values the derogatory assumes a positive and even redemptive valence (116-17). Such is the 
heterodoxy of his private “dogma,” which for example upends the Christian beliefs in both 
inborn sin and infinite grace, offering instead inborn innocence and no hope of salvation: “Man 
was born damned and innocent from the start” (31, 121). He similarly inverts the Christian 
cosmology of heaven and hell, telling Nora, “Let go Hell; and your fall will be broken by the 
roof of Heaven” (124). Holy and abominable, sacred and profane, O’Connor is Nightwood’s 
resident father-confessor as well as its prophet of inversion—an oracular role at which Barnes 
hints by having him keen to God by His several Hebrew names (with, naturally, a couple of 
blasphemous non-sequiturs thrown in): “Jehovah, Sabaoth, Elohim, Eloi, Helion, Jodhevah, 
Shaddai!” (91).  
The quality that most clearly aligns O’Connor with the biblical prophetic tradition, 
though, is his own gift for prophecy, a prognostic prowess that he displays throughout 
Nightwood. Guido Volkbein, the novel’s travestied Christ-child, fulfills O’Connor’s prophetic 
warning to Felix that “the last child born to aristocracy is sometimes an idiot. . . . [W]e go up—
but we come down” (40). In a related prophecy, O’Connor correctly foretells that Felix will take 
to drinking (19-20, 23, 120). But most of the doctor’s visions come to pass only in the final 
chapter, “The Possessed,” a fact that speaks to that chapter’s telic, indeed apocalyptic 
positioning within the narrative. For instance: speaking to Nora of Robin and of Robin’s new 
lover, Jenny Petherbridge, O’Connor predicts that “in the end,” the three women will “all be 
locked together, like the poor beasts that get their antlers mixed and are found dead that way, 
their heads fattened with a knowledge of each other they never wanted, having had to 
contemplate each other, head-on and eye to eye, until death” (100). “The Possessed” bears out 
this prediction with some variation: another sort of “poor beast” takes Jenny’s place in the triad, 
and it is with this animal that Robin meets “head-on and eye to eye,” while Nora alone is left to 
 181 
    
contemplate their strange ritual, her head fattened with a knowledge she never wanted or 
imagined. This last scene also fulfills the prophecy with which O’Connor closed the 
“Watchman” chapter: “though those two [Nora and Robin] are buried at opposite ends of the 
earth, one dog will find them both” (106; emphasis added).  
Likewise, “The Possessed” fulfills O’Connor’s prescient association, early in the novel, of 
royalty, bestiality, church, and profanation. Kings command their subjects’ submission, 
O’Connor explains, because they have been 
set apart as the one dog who need not regard the rules of the house, they are so 
high that they can defame God and foul their rafters! . . . The people love their 
church and know it, as a dog knows where he was made to conform, and there 
he returns by his instinct. But to the graver permission, the king, the tsar, the 
emperor, who may relieve themselves on high heaven—to them they bow 
down—only. (39) 
 
O’Connor here articulates many of the preoccupations of Nightwood’s haunting final pages: the 
people “bow down” to their king because he is “the one dog” who can blaspheme (“defame 
God”) and defile (“foul their rafters,” “relieve themselves on high heaven”) with impunity. As 
the doctor’s monologues in “Watchman, What of the Night?” progress, the seemingly cosmic 
contours of “the night”—an elastic trope for irrationality, sin, sadness, liberation, and 
transgression—begin to telescope into this one specific night, “the night of nights”: “It’s all of a 
certain night that I’m coming to . . . the particular night you want to know about . . . the one 
particular night that makes all other nights seem like something quite decent enough” (89, 97, 
99). His commentary here assumes an indeterminate temporality that further aligns him with 
the biblical tradition, prompting a paradox of meaning and time analogous to the Christian 
theological quandary over realized versus futuristic eschatology—over, that is, the question 
whether the events depicted in Revelation have already happened or are yet to come. Here in 
full prophetic mode, O’Connor seems on the cusp of describing a future occasion that awaits 
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Nora; as it happens, he instead begins to tell of the night when Robin met Jenny Petherbridge, 
and more particularly of their strange mutual going-down in the carriage—a rite that 
transparently prefigures the language and action of “The Possessed.”27  
That O’Connor’s monologues so often prophesy Nightwood’s enigmatic conclusion 
confirms the error of the novel’s promoter and editor, T. S. Eliot, whose enchantment with those 
monologues equaled his insistence that Barnes should excise “The Possessed” entirely.28 It also 
clarifies the conviction behind Barnes’s refusal, despite her typical willingness to comply with 
Eliot’s and others’ suggested deletions, to end the novel in any other way. For one thing, 
without “The Possessed,” Nightwood would conclude with O’Connor’s dramatic lamentation at 
the close of “Go Down, Matthew” (“‘Now,’ he said, ‘the end—mark my words—now nothing, 
but wrath and weeping!’”)—which would destroy the tonal ambivalence which Nightwood’s 
blasphemies work sedulously to sustain throughout. For “The Possessed” does give us an end 
that transcends mere lamentation, that transcends a mode of degradation and profanation that 
would signify only “nothing.” At the same time, it also takes the novel’s core theme of 
inversion—with all its sexual, theological, and profanatory freight—to its logical conclusion. 
This final chapter stands as inversion’s, and Nightwood’s, Revelation; in her ritual going-down 
with a dog in a chapel, Robin Vote ensures that the erotic “inversion” of her affair with Nora 
finds its telos in an inversion of another, more universal and more eminently transgressive sort.  
                                                 
27  “Robin began to go forward . . . as if she had no will, sinking down in the small carriage, her knees on the floor, her 
head forward. . . . and as she sank, Jenny also, as if compelled, . . . leaned forward and over, so that when the whole 
of the gesture was completed, Robin’s hands were covered by Jenny’s slight and bending breast, caught in between 
the bosom and the knees” (N, 76). As in “The Possessed,” Barnes here atomizes her characters, paying minute 
attention to body-parts—knees, heads, hands, and bosoms—rather than to the overall arrangement of the two 
bodies, making it difficult to decipher what exactly transpires in this erotically suggestive yet opaque scene of 
women coming bodily together. (Nightwood will end with the awkward arrangement of a dog’s head lying “flat 
along her knees” as Robin crouches on the floor [170].)  
28  To his credit, Eliot recants in his introduction to the published novel, saying that while he had once thought “it was 
the doctor alone who gave the book its vitality,” he is “now convinced that the final chapter is essential” (N, xii).  
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Going down—both the activity and the phrase, in its various conjugations—recurs with 
notable frequency in Barnes’s writing, often in overtly theological and sexual contexts. This is 
true of each of her major works, though truest of Nightwood, a novel dominated by the voice of 
O’Connor, “an angel on all fours . . . going down face foremost, drinking the waters of night at 
the water hole of the damned” (95). O’Connor so honors the Bible’s commandments, he 
explains, that he not only loves his neighbor but “go[es] down together” with him (153). And 
when he tells of the time he “went down” to a church where he could “be alone like an animal,” 
he again foreshadows Robin Vote’s eventual going-down like an animal in an old Protestant 
chapel—her version of the self-abjection with which both O’Connor and Felix Volkbein exit the 
novel (131).29 Going down’s ubiquity is particularly noteworthy in the work of an author whose 
prose is otherwise so inventive and various. The standard sexual meaning was indeed operative 
during the period in which Barnes wrote,30 but the phrase inevitably also recalls certain of its 
more conspicuous uses in the Bible: God’s commandment to Moses (Ex. 19:21), on which the 
title of Nightwood’s chapter “Go Down, Matthew” is predicated, and likewise His directive to 
Jacob/Israel that he “go down into Egypt; for I will there make of thee a great nation” (Gen. 
46:3). In Nightwood, such sexual and theological contexts overtake and subsume inversion’s 
secular meanings. Hence the novel’s central figure of Robin Vote, up-ender of Creation, “always 
holding God’s bag of tricks upside down” (113). To invert, to be an “invert,” to go down or be 
gone down on, or with: these things never lose their erotic meanings in Nightwood, but they do 
shed their narrow sexological determinism as they acquire fully apocalyptic and eschatological 
dimensions.  
                                                 
29  In Felix’s final appearance, “he turned and made a slight bow, his head in his confusion making a complete half-
swing, as an animal will turn its head from a human, as if in mortal shame” (N, 123). The bow and the turning of 
the head presage “The Possessed,” with Robin’s self-abjection and “her head turned completely sideways” (169-
70). O’Connor too exits by “going down” at the end of “Go Down, Matthew.” 
30  Henry N. Cary’s 1916 dictionary The Slang of Venery defines “Go down” in its current sexual sense (O.E.D.).  
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When God Meets Dog: Blasphemy, Inversion, and the Nonhuman 
From her entrance in the novel onward, Robin’s “Christian proclivities” seem doomed to 
converge with her inexorable attraction to and for the “debased” (44, 42). And indeed they do, 
quite dramatically, in Nightwood’s “final pages of horror, sinister and incomprehensible in 
implication,” as a contemporary reviewer described them.31 Robin prepares for this apocalyptic 
finale with the ambivalence of the blasphemer, “going into many out-of-the-way churches,” 
where she adopts alternately the posture of the faithful—“her hands folded at their length, her 
head bent”—and the attitude of “one renouncing something” (167). Entering each place of 
worship “like a housewife come to set straight disorder in an unknown house,” she offers her 
lighted tapers to the altars (167). Nonetheless, suspecting Robin of “wickedness” and of 
“sensuous communion with unclean spirits,” Jenny Petherbridge takes it upon herself to set 
right Robin’s intrusion into these Christian sanctuaries; following ever close behind, she sneaks 
Robin’s tapers from their sconces, blows them out, and lights them anew (167-68).  
Eventually Robin takes to roaming the forests, “frighten[ing] the woods into silence with 
her breathing” and “circl[ing] closer and closer” to Nora’s house in rural New York (168). 
Occasionally she even sleeps in the “decaying chapel” nearby (168). Relic of the area’s Puritan 
settlers, those men and women with “the calk of prayers thrust in the heart” (51), the church 
serves pointedly as the sanctuary in which Robin enacts Nightwood’s weird conclusion:  
On a contrived altar, before a Madonna, two candles were burning. . . . Robin 
began going down. Sliding down she went; down, her hair swinging, her arms 
held out, and the dog stood there, rearing back, his forelegs slanting; his paws 
trembling under the trembling of his rump, his hackle standing; his mouth open, 
his tongue slung sideways over his sharp bright teeth; whining and waiting. And 
down she went, until her head swung against his; on all fours now, dragging her 
knees. The veins stood out in her neck, under her ears, swelled in her arms, and 
wide and throbbing rose up on her fingers as she moved forward.  
                                                 
31  Rose C. Feld, qtd. in Jane Marcus, “Mousemeat,” 197. 
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The dog, quivering in every muscle, sprang back, his tongue a stiff 
curving terror in his mouth . . . as she came on, whimpering too, coming 
forward, her head turned completely sideways, grinning and whimpering. . . . 
Then she began to bark also, crawling after him—barking in a fit of laughter, 
obscene and touching. (169-70) 
 
Barnes’s original typescript of this chapter, which describes either Robin or the dog—the 
wording is dubious—as the other’s “mistress,” impressed Emily Coleman as overtly sexual. It 
also rather forcefully struck Coleman, as well as fellow draft-readers Peggy Guggenheim and 
Edwin Muir, as implying masturbation on Nora’s part (“With a quick involuntary gesture Nora 
put her hands on the fore parts of her legs, bending forward . . .”).32 Even in the published 
version, of course, the ending is sexually suggestive enough, paying sensuous attention to open 
mouths and tongues, to the “quivering” and “trembling” of playful anticipation. Aside from the 
erotic connotations of Robin’s “going down” and the provocative sight of a woman “grinning 
and whimpering” on all fours, Barnes also gives us a series of phallic images: an erect hackle, a 
“stiff curving terror” in a mouth, and Robin’s “wide and throbbing” veins that swell and rise 
up. Taken together, these textual cues convey the potential for a hyper-literalized coitus more 
ferarum.33  
More important, for our purposes, is the staging. Barnes’s decision to set Nightwood’s 
climax of abjection inside a church, backlit by candles burning on an altar before an image of the 
Virgin, imbues the scene with the atmosphere of a Black Mass, featuring the crouching Robin as 
a kind of human altar that enlists Nora’s dog as profane priest. Like Joyce in Ulysses, Barnes 
positions the Black Mass as a narrative climax, pressing this favorite modernist trope further 
                                                 
32  Cheryl J. Plumb, ed., “Nightwood”: The Original Version, 185, 210 
33  The whiff of this particular transgression perhaps accounts for the common refrain among the novel’s 
contemporary reviewers that the final chapter leaves the realm of all propriety and overreaches the bounds of 
acceptable aesthetics. Rose C. Feld wrote upon Nightwood’s American publication that the novel’s “final pages of 
horror” are its only flaw, while A. Desmond Hawkins similarly concluded that, despite the fact that Nightwood 
“undoubtedly dwarfs all recent fiction,” “the brief last chapter . . . seems to me to fail” (Marcus, “Mousemeat” 197, 
202). Hawkins’s purportedly technical critique that “The Possessed” marks “the only major occasion when action 
overweighs analysis” betrays a visceral intolerance of the ending’s profanatory content (202).   
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even than Mina Loy does in Songs to Joannes. What Joyce and Loy hold in common is an 
intrusion of the erotic body into sacred spaces, a transgression Barnes exacerbates by shattering 
the boundaries between human and beast and hinting at a rather extreme form of interspecies 
“Communion.” In Nightwood’s least forgettable image, Robin meets Nora’s dog in a headlock, 
the two of them on all fours, “moving head to head,” their craniums forming a fulcrum around 
which their bodies perform their strange dance (170). The dog keeps “his head toward her,” 
“running with her, head-on with her head”—until both animals give up, relenting into an iconic 
and monumental stasis, Robin “lying out, her hands beside her, her face turned and weeping; 
and the dog [lying] down, his eyes bloodshot, his head flat along her knees” (170). The aura of 
imminence so palpable here is made more explicit in Barnes’s original typescript, which baldly 
encourages a reading that the published Nightwood merely leaves open: the possibility that 
Robin’s blasphemous degradation has yet farther depths to plumb. Rather than leaving us with 
the indeterminate image of the dog’s “head flat along her knees,” Barnes’s original version 
concludes with an intimation of something more—something perhaps truly un-writable—to 
come: “the dog . . . lay down, his head flat along her knees, his eyes bloodshot, and waiting.”34  
These final words would certainly accord with the enigmatic temporality that clings to 
Robin’s character throughout. Despite her apparent embodiment of an atavistic past—an 
“infected carrier of the past,” she carries “the quality of the ‘way back’ as animals do,” “like a 
person who comes from some place that we have forgotten”—she nonetheless inhabits an 
impossible futurity (37, 40, 118). She moves in a continually deferred future tense, the always 
not-yet of apocalyptic time. “Apocalypse is never now,” in the words of  J. Hillis Miller. “It is 
always to come, a thing of the future, both infinitely distant and immediately imminent.”35 
                                                 
34  Plumb, ed., “Nightwood,” 186; emphasis added. 
35  Miller, Others, 117. 
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Perpetually “waiting to begin,” Robin is likewise “a catastrophe that had yet no beginning” (N, 
155, 48). Her voice intimates “postponed abandon” (38). She has “the face of an incurable yet to 
be stricken with its malady,” and she appropriately becomes—for Nora—like an amputated 
hand that “is experiencing a futurity” (41, 59). Robin functions in the continuous past and future 
of apocalyptic time, “anchored in anticipation and regret,” but apparently unmoored from the 
present (60). She is never now.  
Accordingly, Barnes frames Nightwood’s central relationship, Robin’s strained union 
with Nora Flood, in apocalyptic terms. Like O’Connor’s prophecies and pronouncements, this 
relationship tends irrevocably toward its, and the novel’s, culminating rite of sacrilegious 
revelation. Ever the “early Christian,” Nora awaits the imminent Day of Judgment, imagining 
the fate of their relationship in the Second Coming: “In the resurrection, when we come up 
looking backward at each other, I shall know you alone of all that company. My ear shall turn in 
the socket of my head; my eyeballs loosened where I am the whirlwind about that cashed 
expense, my foot stubborn on the cast of your grave” (51, 58-59). What Nora does not 
understand is that Robin’s will be an embodied transcendence in fundamental conflict with the 
disembodied resurrection Nora imagines; Robin will not whirl free of “that cashed expense” but 
instead, like the speaker of Loy’s Songs to Joannes, will transcend in and through her very 
embodiment. In any case, the apocalypse accompanies these two women: “Death went with 
them, together and alone,” we are told in the language of Revelation, “and with the torment and 
catastrophe, thoughts of resurrection, the second duel” (58). The scene in the decaying chapel 
either enacts or merely commences this second duel, bringing an uncertain “resurrection” of 
Robin and Nora’s relationship and a more certain resurrection of the beast within Robin, which, 
now nakedly unleashed, unfolds before Nora’s eyes as a horrible unveiling, a revelation that yet 
raises more questions than it answers—a “‘second coming,’” as Judith Lee argues, “that denies 
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the possibility of ending.”36 As ever in the case of apocalyptic time, “the coming is always to 
come”: a Derridean formulation that captures both the temporality and the erotics of revelation 
that Robin embodies.37 Her suggestive yet impenetrable gesture of (be)coming leaves us, like 
Nora and her dog, “waiting” for this gesture’s meaning, for the revelation that will clarify yet 
will always be “to come.”  
Yet for all this indeterminacy, “The Possessed” nonetheless marks the logical terminus 
of Nightwood’s converging thematics of inversion and “going down,” and of its overarching 
narrative investments in the sexual and the theological. In doing so, Nightwood’s final chapter 
takes inversion in directions unknown to conventional sexology, and even hints at taking it 
beyond the human; among other things, Robin’s blasphemous barking at novel’s end 
dramatizes what Georges Bataille called one of transgression’s “most obvious characteristics,” 
its “alliance with animal nature.”38 Indeed, in preparation for her climactic sacrilege, Robin has 
taken to “speaking in a low voice to the animals,” and she confronts these unspecified beasts as 
though confronting the emerging beast within: “Those that came near, she grasped, straining 
their fur back until their eyes were narrowed and their teeth bare, her own teeth showing as if 
her hand were upon her own neck” (168; emphasis added).  
Such bestial identification is not without precedent in Barnes’s fiction. In Ryder, for 
instance, Amelia Ryder dreams of “a great fair ox” entering her bedroom—a room bedecked, in 
the tradition of so many Barnes interiors, with an icon of Christ and with tapestries depicting 
                                                 
36  Lee, “Nightwood,” 214. 
37  Jacques Derrida, “Of an Apocalyptic Tone,” 54. As Derrida notes, the Bible’s apocalyptic unveilings often take the 
form of literal denudings, from Ham’s accidental crime against his father Noah to the peculiar emphasis on visual 
discovery in the incest prohibitions of Leviticus. Sexual and apocalyptic revelation go hand in hand, it seems, right 
through the great whore of Revelation. 
38  Bataille, Erotism, 136.  
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scenes from Genesis (99).39 The ox proceeds to lie beside Amelia in bed, demanding recognition 
for his bestial existence in echoes of the biblical “I AM”: “I am also,” he explains; “Give me a 
place in your God, or I go to acquaint him that I am” (99). The scene is readable as a plea against 
speciesism that resonates with Radclyffe Hall’s theologically couched plea for sexual 
recognition in The Well of Loneliness; as God IS, these texts both insist, so I AM.40 Ryder also 
contains another embedded narrative of bestial communion, Wendell Ryder’s Chaucerian tale 
of Pennyfinder the Bull. According to Wendell, Pennyfinder was a gigantic, “besainted” beast 
who blessed the townsfolk with his urine and feces—“His leggës lifted, benedicité!”—and then 
gave himself eucharistically to their devouring: “And when his body was y-served for sup, / 
Why then, God wot, no soul but ate it up!” (63-64). Wendell closes this narrative, as Barnes 
closes Robin Vote’s, with the image of a wordless, eye-to-eye rite between human and beast; 
instead of the bull, however, it is Wendell’s horse that calmly rises up on two legs—a 
“miracle”—and rests his front hooves significantly on his master’s shoulders (68). Like the story 
of Amelia and the ox, Wendell’s encounter with his horse presages Nightwood’s conclusion, 
although there of course the miracle is inverted; instead of a beast rising up to commune with 
man, Robin goes down to commune with a beast, both parties perhaps seeking the  recognition 
implicit in the ox’s “I am also.”  
Robin’s sacrilegious rite seems to propel her, as it were, to the other side—to a pagan 
sense of beasts as sacred. “As soon as human beings give rein to animal nature,” writes Bataille, 
“we enter the world of transgression . . . a sacred world, a world of holy things.”41 If religion 
                                                 
39  Barnes herself decorated in this fashion while living with Thelma Wood, the model for Robin Vote. Their rooms 
contained a portrait of St. Stephen, “church roses in tinsel, one church runner over the mantel, and one china 
Virgin. There were many books on Catholic philosophy” (D, 143-44). 
40  The ox’s “I am also,” writes Bonnie Kime Scott, “echoes the proclamation of the deity. . . . the ‘also,’ however, 
diverts the narcissistic human, undermines the word of God, and strikes a blow against speciesism as yet another 
form of hierarchical thinking” (“‘The Look in the Throat,” 165-66). 
41  Bataille, Erotism, 84. 
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seeks to return us ultimately to this world, Robin manifests a similar goal of reincorporation. 
Surrounded by the lineaments of Christian ritual, she nonetheless enlists as un-Christian a 
partner as possible, a nonhuman agent, and duly commences to crawl and bark along with him, 
as though in fulfillment of Felix Volkbein’s prediction that “she will make an innocence for 
herself; a fearful sort of primitive innocence. It may be considered ‘depraved’ by our generation, 
but our generation does not know everything” (117).42 It is consonant with Nightwood’s 
governing paradoxy that the primitive is something to work toward, that innocence succeeds 
knowledge, and that these inverted trajectories are worked out in transgressive theological 
terms. “Bend down the tree of knowledge,” O’Connor warns/counsels, “and you’ll unroost a 
strange bird” (138). With her climactic rite, Robin Vote may indeed have unroosted a strange 
and transcendent bird, even if it does bark like a dog: the Phoenix that arises from the ashes of 
her sacrificed humanity. In those ashes, too, lies any semblance of sexuality or spirituality that a 
sexologist or a priest would be likely to understand. Nightwood’s inversions—not, centrally, its 
depictions of inverted genders or desires, but its blasphemous inversions of theology and 
eschatology—subsume and transcend such narrowly secular definitions.  
 
Postscript: Blasphemy and Melancholia 
We should not lose sight, however, of the more conventionally blasphemous aspects of 
Robin’s actions in “The Possessed.” Her choice of communicant, after all, is linguistically on-
the-nose, “god” inverted—and not just any god, but a Christian god in particular, as Robin 
makes clear in her very specific choices of housing (a chapel) and interior-decorating (candles, 
icons, a makeshift altar). Why does her communion with Nora’s dog require such symbolic 
                                                 
42  As Carrie Rohman argues, Robin’s rite in “The Possessed” constitutes a “posthumanist triumph”—although 
Rohman’s universalizing conclusion that this triumph “ultimately revises the category human” seems to me to 
overreach (“Revising the Human,” 81). The category human, I think, remains fairly stable in this final scene: it is the 
skin that Robin sheds.   
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staging? Why, unless Barnes’s conception of blasphemous transgression, for all its looking 
beyond the Christian tradition, still clings to that tradition’s sacraments and to its definitions of 
the sacrosanct? In order fully to transgress, Robin must defile something worthy of defilement; 
accordingly, Barnes graces her character with “Christian proclivities,” has her take Catholic 
vows, sends her into the arms of various churches, and stages Robin’s final renunciation as at 
the same time an affirmation (44). And if this affirmation accords with blasphemy’s inherent 
ambivalence (its tendency both to profane the sacred and, in doing so, to affirm its targets as 
sacred), it also sets Nightwood apart from the unredemptive melancholia that characterizes 
Radclyffe Hall’s The Well of Loneliness and Barnes’s own late work The Antiphon. Melancholia, as 
it happens, bears certain structural affinities with blasphemy; both comprise ambivalent 
mechanisms of incorporation and abuse, identification and aggression. Indeed, to set these 
concepts side by side—the one a mode of expression, the other a mode of psychic coping—is to 
discern a homology that stands to illuminate Nightwood’s particular brand of melancholy.  It is 
also to glean certain final insights into modernism’s broader investments in blasphemy as 
literary discourse. 
I have argued that blasphemous modernism takes two predominant forms, the 
typological and the sacrilegious. The former appropriates; the latter profanes, desecrates. In our 
consideration of the New Negro anthology and the often hostile responses it provoked in the 
literature of writers such as Wallace Thurman, Bruce Nugent, and Langston Hughes, we 
witnessed a dialectical tension between these modes of blasphemous expression. In Joyce, Loy, 
and Barnes, however, we have seen the two modes coexist, informing and determining one 
another. To translate our standard critical terms into more psychoanalytic ones, we find in these 
authors’ simultaneous appropriations and profanations of religion an analogue to the 
simultaneous incorporations and debasements that characterize melancholia. For Freud, 
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melancholia is essentially a “substitution of identification for object-love”: one’s cathexis for a 
lost or forsaken object, rather than being “displaced on to another object,” is instead 
“withdrawn into the ego,” where it “serve[s] to establish an identification of the ego with the 
abandoned object.”43 Once this lost object has become fused with the melancholic subject, the 
subject directs his or her otherwise impermissible feelings of anger and resentment inward. This 
is a suggestive framework, especially if that lost yet incorporated object is God Himself; for 
although God lives on in the pages of many modernist writers, He does so in spite of—and 
inevitably in response to—His supposed death beyond those pages.   
Charles Taylor, who puts little stock in oversimplified versions of the Victorian Doubt 
narrative, concedes that it contains “some truth,” principally in the “agonizing” and “poignant 
sense of loss” felt by those—Darwin included—who felt they had lost their God. More broadly, 
Taylor notes that God’s death is typically attended by “melancholy, ennui (the ‘spleen’ of 
Baudelaire).”44 One can only imagine the kinds of spiritual melancholia suffered by those who 
truly experienced God’s death, in A. N. Wilson’s suggestive words, as “the withdrawal of a 
great Love-object.”45 The modernists both registered this withdrawal and complicated it. With 
redoubled vigor, they continued to seek in scripture and theology the sources of affect, cultural 
prestige, and literary force that only religion was quite capable of providing. They wove the 
Christian mythos and its god into the fabrics of their poems and fictions, and at the same time 
put those materials, often, to transgressive and desecratory ends. Like the unmourned but 
nonetheless lost object of melancholia, God and the sacred were both incorporated and 
desecrated—though at the same time inevitably affirmed, since for these “first-rate 
                                                 
43  Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 249. 
44  Taylor, A Secular Age, 378, 6. 
45  Wilson, God’s Funeral, 13. 
 193 
    
blasphemers” (to borrow the language of Eliot’s After Strange Gods), to blaspheme in the utter 
absence of faith would constitute both a philosophical and a rhetorical self-betrayal. 
Not all blasphemous modernism qualifies as first-rate according to this criterion. 
Consider Wallace Stevens’s The Man with the Blue Guitar, a poem that relentlessly profanes the 
Christian deity (“him whom none believes, // Whom all believe that all believe, / A pagan in a 
varnished car”), even as it deploys that derided god as the model for a new poetic creator-
messiah.46 Equating himself with “Gesu” (180), the poem’s speaker draws on Eucharist and 
Crucifixion imagery (173, 166) and channels the language and poetic power of Genesis to 
portray the glory of literary creation: “From this I shall evolve a man,” “and call it good, / The 
immaculate, the merciful good” (181, 168). Stevens advises, here and elsewhere, that “Poetry // 
Exceeding music must take the place / Of empty heaven and its hymns”—but The Man with the 
Blue Guitar seeks to repopulate heaven less with secular poetry than with the supposedly absent 
but conspicuously present figures of Son and Father (167). Having so casually denied and 
negated Christianity’s authority and relevance, Stevens nonetheless draws on Christian 
tradition and trope to give authority and relevance to his poem.  
The Man with the Blue Guitar both disavows and incorporates the abandoned deity, 
performing the existence of a god it simultaneously denies. To adapt Judith Butler’s 
theorizations of melancholia in another context, one might say that this performance 
“allegorizes a loss it cannot grieve, allegorizes the incorporative fantasy of melancholia whereby 
an object”—in this case, the Christian God—“is phantasmatically taken in or on as a way of 
refusing to let go.” If The Blue Guitar seems to evince “both the refusal of grief and the 
incorporation of loss, a miming of the death it cannot mourn,” that may be because Stevens 
                                                 
46  Stevens, The Collected Poems, 170. 
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himself was unwilling to let go of faith altogether.47 That poetry must enact the faith displaced 
from Christianity’s recently emptied heavens is, after all, one of the predominant motifs of both 
his poetic and his critical output, from “Sunday Morning” (1923) to The Necessary Angel (1951). 
For all its swipes at established religion, The Blue Guitar finally has less to do with blasphemy 
than with secularization: “a form of repression,” as Giorgio Agamben has written, that “leaves 
intact the forces it deals with simply by moving them from one place to another.”48 
 A work such as Nightwood is melancholic in a very different way, narrating the loss and 
rejection, not of God or the sacred—whose abiding presence, power, and significance Barnes 
underscores quite emphatically throughout—but of God’s children. If there is an absence at the 
center of this text, a locus of lostness, it is not God but Robin Vote—a kind of vortex who draws 
into her orbit, and inevitably expels, a panoply of equally lost souls. Far from keening or 
trumpeting the deity’s death and rejection yet again, Nightwood’s troupe of “permanent 
mistake[s]”—the souls whom “God forgot”—inscribe their own forsakenness (132, 73, 143). 
Felix, Guido, Nora, Matthew: “all cry out in tiny voices to the great booming God,” their muted 
prayers proving woefully insufficient cries for recognition from the figure whose booming voice 
resounds throughout this densely scriptural novel (136). In Nightwood, God lives, is in some 
ways realer—at any rate, louder—than the “God-forsaken” (144). They, not He, are lost. Thus it 
is a part of Nightwood’s particular dogma that God is not accessible to melancholic incorporation 
or identification. This prohibition even demarcates one of the areas onto which Jenny 
Petherbridge, ”the squatter,” trespasses—prone as she is to such godlike ejaculations as “my 
love is sacred and my love is great!” (75). Robin, who hardly ever speaks, makes an exception in 
order to chastise Jenny her for this characteristically histrionic outburst: “It’s such an awful 
                                                 
47  Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 145-46, 142. 
48  Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation,” 77. 
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weakness with you. Identifying yourself with God!” (76). Not coincidentally, Jenny is the 
novel’s least redeemable character; her blasphemies succumb to an embarrassingly self-
aggrandizing melancholia of the sort that Nightwood cannot endorse. Exclaiming Christlike 
apothegms and lazily identifying herself with God will get Jenny nowhere in Nightwood’s 
rigorous economy of transcendent degradation.   
Jenny, in other words, belongs to a wholly different breed than that of Matthew 
O’Connor and Robin Vote, who respect God enough to mount their battles on His home turf, 
and with the appropriate sacramental staging. So it is that Robin’s highly unorthodox means of 
transcendence nonetheless partakes of quite conventional notions of Christian blasphemy. 
Unlike the Pope “who forgoes his angels that he may recapture the beast,” Robin communes 
with a beast while refusing to forego her angels—or her altars, or her icons and candles, or the 
very structures of Christian theology and ritual (2). Nightwood thus affirms a route to the sacred 
that passes inevitably through the church—or at least a church—even if that route is hardly a 
familiar one. It combines makeshift Catholic iconography with the decaying interior of a 
Protestant chapel, and it requires the forsaken to forsake her own humanity—to bare her teeth, 
to “go down,” to whimper and bark in a fit of obscene and touching abjection, to taunt the abyss 
in a rite that leads, through profanation, to sacred regions below and beyond the human. When 
consigned to society’s underworld, Nightwood finally suggests, one must keep digging, must 
transgress farther and deeper in pursuit of salvation. One must go down until it becomes 
possible to let oneself go, in accordance with O’Connor’s prophetic advice: “Let go Hell; and 
your fall will be broken by the roof of Heaven” (124).  
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CONCLUSION 
   
Modernism takes many shapes, assumes many temporalities. It did not disappear with 
the onset of World War II, any more than God died when Darwin published his Origin of 
Species—or any more, for that matter, than blasphemy died when T. S. Eliot wrote its epitaph in 
1934. Blasphemy, too, assumes various forms, and although it holds a remarkably central place 
in Christian scripture and theology, it hardly belongs to Christianity alone. There are many 
directions, in other words, in which a critical study called Blasphemous Modernism might go. I 
have sought, here, to demonstrate blasphemy’s importance to literature of the period in which 
Anglophone modernism flourished—a period still very much associated with the “men of 
1914,” but also with the New Negro Renaissance, with “Sapphic modernism,” and with the 
often startlingly avant-garde efforts of writers and artists like Mina Loy and Richard Bruce 
Nugent. Despite their differences, these authors’ blasphemies all depend primarily on the 
Christian contexts, Catholic and Protestant, which accounted so pervasively for religious 
experience and literary precedent in their time and place. Although many modernists expressed 
interest in other religions and spiritual systems, Christianity represents the living tradition that 
most pressingly demanded their artistic attentions and negotiations. Small point, as G. K. 
Chesterton observed, in blaspheming Thor, the god of a bygone culture.1 Or as Salman Rushdie 
wrote, many years later, in the novel that earned him the blasphemer’s highest sentence: 
“Where there is no belief, there is no blasphemy.”2  
The reception of Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, the most famous work of blasphemous 
postmodernism, provides a forceful example of literary profanation in a non-Christian context, 
while also illustrating blasphemy’s abiding relevance to the world we inhabit—a world whose 
                                                 
1  Chesterton, Heretics, 20. 
2  Rushdie, The Satanic Verses, 393.  
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geopolitics continue to pivot around deep-seated conflicts between divergent religious and 
secular cultures, and in which blasphemy continues to hold pride of place at the nexus of 
literature, politics, and theology. Surveying that novel’s legacy, two decades after the fatwā, a 
journalist for The Guardian writes that “from the start, the Satanic Verses affair was less a 
theological dispute than an opportunity to exert political leverage.”3 Such a statement raises 
obvious questions. When is a theological dispute not an opportunity to exert political leverage? 
Since when is there any coherent means of distinguishing theological polemics from their 
political implications and ramifications? Political contests are not always theological contests, 
that is, but theological disputes are invariably political. They could hardly be otherwise.  
Rushdie’s own critiques of Islam in The Satanic Verses are, of course, also political ones. 
The novel’s theological satire encompasses the worldly and often terroristic enforcement of 
Islamist theocracy, including its silencing of counterhistories, its treatment of women, and, of 
course, its intolerance of heterodox belief and blasphemous expression: this last a critique more 
than ably borne out by the violent reactions the book inspired in many Muslim quarters. Like 
Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita before it—Rushdie has cited that novel as one of 
the Verses’ “greatest models”—The Satanic Verses frames its literally dangerous political 
critiques in theological terms, mingling its blasphemies and its treasons in ways that would not 
be unfamiliar to James Joyce or Langston Hughes.4  
Rushdie’s death sentence has not, thankfully, been carried out, but assassination 
attempts have been made on four of The Satanic Verses’ translators (into Japanese, Italian, 
Norwegian, and Turkish). One of these proved successful; another resulted in serious injuries. 
                                                 
3  Andrew Anthony, “How One Book Ignited a Culture War.” 
4  Rushdie, “In Good Faith,” 56. Bulgakov’s novel was blasphemous in its fast-and-loose appropriations and 
rewritings of the Gospels, and at the same time “treasonous,” unpublishably so, in its satire of the Soviet Union’s 
suppressions of religious faith. Written between 1928 and 1940, it was not published until the late 1960s, long after 
Bulgakov’s death—and even then in censored form.   
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Along with such highly publicized events as the 2004 killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh and the uproar, the following year, over Danish cartoons depicting the prophet 
Muhammad, the shadow that continues to hang over Salman Rushdie suggests that the story of 
blasphemy in the twenty-first century will be a predominantly Islamic one. Problems arise, 
however, when observers too readily take blasphemy as a measure of temporal asymmetry 
between an enlightened multicultural West and its Muslim other. “The presumed archaism of 
blasphemy,” as Gauri Viswanathan observes, is often “invoked to separate cultures of 
modernity from those of premodernity, as if to suggest that blasphemy is operative today only 
in the Third World.”5 It is not, of course, and neither is its criminalization, as suggested—and, 
ironically, ensured—by its recent prohibition in the land that produced the eminently 
blasphemous James Joyce.  
Effective January 1, 2010—less than fifty years after Ireland belatedly allowed Ulysses to 
be sold inside its borders—the law activates a previously dormant provision of the Irish 
Constitution and holds liable, to the tune of up to €25,000, anyone who “utters matter that is 
grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby causing 
outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that religion,” or who even “intends . . . 
to cause such outrage.”6 Proposed as a measure to promote multiculturalism and prevent 
sectarian intolerance, Ireland’s new law has met with staunch opposition from advocacy groups 
who see it as a reactionary muzzling of free speech.7 Admittedly, this legislation—like the 
United Kingdom’s Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006—has been enacted for very different 
                                                 
5  Viswanathan, Outside the Fold, 240. 
6  “Defamation Act 2009.” This act is worth comparing to Britain’s Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006; for a 
thorough survey of blasphemy as a legal and cultural problem in European nations in the twenty-first century, see 
David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World, 14-41. 
7  Loudest among these dissenting groups has been Atheist Ireland, which has mounted a campaign—thus far 
unsuccessful—to repeal the law. The group’s rationale can be found at the website atheism.ie. See Henry 
McDonald, “Irish Atheists,” for more on the controversy. 
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purposes than those served by older blasphemy laws in Europe and the United States. Today’s 
variety aims less at protecting Christianity and Christendom from the profaning tongues of 
heretics, public drunks, and mischievous artists than at trying to patrol precisely the kinds of 
violent confrontations between Christian, secular, and Islamic demographics that works such as 
The Satanic Verses helped to foment.  
It is not my aim here to survey blasphemy’s fascinating legislative and judicial history—
other scholars have covered that territory—but two instances bear noting, one in the United 
States and the other in England.8 The first occurred in 1971, when two Pennsylvania 
shopkeepers were formally charged with the crime of blasphemy for hanging in their store 
windows a “Wanted” poster depicting a hippie Christ alongside the following text: “Wanted for 
sedition, criminal anarchy, vagrancy and conspiracy to overthrow the established government. 
Dresses poorly; said to be a carpenter by trade; ill-nourished; associates with common working 
people, unemployed, and bums. Alien; said to be a Jew.”9 The charge was eventually dropped, 
under pressure from the ACLU, but the incident records the satisfying irony that whoever filed 
these charges manifested in doing so the very hypocrisy the poster quite reasonably lampoons. 
The incident also reminds us of the radical core that many theologians, biblical scholars, and 
leftist social critics alike find in the Christian scriptures; and it further underscores the neglect of 
that radicalism by many Christians—such as those who pressed these charges—as well as by 
the so-called New Atheists who can find nothing in Christianity worth preserving or 
resuscitating. 
Jesus of Nazareth, after all, provides a remarkable example of blasphemy’s equally 
theological and political import. Consider how politically revolutionary many of Christ’s 
                                                 
8  For more on blasphemy’s legal history, see Leonard W. Levy, Blasphemy; Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World; 
and Joss Marsh, Word Crimes. 
9  Quoted in Levy, Blasphemy, 530. 
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proposals, as recounted in the gospels, would sound today in the ears of countless secularists 
and believers alike, and reflect that the crime with which Jesus was charged—as each of the 
gospels insists—was blasphemy. As the biblical scholar John Dominic Crossan argues, the 
threat Jesus posed or seemed to pose to Roman and to Jewish authority was equal parts political 
and religious, which is to say equally treasonous and blasphemous. The New Testament’s 
essential conflict, Crossan writes, arises “between Pilate’s Kingdom of Rome as violent 
repression and Jesus’s Kingdom of God as nonviolent resistance.”10 For many biblical scholars, 
and for avowed radicals like Slavoj Žižek and Terry Eagleton, the essential lesson of the New 
Testament is, in Eagleton’s words, “that the ultimate signifier of the human condition is the 
tortured and murdered body of a political criminal.”11 If the variously blasphemous modernists 
we have considered here pursued radical agendas of their own, they did so in part by drawing 
on the transformative and subversive resources of Christianity’s texts, traditions, rituals, and 
sacraments. This is not to say that these writers were all budding Eagletonians, but that their 
blasphemies may have been truer to the insurrectionary spirit of early Christianity and of Jesus 
himself—whose blasphemy killed him and founded a faith in his name—than were many of 
their contemporary Christian institutions. 
This insurrectionary spirit is what those Pennsylvania shopkeepers so “blasphemously” 
attempted to publicize, and it likewise animates our second example: the infamous Gay News 
case of 1977, in which the English poet James Kirkup was convicted of blasphemy along with 
the newspaper that had published his poem “The Love That Dares to Speak Its Name.”  Like 
the shopkeepers’ poster, this offense involved Jesus in image and text; illustrated by a large 
picture of the Nazarene “in full frontal nudity and, in the phrase of the poem, ‘well hung’”—a 
                                                 
10  Crossan, God and Empire, 5.  
11  Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 37. Even as conservative a Christian as G. K. Chesterton remarked with awe 
the subversive and “terribly revolutionary” political implications of Christianity; that its God is “a rebel as well as 
a king” constitutes, in his view, “a boast for all insurgents for ever” (Orthodoxy, 145). 
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characteristically unsubtle pun—Kirkup’s poem equates salvation with homosexuality, 
promiscuity, and necrophilia.12 It concerns a Roman centurion who, having lifted Jesus down 
from the cross, narrates a final round of eroto-religious ecstasy: 
For the last time 
I laid my lips around the tip 
of that great cock, the instrument 
of our salvation, our eternal joy.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
                            My spear, wet with blood, 
his dear, broken body all open wounds, 
and in each wound his side, his back, 
his mouth – I came and came and came 
as if each coming was my last. 
And then the miracle possessed us. 
I felt him enter into me, and fiercely spend 
his spirit's final seed within my hole, my soul, 
pulse upon pulse, unto the ends of the earth—  
he crucified me with him into kingdom come.13 
This poem bears out David Lawton’s observation that blasphemy’s inversions and other 
revisions of the sacred are often “painfully literal.”14 When invited, Jesus “comes into” the 
centurion’s hole/soul, and he promiscuously shares his love with “all men,” from Pontius Pilate 
to John the Baptist and all of the Apostles (“he’d had it off with other men. . . . He loved all men, 
body, soul and spirit”). Here, though, it is the saved, not the Savior, who has the second coming 
(Jesus came first, in “death’s final ejaculation”), and it is likewise the saved, not the Savior, who 
undergoes a crucifixion in the last line quoted—his reward being “kingdom come,” a salvation 
rather more orgasmic than the one Christianity typically describes.   
 In its bad puns and insistent prurience, Kirkup’s poem nears the unintended comedy of 
D. H. Lawrence’s 1929 novella The Escaped Cock, in which Jesus Christ’s Resurrection is 
                                                 
12  Levy, Blasphemy, 536. 
13  The full poem, still banned from publication in Great Britain, is available on various web sites, including 
http://www.annoy.com/history/doc.html?DocumentID=100045. 
14  Lawton, Blasphemy, 31. 
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supplanted by, I suppose, the Erection: “He crouched to her, and he felt the blaze of his 
manhood and his power rise up in his loins, magnificent. ‘I am risen!’”15 More to the point, 
Kirkup’s poem and its successful prosecution—along with the fact that this prosecution made 
England’s blasphemy law “even more reactionary”—underscore the abiding shock-value of 
bringing God and the erotic body too close for comfort.16 It also reminds us that with each 
ensuing generation, blasphemy finds not only new dangers but also new necessities and new 
efficacies in matters political, racial, gendered, and sexual. In the 1920s and ’30s, blasphemy 
served as a means for black, queer, and women writers to assert such essentially modernist 
subjectivities as those implied by the terms “new woman” and “new Negro.”  By the 1970s, 
when many of these earlier blasphemies might have been more easily tolerated—if not, by any 
means, quite condoned—homoerotic blasphemy appears to have remained dangerously beyond 
the pale. As the presiding judge recalled in his memoirs, “One didn’t have to be a Christian to 
be revolted by it,” but Leonard Levy’s gloss is apt: “Presumably one had to be heterosexual.”17 
Today, it seems highly doubtful that anyone in either Britain or the United States could 
successfully press charges for this particular crime.  
Such is progress. And while more recent events such as the Satanic Verses affair and the 
killing of Theo van Gogh demonstrate the continued and even mortal danger of blasphemous 
expression in art and literature, they also—like the Gay News trial—underscore blasphemy’s 
historical and cultural specificity, the way such expression matters most when framed in terms 
most relevant to the blasphemer’s time and place. In another time or another place, that is, van 
Gogh’s film would not have cost him his life, and The Satanic Verses would have been best 
known for its considerable virtuosity as a work of fiction. Yet blasphemy’s relevance also 
                                                 
15  Lawrence, The Escaped Cock, 57.  
16  Levy, Blasphemy, 543. 
17  Ibid., 540. 
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outlives its immediate temporal and cultural contexts. One will not rock many boats, today, by 
speaking impiously of the ancient Greek gods—but the shape of Western philosophy would 
look rather different if Socrates had not done so, and had not paid for that transgression with 
his life. Christianity, too, would be a very different thing without its founding narrative of a 
Christ who suffered the same punishment for his blasphemy. And modernism, minus 
blasphemy: what would that look like? 
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